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Nicholas Engel
Reasons fundamentalists assert that normative reality is constituted by exemplifications
of the normative reasons relation: an irreducible, sui generis relation that strongly super-
venes on non-normative reality. In this dissertation, I argue that reasons fundamentalists
cannot explain why exemplifications of the normative reasons relation strongly supervene
on non-normative reality. Irreduciblists about normativity can avoid this problem by as-
serting, contra the reasons fundamentalist, that normative reality is constituted by exempli-
fications of thick properties, which provide material for a conceptual analysis of normative
reasons. The theory that results analyzes normative reasons for action as answers to ques-
tions why an action promotes a thick property.
Nearly every normative theorist affirms what I call
Additive Normative Supervenience (ANS): Normatively discernible worlds
must be non-normatively discernible.
ANS asserts that, if Edward Snowden is morally good, then Snowden’s counterparts in
worlds that are indiscernible in all non-normative respects must be good. Reasons funda-
mentalists struggle to explain why ANS is true. I consider and reject potential explanations
of ANS that appeal to conceptual entailment and a posteriori necessity. Rosen has recently
offered an argument against ANS. Rejecting ANS, however, problematizes irreduciblist
accounts of normative explanation and normative epistemology.
Irreduciblists can avoid this dilemma by arguing that ANS is either incoherent or false
and adopting an alternative formulation of normative supervenience. Bilgrami’s arguments
against the intelligibility of normative supervenience doctrines purport to show that ANS is
in fact unintelligible, and Merricks’ arguments against the supervenience of consciousness
on microphysical properties can be extended to show that ANS is false. Neither argument,
however, establishes the falsity or unintelligibility of a modified for- mulation of normative
supervenience,
Transformative Normative Supervenience (TNS): Normatively discernible
worlds must be descriptively discernible,
where descriptive discernibility is just discernibility with respect to non-normative prop-
erties or thick normative properties. Irreduciblists can explain the truth of TNS by adopting
non-centralism about normative reasons–that is to say, by maintaining, contra the reasons
fundamentalist, that normative reality is constituted most fundamentally by exemplifica-
tions of thick properties. This allows the irreduciblist to provide an account of normative
explanation and normative epistemology, analyze normative reasons in terms of thick prop-
erties, and preserve buck-passing accounts of thin normative properties.
Scanlon has argued that the reasons relation is a four-place relation, relating the facts
that are reasons for an agent to perform an action in a given circumstance. I argue that facts
are also reasons for an action with respect to a thick property that that action will promote,
in contrast to sets of distinct actions that the agent could perform instead. The resulting six-
place relation turns out to be an instance of the relation that holds between why-questions
and answers. What it is to be a normative reason for an agent to do something is to be a
correct answer to a question why that agent’s doing that action will promote a thick property.
Decades ago, Anscombe had also suggested that reasons were answers to why-questions
of a certain kind. The attractiveness of this position has been relatively underappreciated
in the philosophy of normative reasons, in part because Anscombe had offered the reasons-
as-answers thesis as a thesis about motivating reasons rather than normative reasons. The
reasons-as-answers thesis also provides resources for those irreduciblists about reasons who
reject my non-centralist conclusions to avoid the wrong kind of reason problem for buck-
passing accounts of normativity: they can distinguish between right and wrong kinds of
reasons by distinguishing between answers to distinct kinds of why-questions.
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The many thoughts we have about the world (broadly construed) fall into two categories.1
A first category of thoughts concern the way the world is, what its components are, and
how all these components are structured. These are thoughts about the world’s descriptive
features. A second category of thoughts concern the way the world ought to be and how
these oughts are structured. These are thoughts about the world’s normative features.
The normative aspect of our thoughts about the world is a rich and complicated land-
scape. We have deontological notions like those of oughts, norms, rules, rights, and duties.
We have thinner evaluative notions like those of goodness, value, and pleasure and pain. We
have thicker evaluative notions like “courage” (Aristotle, NE II.2) and “lewdness” (Black-
burn and Gibbard 1992). Some concepts are concepts of properties that a thing can have
more or less of (goodness is an example), and some, like our notion of rights, are of prop-
erties that we have discretely. We have judgment-sensitive attitudes like belief and admi-
ration, and other mental states and emotions that are, as Gibbard likes to say, tinged with a
normative character.
1There are, of course, many other ways to categorize our thoughts than the categorization I am proposing
here.
1
We also have predicative, attributive, and functional notions of goodness. Geach distin-
guishes between predicative adjectives and attributive uses of adjectives (Geach 1956). A
adjective, used predicatively, is like the adjective “red” in the following statement: “That
is a red barn”. To say that “red”, in this statement, is being used predicatively, for Geach,
is to say that the statement “That is a red barn” is semantically equivalent to the statement
“That is red and that is a barn”. An adjective, used attributively, is like the adjective “big”
in the following statement: “That is a big mouse”. To say that “big”, in this statement, is
being used attributively, for Geach, is to say that the statement “That is a big mouse” is not
semantically equivalent to the statement “That is big and that is a mouse”. “Big”, in this
example, is indeed being used attributively, since it’s a mistake to infer from the fact that an
object is a big mouse that that object is big simpliciter. “Good” is characteristically being
used functionally when it appears in phrases of the form “good for X”. When we say that
nitrates are good for plants, we mean that nitrates bear some positive causal or constitutive
relation to the functioning of plants.2
Some of these normative notions, like the distinctions among kinds of goodness, are
more obscure: notions that only a philosopher would love. Others, like duties and pain, are
familiar to us from everyday life. The normative notion that most of us would find most
familiar is one not yet mentioned: the notion of a practical normative reason (hereafter:
reason).
It’s 7:05 a.m.—time for John to leave for work. He looks outside. It’s raining. He takes
an umbrella before stepping out.
2There is some debate over whether functional uses of “good” are normative—or, as Korsgaard prefers,
“normatively loaded” (Korsgaard 1996, p. 42).
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Isabella turns on HBO for the next Game of Thrones episode. Her phone starts ringing.
It’s Kaila. She’s saying that she was just laid off. Isabella sets aside her plans for the evening
to listen.
Priam looks out past the ramparts of Troy. The Greeks, it seems, are stirring and about
to advance. He starts shouting orders to his generals.
“It’s raining outside”, “My friend lost her job”, “They’re about to invade”—all of these
are reasons. This dissertation is about them. It’s about what they are, how our thoughts
about them feature in our practical deliberation and activity, how they fit into a larger philo-
sophical picture of our world, and whether it makes sense for us to care about them.
There’s a sense in which this kind of dissertation topic is curious. Dissertations are
supposed to advance the current state of knowledge of some academically respectable topic.
Reasons, however, are already deeply familiar to us. How does one go about expanding the
current state of knowledge—at dissertation length—about something that is already deeply
familiar? What more is there to know?
Like most philosophers, my answer is that we can expand our knowledge of deeply
familiar things, such as our beliefs about reasons, by articulating them—or, to use Robert
Brandom’s colorful phrase, by making these beliefs explicit (Brandom 1998). The articu-
lation of the familiar has always been a particular task of philosophers, and it’s a valuable
one, both personally and theoretically. Personally, articulating our pre-reflective beliefs
is part of fulfilling the Delphic imperative to know ourselves—an important task since, as
Xenophon remarks,
Through self-knowledge men come to much good, and through self-deception
to much harm. For those who know themselves, know what things are expedi-
3
ent for themselves and discern their own powers and limitations. And by doing
what they understand, they get what they want and prosper... (Xenophon 2015,
Mem. 4.2.26)
Theoretically, the project of articulating deeply familiar ideas and beliefs is an essential
component of the task of determiningwhether our ideas and beliefs are rationally defensible,
and therefore possibly true. While our philosophically pre-reflective beliefs have many
virtues—we can use these beliefs to get around in the world, to make predictions, to talk
to each other in everyday contexts, and so forth—they also have many vices. Our pre-
reflective beliefs tend to exemplify a logical problem: they’re frequently inconsistent with
each other, which means that some of themmust be false.3 Take my students as an example.
If they are moral nihilists, as they frequently say they are (even after I explain to them what
the view is), they think that no actions are morally wrong. If they think that engaging in
domestic violence is morally wrong,4 as they always say they do, they must think that there
are some actions that are morally wrong. The conjunction of both claims generates a logical
contradiction. Something in our pre-reflective beliefs has to go.
Second—and for our purposes, most importantly—our philosophically pre-reflective
beliefs can be false for substantive philosophical reasons. Our thoughts about reasons,
again, provide what many philosophers would take to be a plausible case in point. Reasons
do seem philosophically unusual. They’re not ordinary concrete objects. If they’re among
the furniture of the world, they’re a queer furniture indeed. Reasons are not a substance
or a material. Objects are not composed of reasons. You can’t touch or taste a reason—
3See (Sverdlik 1985) for a particularly good discussion of inconsistencies between everyday moral be-
liefs.
4And that some actions are in fact instances of domestic violence.
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or at least, you can’t touch or taste the reason’s being a reason as, say, we can see an
object’s being colored.5 Unlike numbers, reasons don’t appear in the sorts of models that
one constructs in empirical disciplines like economics, physics, and climate science. So if,
as many of us say, the best way to know the world is to defer to our best scientific theories,
numbers, philosophically opaque though they are, seem to stand on firmer footing. In the
class of things that philosophers take a special interest in, reasons present problems of their
own.
1.2 Introducing metaethics
Our prereflective beliefs about reasons fall within the domain of practical philosophy, which
we also call ethics. Joseph Raz notes that
Practical philosophy includes both a substantive or “evaluative” part and a for-
mal part concerned with conceptual analysis. Substantive practical philosophy
includes all the arguments designed to show which values we should pursue,
what reasons for action should guide our behavior, which norms are binding,
etc. The conceptual analysis concerns the logical features of concepts like
value, reason for action or norm and the nature of rules of inference governing
practical reasoning. (Raz 1975, p. 10).
The distinction Raz is drawing in this passage is a foundational distinction in ethics. When
we are asking questions like “should we pull the switch in a trolley case?” (Foot 1967) or
“should I engage in commercial surrogacy?” (Anderson 1990), we are asking substantive
ethical questions. In answering these questions, we’re likely to list some of the reasons
for pulling the switch (or not) and engaging in commercial surrogacy (or not): “a train
5Even the moral perception literature seems to lean in this direction with its emphasis on the perception
of value properties rather than the property of being a reason. See, e.g., (Cullison 2010).
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is hurtling toward five hapless victims”, “there’s someone on the other track”, and so on.
Substantive ethical questions therefore raise questions about what the reasons are. This
“what are the reasons?” question is a question about how to construct a special list, one that
includes all the reasons and leaves out all the non-reasons. More specifically, they ask the
question that this chicken is asking in a motivational poster that the school administration
has decided to display at a local middle school:
This chicken’s question is not the primary topic of this dissertation. The dissertation
concerns, rather, questions in the “conceptual analysis” part of practical philosophy that
Raz identifies. While questions about what the reasons are falls under substantive practical
philosophy, my dissertation concerns the conceptual question of what reasons are. When
we ask what reasons are, we are not asking for an inventory of the reasons that are out
there. We are asking questions about their nature or essence, about what makes something
a reason rather than something else.
This general type of distinction exemplified by the distinction between what the reasons
are and what reasons are is common in philosophy. Take metaphysics, for instance. One
branch of metaphysics, which we call ontology, concerns itself with Quine’s question “what
is there” (Quine 1948) and wonders such things as, “are there tables?” and “are there
6
uncountable infinities?” Another branch of metaphysics, whose subject matter Aristotle
isolates in MetaphysicsE, studies what it is to be, that is, the nature of being itself, or being
as being.6 Similarly, we can distinguish between questions like what counts as money and
what is it to be money (Engel 2015), what the virtues are and what it is to be a virtue, and
so on.
More closely related to my own concerns in this dissertation is another token distinction
of this type thatMoore drew over a hundred years ago in hisPrincipia Ethica (Moore 1993).
Moore had written the first part of the book out of a concern that ethicists, whose business
it is to “give reasons for thinking that our statements about... the morality of actions are
true or false” (ibid., p. 53), had hitherto ignored another kind of question that had equal
claim to falling under the domain of ethics: “what is it that is thus common and peculiar”
(ibid., p. 53) to these judgments about the truth and falsity of moral claims? That which
is common to these claims, Moore thought, was that they were claims about objects and
actions as having a certain property: the property of being good. When we ask what it
is that is common and peculiar to our moral judgments, we are therefore asking questions
into the nature of goodness. Other ethicists, Moore thought, had been doing ethics without
sufficient awareness of what it is that they were doing.
Moore’s particular conclusion about the nature of the goodness property was that it was
both sui generis and simple.
The goodness property was “sui generis”, for Moore, in that it was neither a “natu-
ral” property nor a “metaphysical” property. Natural properties, for Moore, were those,
roughly, that we are used to observing around us—yellowness, roundness and so forth—
6 (Varzi 2011) draws a similar distinction.
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while “metaphysical” properties, in Moore’s idiosyncratic lexicon, were properties of spir-
itual things, things that we are not used to observing around us. Goodness, in being neither
a natural nor a “metaphysical” property, occupied a category all of its own, hence its sui
generis nature.
By its being “simple”, Moore meant that goodness was not a complex property. Some
properties, like my property of being between 5’11” and 6’0”, are complex: they’re instan-
tiated just when their conjuncts are.7 I instantiate the property of being between 5’11” and
6’0” just if I instantiate the property of being taller than 5’11”, and I instantiate the property
of being shorter than 6’0”. Goodness, Moore thought, was a simple property, which is to
say that conjunction was not among its instantiation conditions.
That goodness was a property unlike any other kind of property, that goodness was
not conjunctively complex—these are negatively defined features of goodness. When it
comes to positive claims about the nature of goodness, Moore was much more reticent,
and, indeed, outright hostile. Moore derides ethicists who attempt to give positive claims
about the nature of goodness, accusing them of committing the “naturalistic fallacy”: the
mistake of trying to characterize goodness, a sui generis property, in naturalistic terms.
Moore, I remarked, was moved to ask questions about the nature of goodness out of
a concern that ethicists, in focusing exclusively on questions about the truth and falsity
of claims about what is good and what is not, were not sufficiently aware of what they
were doing when they answered these questions. Given the absence of positive claims
about the nature of goodness in Moore’s account, one might, I think, reasonably wonder
7Properties can be complex without being conjunctive. Disjunctive properties are a case in point. Moore,
however, seems to have in mind only conjunctive properties when he discusses complex properties.
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whether ethicists, having accepted Moore’s purely negative conclusions of the nature of
goodness, were in any better position to understand what they were doing when they did
ethics. Despite any reservations about the truth or utility of Moore’s own conclusions about
the nature of goodness, however, the original distinction that motivated his investigation—
the distinction between what the moral truths are and what moral truth consists in—is the
most important distinction in all of metaethics. The importance is both historical and disci-
plinary. Disciplinarily, the question of what moral truth consists in is of first importance, as
it delineates the terrain that metaethics studies. Historically, as Baldwin notes, “twentieth
century British ethical theory is unintelligible without reference toPrincipia Ethica” (Bald-
win 1990, p. 66). Nearly all theories of the metaphysics, semantics, and epistemology of
normative properties in the early twentieth century can be understood as either extensions
of Moore’s theory of normativity or as positions that defined themselves against one or
more aspects of Moore’s theory of normativity.
In the many decades sinceMoore’s contributions to ethics, questions about the nature of
goodness and other normative properties have generated not only a library of written work
but an entire field of philosophy, one which can be characterized as the field of philosophy
that takes as its domain of study the philosophical presuppositions and commitments of our
normative thought, talk, and activity.8 This area has come to be called “metaethics”.
An odd name, to be sure, and I think a misleading one, for two reasons. The term
“metaethics” conjures up images of a higher-order ethical discipline that takes a lower-
order discipline as its subject matter. But metaethics is not an ethics of ethics. It doesn’t
8This definition is adapted from that given at (Sayre-McCord 2007).
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ask, for instance, how one ought to behave at ethics conferences.9
Nor, plausibly, is it higher-order in some other sense. Timothy Williamson recently
wrote a book in metaphilosophy. He chose to title the book not Metaphilosophy, but The
Philosophy of Philosophy. The reason was, as Williamson says, that “the philosophy of
philosophy is automatically part of philosophy just as the philosophy of anything else is,
whereas metaphilosophy sounds as though it might try to look down on philosophy from
above, or beyond” (Williamson 2008, p. ix). This “outside perspective” view of metaphi-
losophy is a mistake, Williamson thinks, since metaphilosophy has just as much a claim to
being philosophy as all the more standard philosophical specializations. Metaphilosophy
is not at a distance from philosophy but rather continuous with it.
Metaethics, too, is more continuous with ethics than the term “metaethics” connotes.
Many metaethical questions seem to get their grip not after one steps back to occupy a
vantage point from which one can overlook the whole of ethics, but from within the first-
order study of ethics itself. Just one example of this is Aristotle who, after asking in Book
II of the Nicomachean Ethics whether a virtuous character is something we can take steps
to cultivate, moves on in Book III to explore the nature of voluntary action. And just as
ethical questions can engender metaethical ones, metaethical study can exercise (or at least
ought to exercise) a substantial impact on one’s substantive normative ethical views. If it’s
true, as Joshua Green argues, that deontological judgments flow from psychological events
such as feelings of disgust that we would rationally judge not to reliably track ethical truth
(Greene 2007), then this ought to weaken our commitments to deontological ethical views.
9This would be a laudable candidate question for philosophical study, but it’s one that tends to be discussed
at the Leiter Report and Daily Nous moreso than in Ethics and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
where the magic of metaethics tends to happen.
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I’m not sure when the term “metaethics” began to exercise traction over the discipline,
although it does start to appear in print in the early 1950s in (Mothersill 1952) and (Wick
1953). It seems tome that a term like “philosophy of practical normativity”, when compared
to that of “metaethics”, would better serve the role of describing the domain of inquiry that it
denotes. But “metaethics” does have two virtues that “philosophy of practical normativity”
lacks. First, it is familiar to readers; secondly, it is catchy and short. So in this dissertation,
I’ll set my concerns aside and adopt a terminology that is more amenable to the discipline’s
discursive conventions.
1.3 Introducing reasons fundamentalism
Systematizing normative reality
Some philosophers find great delight in the huge proliferation of normative thoughts and
concepts. One example is BernardWilliams, who eloquently and quite reasonably remarks,
in the introduction to his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, that “we need as many con-
cepts to describe the ethical life as we find we need, and no fewer” (Williams 1985, p. 17).
Other philosophers, not sharing Williams’ moderate philosophical anarchism, prefer to at-
tempt to provide a systematic theory of the panoply of normative concepts. A common
strategy is to isolate a small number of particular normative concepts and then offer pur-
ported characterizations of large portions of the other normative concepts in terms of these
select few. This is the strategy of, for example, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, which
takes norm-acceptance as the central normative concept; Mark Schroeder’s Humean theory,
11
which takes the notion of a desire as central; and T.M. Scanlon’s reasons fundamentalism,
which places the notion of a reason at the theoretical center. This dissertation focuses on
the reasons fundamentalist approach to systematizing normative reality.
Although Scanlon coined the term “reasons fundamentalism” in his (Scanlon 2014), and
Scanlon’s view is the one that I’ll be appealing to the most in this exposition, the reasons
fundamentalist view had been elucidated and defended in print by Joseph Raz almost 30
years before. Raz’s contention, quite controversial at the time, was that, of all the concepts
implicated by our understanding of action and normativity, the concept of “a reason for
action is the most fundamental” (Raz 1975, pp. 11-12).
Perhaps unsurprisingly given his background in legal theory, Raz was most concerned
in his Practical Reason and Norms to give a theory of the normativity of rules in terms of
reasons for action. As he states in his introduction, “The key concept for the explanation of
norms is that of reasons for action. To mymind the main difficulty in explaining rules [rules
and norms are used interchangeably] is to understand their relations to reasons for action”
(ibid., p. 9). However, by 1999, Raz had adopted a stronger thesis: that “The normativity
of all that is normative consists in the way that it is, or provides, or is otherwise related to
reasons” (Raz 1999, p. 66). This bold, pithy statement encapsulates a thesis that is at the
heart of the contemporary reasons fundamentalist research program.10
10And, more generally, at the heart of what Wedgwood calls the “reasons-first research program” (Wedg-
wood 2015). There is currently a similar attempt at systematization playing out in metaphysics. One of the
central concepts in contemporary metaphysicsis the concept of grounding. A set of propositions Q1, ..., Qn
grounds P just if its being the case that P consists in nothing more than its being the case that Q1, ..., Qn
(Fine 2001, p. 15). Grounding is of particular interest in part because there is reason to believe that the no-
tion of grounding is fundamental to our understanding of the nature of reality. Some philosophers harbor a
hope that this concept will eventually be shown to elucidate other central concepts in philosophy: realism,
truthmaking, essence, metaphysical possibility, and so on (Fine 2012, pp. 40-46) (Fine 1994) (Fine 2001).
If contemporary metaphysicians manage to pull this off, they will have done a lot to bring these concepts
together into something that better resembles a unified conception of the nature and structure of reality. That
12
Varieties of fundamentality
By stating that normativity of all that is normative consists in the relationship of the nor-
mative to reasons, Raz suggests that reasons are fundamental in two ways. First, reasons
are the fundamental source of the normativity of that which is normative. Consider, for
example, these two rules of etiquette: that you shall wait to start eating until everyone has
been served, and that peas shall be eaten with a fork. The first (or so I tend to think) has
normative force, the second typically does not. The difference, according to reasons fun-
damentalism, is due to the presence or absence of reasons to follow these rules. Waiting
until everyone else is served indicates that we are concerned about the well-being of the
other people at the table—something we have reason to communicate to those around us.
The rule about eating peas with a fork, in contrast, is an archaic rule of etiquette that most
people haven’t ever heard of, and is followed so infrequently that we no longer have any
reason to do so in any but the most esoteric contexts.11 Call the normative fundamentality
of reasons the view that reasons are the fundamental source of normativity.
If reasons are the fundamental source of the normativity of that which is normative,
correct explanations of the normativity of that which is normative will appeal to reasons.
The fact that waiting to eat shows concern for the well-being of the other people at the table
not only cites the particular reason that provides the normativity of the rule that you wait to
eat. It also explains why the rule to wait to eat is normative. For the reasons fundamentalist,
however, the normative nature of reasons neither “needs, or can be given, a philosophical
is a goal philosophically well worth pursuing.
11Derek Parfit is a notable exception, having not only heard of the rule but mentions it at (Parfit 2011,
p. 145). This passage from Parfit also features a discussion of the distinction between rules with normative
force and rules without normative force that I am discussing here.
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explanation in terms of some other, more basic notion” (Scanlon 1998, p. 3). Call this the
explanatory fundamentality of reasons.
In his recent contributions to the reasons fundamentalist view, Scanlon has identified a
third way in which reasons can be fundamental. Scanlon has influentially argued that value
properties such as goodness are merely formal, second-order properties: “Goodness is not a
single substantive property which gives us reason to promote or prefer the things that have
it. Rather, to call something good is to claim that it has other properties (different ones
in different cases) which provide such reasons” (ibid., p. 11). Value properties, Scanlon
argues, are “purely formal, higher-order properties of having some lower-order properties
that provide reasons of the relevant kind” (ibid., p. 97). This view is commonly referred to
as the buck-passing account of value.
On the buck-passing account of value, what it is to have the property of being valuable
in a certain way just is to have properties that provide reasons of a certain kind. What it
is for x to be admirable is for xto have properties that provide reasons to admire x; what
it is for x to be fearful is to have properties that provide reasons to fear x. Values, on this
buck-passing account, are constituted by the property of providing reasons; and reasons
are therefore more fundamental than value properties in the sense that they constitute value
properties. Call this the constitutive fundamentality of reasons.
The constitutive fundamentality claim entails the explanatory fundamentality and nor-
mative fundamentality claims. If values, for instance, are just higher order properties of
having lower order properties that provide reasons—if this is what it is to be a value—then
values could only derive their normativity through reasons. And if there is no further fact
from which reasons derive their own normativity, values could only derive their normativ-
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ity from reasons. The mere higher-orderness of a property provides neither an additional
source of normativity nor an additional explanation of it; there’s nothing else to provide the
normativity of values except the reasons.
Reasons, for Scanlon, are constitutively fundamental to a variety of normative proper-
ties, not simply the evaluative ones. Scanlon understands wrongness, for example, in terms
of reasonable rejection of principles:
judgments of right and wrong by saying that they are judgments about what
would be permitted by principles that could not reasonably be rejected, by peo-
ple who were moved to find principles for the general regulation of behavior
that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject. In particular, an
act is wrong if and only if any principle that permitted it would be one that
could reasonably be rejected by people with the motivation just described (or,
equivalently, if and only if it would be disallowed by any principle that such
people could not reasonably reject). (ibid., p. 4)
An historical aside
Raz’s Practical Reason and Norms, along with Nagel’s The Possibility of Altruism (Nagel
1978), launched, if not a research program, at least a huge surge in interest among analytic
philosophers in the notion of a reason for action. According to John Broome, the 1970s
was the “age of the discovery of reasons” (Broome 2004, p. 24). And Broome is not the
only one who seems to view the intellectual history in this way. Parfit, for example, goes
as far as to claim that reasons were not much discussed before the 70s because the older
generation of moral philosophers, and Bernard Williams in particular, “did not understand
[the] concept of a reason” (Parfit 2011, p. 434).
Two curiosities lurk in the background here. Irrespective of whether Parfit is right
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about what concepts Williams understood,12 it’s certainly true that there was, compara-
tively speaking, little discussion of reasons before the 70s. Suppose for a second that Raz is
right about the conceptual fundamentality of reasons. How could moral philosophers have
been so completely in the dark, for so long, about the very thing that Raz is claiming is
fundamental to the most important concepts that constitute our understanding of practical
reality?
I have no response to this question. It is a real mystery. It is like asking why Aristotle
never dropped two rocks of different masses off the Parthenon and saw that his theory of
gravity is false. Why, Aristotle? How could you not do that?13
For the second curiosity, what about Anscombe’s influential work on reasons in her
magisterial Intention, which was published in 1957? Why don’t Broome and Parfit fail to
locate the age of the discovery of reasons a full two decades earlier? You can’t chalk it off
to the book’s general lack of influence, since Intention frequently makes it on top ten lists
of most influential philosophical books of the 20th century (Ho 2009), (Leiter 2010).
I have not one but two responses to this curiosity: one philosophical and one sociolog-
ical.
Philosophically, the kind of reasons that play the star role in Anscombe’s Intention are
motivating reasons: reasons why one did something. Motivating reasons are not (or at
12I remember Parfit saying in seminar that he was driven to this view out of respect for Williams’ philo-
sophical acumen. Parfit, as I remember it, said that he had difficulty accepting that a philosopher as adept as
Williams could have been led to accept the internalist conclusions about normativity that Williams argued for
in “Internal and External Reasons” (Williams 1981, pp. 101-113), and that Parfit thinks are decisively false.
13Even more mysterious: why did no one do this for 2000 years until Galileo showed up? One response:
they did, but they didn’t write about it because of the influence of Aristotle on the Church and the Church’s
power over anyone who could write. Analogously, perhaps plenty of philosophers had the concept of a
normative reason for action before the 1970s, but they didn’t write about it because of the influence of overly
scientistic conceptions of the world on the most influential philosophers at the time and these philosophers’
power over anyone who wanted to publish in philosophy journals. This is just idle speculation.
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least need not be in every case) normative reasons, which are reasons why one ought to
have done something. Intention does not discuss normative reasons. They had yet to be
discovered.
Sociologically, Anscombe’s work on intentional action has been hugely influential, but
the work has exercised a greater influence over more recent philosophers of action. David
Velleman, Michael Bratman, Carl Ginet, and Michael Thompson, all of whom have con-
tributed substantially to our philosophical understanding of action, often and explicitly ac-
knowledge Anscombe’s influence on their thought and work. In contrast, the most promi-
nent metaethicists do not explicitly recognize their debt to Anscombe in the same way.
Scanlon cites Anscombe less than a handful of times in his authoritative (Scanlon 1998),
and in every case the reference is to an aspect of Anscombe’s work that relates only indi-
rectly to the topic of reasons for action. Similarly, Parfit limits his citation and discussion
of Anscombe to the parts of his On What Matters that deal with normative ethics. Scanlon
and Parfit both seem to be writing within an intellectual tradition in which Anscombe’s in-
fluence on action theory and the theory of reasons is not as recognized. Parfit might have
simply forgotten about Anscombe’s work on reasons when he writes that, before Raz and
Nagel, no one in philosophy had been talking about reasons.14
14Parfit is charging Williams with not grasping the concept of a normative reason, so I think it’s not
uncouth for me to charge Parfit with the much less egregious mistake of failing to recall Anscombe’s work on
reasons. Furthermore, Parfit is famously absent-minded (Macfarquhar 2011), so the charge is not implausible.
Broome falls distinctly within the Scanlon-Parfit tradition in virtue of his heavy interactions with Parfit, so it is
not surprising from a sociological point of view at least why Broome’s only mention of Anscombe in (Broome




This dissertation argues for a three-part thesis. First, this dissertation argues for a particular
interpretation of reasons fundamentalism. According to reasons fundamentalism, the prop-
erty of being a reason is a relational, irreducibly normative, and primitive property whose
distribution supervenes on the distribution of non-normative properties. By irreducibly nor-
mative, I mean not identical to any purely descriptive property; and by primitive, I mean not
decomposable into simpler properties. The first part of my thesis, which I offer in chapter
2, argues for a particular precisification of this general characterization.
Second, this dissertation argues that although reasons fundamentalism, on my interpre-
tation, holds that the normative features of the world supervene on the world’s descriptive
features, reasons fundamentalism cannot explain why the normative and descriptive fea-
tures should relate in this way. This argument plays out across chapters 3 and 4.
Third, this dissertation argues for a novel metaethical theory that preserves key virtues
of the reasons fundamentalist view while also answering the explanatory challenge. On this
theory, the normative notion that best systematizes the panoply of metaethical concepts is
not the notion of a reason but the notion of a genuinely thick property, that is, a property
that has descriptive and normative content such that these contents cannot be broken apart
into components that are all purely normative or purely descriptive. On my theory, gen-
uinely thick properties are similar to the reasons fundamentalist construal of reasons in three
ways: they are irreducibly normative; they are primitive; and they partially constitute thin
properties. Genuinely thick properties, I argue, do not supervene on non-normative prop-
erties, and in this way they are unlike the reasons fundamentalist conception of the relation
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between reasons and the descriptive features of the world. The genuinely thick properties,
however, do constitute a supervenience base for other key normative properties such as thin
properties and the property of being a reason; and these supervenience relations can do all
the explanatory work that metaethical theory needs supervenience claims to do. I present




This chapter is a detailed exposition and articulation of reasons fundamentalism. Most
broadly, reasons fundamentalism is the view that there are irreducibly normative truths
about reasons for action (Scanlon 2014, p. 1).More specifically, reasons fundamentalism
is particular conjunction of views defended by Raz, Parfit, and Scanlon. These conjuncts
we can call the Centrality, Relationality, Primitivity, Irreducibility and Additive Reasons
Supervenienceconjuncts. I’ll go ahead and define these conjuncts here, so that my readers
have a handy place to look them up. However, they’re going to need a lot of explaining.
So, after listing the conjuncts of reasons fundamentalism here, I’ll unpack the conjuncts in
more detail in the rest of the chapter.
The conjuncts:
Reasons Centrality: For all facts F , F is a normative fact only if F is a reasons fact
or F embeds a reasons fact.
Reasons Relationality: Any reason fact is normative in virtue of its standing in the
favoring relation with a circumstance-agent-action triple.
Reasons Primitivity: The favoring concept is primitive.
Reasons Irreducibility: The favoring relation is not normatively masked.
Additive Reasons Supervenience: For any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any fact-
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agent-action-circumstance tuples T1 in w1 and T2 in w2, if T1 and T2 are intrinsically
and extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible and w1 and w2 are non-normatively
indiscernible, then T1 instantiates the favoring relation if and only if T2 instantiates
the favoring relation.
Typically, reasons fundamentalism is also construed as also offering a theory of rational
motivation, of how reasons motivate actions. Despite this, I will not consider rational mo-
tivation in this chapter. The reason for this is because rational motivation is a question that
appropriately belongs to moral psychology and is therefore at least somewhat orthogonal to
my own area of investigation: the metaphysics of reasons. I will, however, be in a position
to discuss rational motivation at the very end of this dissertation, after I have discussed in
considerably more detail the role and nature of thick normative properties.
I should mention that the exposition of reasons fundamentalism that I give in this chap-
ter, both in its general presentational features and in the substantive details, is my own. As
far as I know, no one has described the theory as the conjunction of the above six claims;
and no one, as far as I know, has formulated the conjuncts in the way that I have. In partic-
ular, my presentation of reasons fundamentalism is not Scanlon’s presentation. However,
I take it that the substantive theory I describe in this chapter is a proper part of Scanlon’s
theory in all key respects, and differs in presentation only because I felt that it was impor-
tant to give a more precise characterization of various features of Scanlon’s view in order
to adequately formulate and develop the arguments of §3 - §5 of my dissertation. Through-
out the presentation, I also mention ways that my formulation of reasons fundamentalism
captures certain key features of Parfit Raz, and Enoch’s theories as well.
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Furthermore, the philosophers who assert the six conjuncts I have just mentioned also
hold a variety of other positions on the nature of normative reality. I am specifically using
“reasons fundamentalism” in this chapter to refer to the conjunction of the six philosophical
theses I have just enumerated. For example, Scanlon argues that there exist pure normative
truths such as “pain is bad” that hold with metaphysical necessity and provide principles of
explanation for why any particular reason is a reason. In §4, I argue against the idea that
there are pure normative truths. However, although my argument against the existence of
pure normative truths in that section is an argument against one of Scanlon’s positions, it
is not an argument against reasons fundamentalism on my construal of reasons fundamen-
talism, since the existence or nonexistence of pure normative truths is an issue that turns
out to be independent of the truth of the six philosophical theses I have just enumerated. I
mention this only to clarify that the reasons fundamentalist position that I describe in this
chapter is specifically the conjunction of Centrality, Relationality, Primitivity, Irreducibil-
ity, Additive Reasons Supervenience, and Non-Humean Normative Motivation. That’s it.
Although I do at times discuss further aspects of Scanlon’s theory, my exposition in this
chapter is not intended to be an exposition of Scanlon’s entire theory of normativity.
2.1 Centrality
Centrality explained
Here again is the Centrality conjunct of reasons fundamentalism:
Centrality: For all facts F , F is a normative fact only if F is a reasons fact or
F embeds a reasons fact.
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To explain this, I’ll first discuss how I’m using the term “fact”. Then I’ll define “reasons
fact”. Lastly, I’ll explain what it means to embed a reasons fact.
I understand facts to be entities in which particulars exemplify properties or stand in
relations.1 In this I agree with Baylis when he writes,
Facts are entities in relation. At the lowest level they are relations among par-
ticulars such as one patch or one building being larger than another, or they are
relations of exemplification between particulars and the characters which char-
acterize them, as for example a given patch being red. (Baylis 1948, p. 462)
Facts are recursive: if it is a fact that Obama likes Predator drones, then it is a fact that
it is a fact that Obama likes Predator drones, it is a fact that it is a fact that it is a fact that
Obama likes Predator drones, and so on. The recursion of facts evidences that there can be
facts about facts: for instance, the fact that it’s a fact that Tim Scanlon is a philosopher, or
the fact that the fact that we have reasons not to commit terrorist acts is a normative fact.
We can define a factual embedding function recursively as follows:
For any facts F and G, if F is a fact about G, then F embeds G.
For any facts F , G, and H , if F embeds G and G embeds H , then F embeds H .
Reasons, for Scanlon and most people who work on reasons, are facts. A reasons fact,
as I’m using it, is just a fact that some other fact is a reason. So when Centrality says that
any normative fact is either a reasons fact or a fact that embeds a reasons fact, it is saying
that any normative fact is either a fact that something is a reason, or a fact about the fact
1I slightly modify this formulation from (Correia and Mulligan 2013). At times, I may talk of sets of
particulars “exemplifying” some relation or relational property R. If I say this, I mean to say that these
particulars stand in R. At times, I may also talk of some x as being an “object” exemplifying a property or
standing in some relation. If I say this, I mean to say more broadly that x is a particular that exemplifies the
property or stands in the relation.
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that something is a reason, or a fact about a fact about a fact that something is a reason, and
so on.
One potentially surprising implication of Centrality is that most reasons are not norma-
tive facts, since most reasons are not facts about some other facts’ being a reason.2 Take,
for example, the fact that air pollution causes global warming. On the reasons fundamen-
talist way of thinking about things, the fact of air pollution’s causing global warming is not
in itself a normative fact: there’s nothing about what it is for air pollution to cause global
warming that entails anything about what we should do or how the world should be. For
the reasons fundamentalist, it’s only the fact that the fact that air pollution causes global
warming is a reason that in itself entails anything about what we should do or how the world
should be.
When Centrality states that for all facts F , F is a normative fact only if F is a reasons
fact or F embeds a reasons fact, it is allowing for there to be normative facts other than
facts about certain facts being reasons. However, it requires that any such normative facts
be about facts about certain facts being reasons.3
To illustrate this aspect of the Centrality principle, we can take another look at Scan-
lon’s buck-passing account of value. On the buck-passing account of value, for a particular
individual x to be valuable is for x to have a feature P such that x’s having (exemplifying)
P is a reason to value (promote) x. The fact of P ’s being valuable consists in nothing over
and above the fact that the fact that P ’s having F is a reason exemplifies a certain property:
2Some reasons are. The fact that terrorism kills innocent people is a reason not to commit acts of terrorism.
But the fact that terrorism’s killing innocent people is a reason is itself a reason for me to use it in this example.
3This is probably confusing, but I don’t think that that’s my fault. It has to do with the fact that the
Centrality conjunct of reasons fundamentalism makes claims not only about normative facts but also about
facts about normative facts and facts about facts about normative facts.
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the property of being a reason to value P .
Here is an example. Suppose (counterfactually or not) that philosophy is fun:
Fact 1: FUN(philosophy).
Suppose further that Fact 1 is a reason:
Fact 2: REASON(FUN(philosophy)).
Fact 2 can exemplify lots of properties, such as the property of being a reason for loving
philosophy, or for admiring philosophy, and so on. Suppose that the funness of philosophy
is a reason to value philosophy—that is to say, that the fact that the funness of philosophy
is a reason has the property of being a reason fact of the valuing kind:
Fact 3: VALUING_KIND(REASON(FUN(philosophy))).
On the buck-passing account of value, for philosophy to be valuable just is for philosophy
to have a feature that constitutes a reason to value philosophy. In this case, that feature is








The fact that philosophy is valuable is a normative fact. But it is not a reason fact, since it
is not a fact that anything is a reason. The reason fact in our example is Fact 2. However,
although the fact that philosophy is valuable is not a reason fact, it does embed a reason
fact, as we can see in Fact 3. So Centrality allows the fact that philosophy is valuable to be
a normative fact as well.
2.2 Relationality
Raz’s early work articulated not only the Centrality principle but also a view as to what the
reasons are, and what makes them so. As Raz notes,
We usually think of reasons for action as being reasons for a person to perform
an action when certain conditions obtain. The performance of an action by an
agent in certain circumstances can be regarded as a fact, and it may be thought
that reasons are relations between facts. (Raz 1975, p. 19)
In this short paragraph, Raz is saying two significant things. Reasons, first of all, are facts.
But not all facts are reasons, which raises the following question. Take all the reason facts
in your left hand, and all the non-reason facts in your right. What’s the basis of dividing
up the facts in the way that we just did? Raz’s answer is very simple, and yet, for all its
simplicity, has been exceedingly helpful in advancing our philosophical understanding of
reasons. What accounts for reasons’ being what they are is that the facts that are reasons
possess a certain property—the reasons-making property—that makes them so. This prop-
erty, furthermore, is a relational property. Facts that are reasons bear the reasons-making
relation toward a person for whom the fact is a reason, the action for which the reason is a
reason, and the set of conditions in which the fact is a reason for that person to do that ac-
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tion. Since the reasons-making property is a relational property, the literature has taken to
calling the property the “reasons relation”.4 Call any tuple “reasons-apt” just if it’s a fact-
agent-action-circumstance tuple—in other words, that it’s of the right form for instantiating
the reasons relation.
It’s now widely accepted that the reasons-making property is a relational property. The
most outspoken contemporary defender of Raz’s view5 that the reasons relation is a four-
place relation is Scanlon, who writes:
Whether a certain fact is a reason, and what it is a reason for, depends on an
agent’s circumstances. The fact that this piece of metal is sharp is a reason for
me not to press my hand against it, but under different circumstances it might
be a reason to press my hand against it, and under still different circumstances
a reason to do something else, such as to put it into the picnic basket if I will
later have reason to want to cut cheese. This suggests that “is a reason for” is a
four-place relation, R(p, x, c, a), holding between a fact p, an agent x, a set of
conditions c, and an action or attitude a. This is the relation that holds just in
case p is a reason for a person x in situation c to do or hold a. (Scanlon 2014,
pp. 30-31)
The reasons-making relation is called the favoring relation, a term which again we owe to
Scanlon.6
The difference between reasons and the reasons-making relation is more important than
it may at first seem. Scanlon and Raz identify reasons with facts. So reasons will be philo-
sophically problematic in the same ways that facts are.7 However, reasons pose philosoph-
4Peacocke sometimes refers to the relation as the “reasons for” relation. I don’t use this particular locution.
5Although, it seems, without citing Raz.
6I had actually thought that Dancy had originated the term, but Dancy cites Scanlon as his inspiration at
(Dancy 2004, p. 29). Not everyone understands the favoring relation to be four-place. Dancy, for example,
talks of it as being a two-place relation. The four-place structure of the favoring relation is a commitment of
reasons fundamentalism in particular, not of reasons realists, such as Dancy, in general.
7The issue regarding facts thatmost easily comes tomind is not a terribly recent one: Davidson’s Slingshot
Argument. I’ve found (Soames 2008) and (Merricks 2007) helpful in understanding the current state of this
debate.
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ical issues over and above those posed by facts. The locus of these additional issues will
be, not the reasons themselves—for these are just facts on Scanlon and Raz’s account—
but the property in virtue of which the reason-facts are reason-facts and not just facts of
some other kind. The shift from reasons to the reasons relation therefore better isolates the
philosophical issues that are in the metaethicist’s purview.
The normativity of reasons facts derives from the favoring relation they bear to some
circumstance-agent-action triple. Take, for instance, the
Tyranny Fact: Acts of terrorism against citizens of Western countries tend to
strengthen tyrannical impulses on the part of Western governments.
For reasons fundamentalists, reasons are facts that stand in the favoring relation to a
circumstance-agent-action triple. So when I am saying that Tyranny Fact is a reason for
critics of the West not to commit terrorist acts in our particular global situation, I am saying
that Tyranny Fact stands in the favoring relation to a triple consisting of our current global
situation, critics of the West, and the action of committing terrorist acts. In addition to
Tyranny Fact, there is also the numerically distinct fact that that Tyranny Fact, our current
global situation, critics of the West, and the action of committing terrorist acts all stand in
the favoring relation to each other. Since the favoring relation is a normative relation, this
latter fact is, in fact, a normative fact. Crucially, however, according to reasons fundamen-
talism, Tyranny Fact is not a normative fact. Any and all of the normative character that





If the favoring relation is the source of all value, the philosophically minded might well
start to wonder: well, what is this favoring relation anyway? The literature redounds
with attempts to elucidate the favoring concept in terms of something more philosophically
tractable—for instance, in terms of our concept of a pro-attitude (Schroeder 2007), com-
mitment (Street 2008), norm-acceptance (Gibbard 1990, p. 163), explanations of ought
facts (Broome 2013, pp. 54-55), and evidence for ought facts (Kearns and Starr 2008).
Scanlon’s view, however, is that these elucidations all fail:
I will take the idea of a reason as primitive. Any attempt to explain what it
is to be a reason for something seems to me to lead back to the same idea: a
consideration that counts in favor of it. “Counts in favor how?” one might ask.
“By providing a reason for it” seems to be the only answer. So I will presuppose
the idea of a reason. (Scanlon 1998, p. 17)
Parfit agrees:
It is hard to explain the concept of a reason, or what the phrase “a reason”
means. Facts give us reasons, we might say, when they count in favour of our
having some attitude, or our acting in some way. But “counts in favour of”
means roughly “gives a reason for”. Like some other fundamental concepts,
such as those involved in our thoughts about time, consciousness, and possibil-
ity, the concept of a reason is indefinable in the sense that it cannot be helpfully
explained merely by using words. (Parfit 2011, p. 31)
There are two things I want to say about this. First, the locution that reasons are consid-
erations that “count in favor”, which we see in both quotations, is the source of our contem-
porary proclivity to call the reasons relation the “favoring relation”. So if you see the term
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“favoring relation” either here and elsewhere, all it means is the reasons relation. Second,
by saying that the concept of a reason is “hard to explain”, Parfit isn’t simply engaging in
the overused philosophical trope of saying that some philosophical concept is “notoriously
difficult to define”.8 Parfit is not simply saying that it’s difficult to define “reason”, but that
it’s actually impossible to define “reason” in a correct, non-circular way.
These passages indicate that Scanlon and Parfit are primitivists about the favoring con-
cept. A concept is primitive just if it does not admit of a correct, non-circular analysis.
Although Scanlon and Parfit do hold that “favors” means “is a reason for”, they hold that
these distinct locutions are simply different ways of expressing identical concepts. In claim-
ing that the favoring/reasons-for concept is primitive, Scanlon and Parfit are claiming that
this single concept that both locutions express does not admit of any further elucidation in
terms of simpler concepts that may be more philosophically tractable.
Scanlon’s claim that a reason is a “consideration that counts in favor” of performing
a certain action (Scanlon 1998, p. 17) introduces a complication in Scanlon’s thought.
Scanlon also thinks reasons are facts. However, facts and considerations are distinct. Con-
siderations, for instance, seem to be mental events, while facts are not: they’re part of the
furniture of the world. A consideration can be of a fact, and there can be facts about consid-
erations,9 but facts and considerations are nevertheless distinct kinds of things. Are reasons
facts, then, or are they considerations? Although this is an important question, I will set it
aside in this dissertation and assume, along with Scanlon, that reasons are facts.10
8For examples of this trope, see most entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia.
9And facts about considerations of facts about considerations of facts, and so on—see (Varzi 2012).
10In §5, I argue that reasons are answers to why-questions. Answers are typically understood to be propo-
sitions rather than facts. However, it is consistent with my arguments in §5 to say, not that reasons are answers
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The normative question objection
Discussion of reasons primitivism predates Scanlon and Parfit’s defense of it. Gibbard
remarks that “Some writers speak of ‘reasons’ in a non-Humean way, and indeed try to
ground ethical theory on a non-Humean concept of reasons... None of them, so far as I can
discover, explains what he is using the term ‘reason’ to mean” (Gibbard 1990, p. 161).
Gibbard suggests here that the non-Humeans’ general inability to articulate what they take
reasons to be, and what they mean when they discuss reasons, to be a deficit of non-Humean
theories of normative reasons such as those of Scanlon and Parfit. One major deficit, Gib-
bard sees, is that, without any elucidation of the reasons concept, the non-Humean cannot
explain what it is about reasons that makes them normatively salient.
To put the objection another way, suppose we come to believe that volunteering at the
shelter this Saturday is what we have most reason to do. Even armed with this belief, we
still have not exhaustively settled the question of deciding what to do. What is it about
having most reason to volunteer at the shelter this Saturday that settles the question what
to do on Saturday? Gibbard worries that, without further elucidation of the concept of a
reason, which the reasons primitivist can’t provide, there remains both an explanatory gap
and a practical gap between an action’s property of being such that we have most reason
to do it, and the action’s property of being “the thing to do” or “what to do”. Call this the
Normative Question Objection to reasons primitivism.11
to why-questions, but that they are such as to provide answers to why-questions or bear some other close re-
lationship to answers to why-questions. So I think that my remarks in §5 do not help to settle the question
whether reasons are facts, propositions, considerations, or something else entirely.
11These remarks are an adaptation of Gibbard’s comments at (Gibbard 2003, pp. 15-16). His remarks
there focus on the “ought” property rather than the property of being a reason, and he doesn’t mention reasons
primitivity explicitly. A good review of literature on the normative question, especially as it relates to reasons
fundamentalism, can be found at (Dreier 2015).
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Gibbard’s remark here is interesting not only because it substantially predates the rise of
reasons primitivism, but also because Gibbard on the one hand, and the non-Humeans Scan-
lon and Parfit on the other, have conflicting approaches to the question whether the failure
to provide any elucidation of the concept of a reason is a theoretical virtue or a theoretical
vice. Scanlon, for instance, thinks that reasons primitivism is fully capable of answering the
explanatory challenge that Gibbard raises. According to Scanlon, my reasons to volunteer
at the shelter on Saturday are normative for an agent like, say, me, because, to the extent
that there are reasons for me to volunteer at a shelter on Saturday, these reasons are reasons
for me to volunteer at the shelter on Saturday (Scanlon 2014, p. 10). Scanlon thinks that
no “further explanations [of why my reasons are normative for me] need or can be given”
(ibid., p. 44). If there were a live question as to why my reasons to volunteer on Satur-
day were normative for me, then I think it’s correct to say that a reasons realist would face
pressure to give some sort of elucidation of these reasons in terms that made more readily
apparent the connection between something’s being a reason for me, and something’s being
normative for me. However, Scanlon thinks the question of why my reasons are normative
for me is not a live question: it’s sufficiently answered in the reasons’ status of being rea-
sons for me. The question, in other words, admits of a trivial answer and therefore does not
pose any philosophical worry. Scanlon concludes that the Normative Question Objection
does not provide any reason to give up reasons primitivism.12
In the next section, I will investigate Gibbard’s concern more thoroughly. However, the
12Furthermore, even if the normative question were a serious objection to reasons primitivism, Scanlon
charges Gibbard’s variety of expressivism with an implicit commitment to reasons primitivism at (Scanlon
1998, p. 58). So reasons primitivism’s putative failure to answer the normative question would therefore not
be a reason to defect to Gibbard’s norm-acceptance theory of reasons.
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arguments of this next section not serve any further role in the overall argumentation of this
dissertation. Readers pressed for time can therefore easily skip it.
Caring about normativity
Here is another way to state the Normative Question Objection. A number of objections
against reasons fundamentalism take this form:
1. The favoring relation possesses feature F .
2. If reasons fundamentalism is true, then the favoring relation does not possess F .
3. Therefore, if the favoring relation possesses F , then reasons fundamentalism is not
true. (2, contraposition)
4. Therefore, reasons fundamentalism is not true. (1, 3, modus ponens)
Here’s an instance of an argument that takes this form:
1. We care about whether things exemplify the favoring relation. (premise)
2. If reasons fundamentalism is true, then we can’t say anything informative about what
the favoring relation is like. (Primitivity premise)
3. If we can’t say anything informative about what some property or relation is like,
then we do not care whether things exemplify that property or relation. (premise)13
4. Therefore, if reasons fundamentalism is true, then we do not care whether things
exemplify the favoring relation. (2, 3, transitivity, universal instantiation)
13In other words, we don’t care whether things exemplify relations that we can’t say anything informative
about. This formulation is clearer than the one I provide in the text of the argument, but the formulation that
I provide in the text of the argument makes, I think, the argument’s validity more apparent.
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5. If we care whether things exemplify the favoring relation, then reasons fundamental-
ism is not true. (4, contraposition.)
6. Therefore, reasons fundamentalism is not true. (1, 4, modus ponens)
Call this the Descriptive Caring Objection.14
Korsgaard provides a version of the Descriptive Caring Objection when she writes:
Why after all should we govern our lives, or anyway restrict our private in-
terests, for the sake of the promotion or maximization of things possessing a
non-natural property about the character of which we are able to say very little?
Is it really enough to say that after all this is the good we’re talking about, not
just any old property? If it is a natural state or object... we might feel somewhat
easier about the intelligibility or commitment to it. (Korsgaard 1981, p. 10).
Korsgaard’s target here is a primitivist about goodness, but her concerns about primitivist
accounts of goodness are easily adapted to target primitivist accounts of the favoring rela-
tion. Intuitively, we care about whether some fact or other is a reason—which is to say,
whether that fact stands in the favoring relation. But, according to reasons fundamentalism,
we are only able to say very little about this relation. Its character is mysterious, and calling
this relation the “favoring relation” doesn’t help dispel the mystery. Usually, we care about
things that are not totally mysterious, like our children and our careers. We can say some-
thing about why these things we care about are careworthy. But if reasons primitivism is
true, we can’t do this about the favoring relation, so it’s hard to see how we can care about
it. In fact, the reasons fundamentalists’ commitment to primitivity means that they can’t
say anything about how we can care about it. So reasons fundamentalism is false.
I argue that we should reject premise (1) of the Descriptive Caring Objection.
14I call it the Descriptive Caring Objection, rather than just the “Caring Objection”, in order to preemp-
tively distinguish it from a normative version of this objection that I raise in a few paragraphs.
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According to Korsgaard, we do not care about governing our lives “for the sake of the
promotion or maximization of things possessing an [insurmountably mysterious] property”.
This is ambiguous. In particular, the sentence admits of de dicto and de re interpretations.
On the de dicto interpretation, the sentence says that we do not care about promoting what-
ever states of affairs and actions that happen to instantiate the favoring relation, whatever
they happen to be. On the de re interpretation, the sentence says that we do not care about
promoting the very states of affairs and actions that instantiate the favoring relation. In
other words, on the de re interpretation, Korsgaard is claiming that we do not care about
things that happen to instantiate insurmountably mysterious properties.
Korsgaard’s claim is plausible only on the de dicto interpretation. When we are moved
by the Paris killings, we are moved by these acts’ natural properties: their properties of
causing death and destruction to many innocent people. Although it’s true that these acts
are also wrong, we’re not primarily moved by these acts’ wrongness. We care far more
about these natural properties of the Paris killings. It is not plausible that we do not care
about the natural properties of actions like the Paris killings that also happen to instantiate
normative properties, which is what the de re interpretation claims.
Tim Chappell argues, I think correctly, that the de re reading is more in line with what
reasons fundamentalists actually think. If this is true, then the de dicto interpretation of
Korsgaard’s claim, which I argued is the only plausible interpretation, will not constitute
an objection to reasons fundamentalism.
It’s surely true that what we care about in practical contexts is the natural world. Instead
of claiming that we also care in practical contexts about normative properties, the primitivist
can claim that the normative properties serve rather as markers of things in the world that
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it’s correct to care about (Chappell 2014). We care about our children’s health, for example;
and when we tend to a child who is ill, we are responding to descriptive facts like the fact
that my child is ill or that my child is in discomfort. What we really care about is that my
child is ill and in discomfort rather than in a healthier state. We don’t first and foremost
care about whether our child’s health has the further property of being valuable. In this, the
reasons fundamentalist agrees with Korsgaard.
The reasons fundamentalist will say that there is still the normative fact that alleviating
our child’s illness or discomfort is correct or valuable or right. This normative fact functions
as a truth-maker for our claims that our actions are correct, or valuable, or right. But it can
function as a truthmaker without our having to care about it. So reasons fundamentalists
can maintain that the favoring relation serves as constituents of truthmakers for norma-
tive claims while avoiding commitment to the claim that we care about these truthmakers,
thereby avoiding (1) and therefore avoiding (6).
Surely some of us do care whether the actions we perform and states of affairs we pro-
mote are normatively favored or are valuable. Parfit, for example, seems to care a whole
lot, particularly when he concludes that, if there are no irreducibly normative truths, then he
“would have wasted much of [his] life” (Parfit 2011, p. 304).15 So it is open to the reasons
fundamentalist to reject (3) and therefore (4) and (6).
I think that this response on behalf of reasons fundamentalism is a mistake. The mistake
turns on an ambiguity in the notion of caring. There is a theoretical kind of caring that we
15Korsgaard’s response to this would likely be that Parfit is just idiosyncratic, as she says in (Korsgaard
2009). I believe Parfit’s response to the idiosyncrasy claim would be that, yes, he is idiosyncratic, but his
idiosyncracy is a virtue when nearly everyone else in the field of normative theory has been so horribly
wrong about the nature of normativity for so many decades.
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have when we are gripped by theoretical questions. But I don’t think Korsgaard disagrees
that we theoretically care about irreducibly normative truths. We are philosophers and all
know, or at least remember, what it’s like to be gripped by theoretical questions. In talking
about caring, I think she has in mind the practical kind of caring that we are all familiar
with. I suspect that Parfit is concerned that he would have wasted much of his life if there
were no irreducibly normative truths in significant part because much of his life was spent
studying irreducibly normative truths. If there aren’t any, then many of the non-irreducibly-
normative aspects of his life that he does care about—his career, thousands of his evenings,
and so on—would have been spent chasing a theory about something that doesn’t exist.
I suspect most defenders of irreducibly normative truths—and I am one of them—care
about exemplifications of the favoring relation because the value of many of their personal
projects and pursuits, which they do care about, would lose much of their value if there turn
out not to be any irreducibly normative truths. This is no different than the kind of care that
some physicists bear towards theories of quantum gravity, or that computer scientists have
for the PNP problem: if there is no theory of quantum gravity or no solution to the PNP
problem, their personal projects would lack certain natural features—going down in the
textbooks, keeping their jobs, being respected by their academic communities, defeating
their theoretical opponents—that they do care about. In the case of moral philosophers
no less than physicists or computer scientists, our practical caring about the truth of the
theories we create is derived from the care we have for the various practical implications
of the success or failure of these theories.
There is another sense in which we care about exemplifications of the favoring relation.
When we are deciding what to do, we will ask questions like “is such-and-such a course of
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action wrong” or “do the reasons weigh in favor of doing professional philosophy or going
to law school”. When we are asking these questions, we certainly care about whether and in
what ways the favoring relation is exemplified. But I suspect that the care we have for these
is again derivative of the non-normative features of our lives and world for which we have
practical concern. Reasoning about whether something is wrong or whether something is
what we have most reason to do is reasoning about whether certain courses of action have
normative properties. But this reasoning often functions as a surrogate that takes the place
of reasoning about our cares and concerns directly. If I am of a certain kind of Kantian bent,
I might reason in the following way: ϕ-ing is not universalizable, therefore ϕ-ing is wrong,
therefore I will not ϕ. But the universalizability method of determining the permissibility
or impermissibility of certain courses of action can function as a heuristic for determining
whether ϕ has certain other non-normative features that I care about, such as the feature
of showing respect for the humanity of the other persons that I’m interacting with, or the
feature of being freely chosen, or the feature of being an action at all.16 The wrongness of
ϕ-ing is indeed something that I would care about if I were a Kantian of this bent, but only
because of certain non-normative features of ϕ-ing that the wrongness of ϕ-ing entails.
We can put the caring objection in another way, not in terms of a descriptive constraint
on theories of reasons, but in terms of a normative constraint:
1. We ought to care whether things exemplify the favoring relation. (premise)
2. If reasons fundamentalism is true, then we can’t say anything informative about the
16I reiterate that I do not think that freedom and actions are non-normative. I am stating that they are
non-normative here because it better reflects the reasons fundamentalist position that I am developing. I have
more to say on the normative nature of actions in §4.
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favoring relation. (Primitivity premise)
3. If we can’t say anything informative about a property or relation, then we ought not
to care whether anything exemplifies that property or relation. (premise)
4. Therefore, if reasons fundamentalism is true, then we ought not to care whether any-
thing exemplifies the favoring relation. (2, 3, transitivity)
5. Therefore, if we ought to care whether anything exemplifies the favoring relation,
reasons fundamentalism is not true. (4, contraposition)
6. Therefore, reasons fundamentalism is not true. (1, 5, modus ponens)
Call this the Normative Caring Objection to reasons fundamentalism.
I think a reasonable response to this argument is, again, to deny (1). Nietzsche famously
worries that
Our social conceptions of good and evil, weak and effeminate as they are, and
their enormous influence over both body and soul, have had the effect of weak-
ening all bodies and souls and of crushing all unprejudiced, independent, and
self-reliant men, the real pillars of a strong civilization: wherever we still find
the evil morality today, we see the last crumbling ruins of these pillars. (Niet-
zsche 2012, §163)
Nietzsche’s worry, expressed here, raises a concern that caring about whether normative
properties are exemplified may have deleterious consequences for the flourishing of other
non-normative things that we happen to care about, such as personal strength, “masculin-
ity”, and strong civilizations. If we happen to care more about these non-normative things
than about whether our actions exemplify normative properties, then our caring about
whether our actions exemplify normative properties may ultimately be deleterious to the
promotion of what we care most about. We would then ought not to care about whether
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our actions exemplify normative properties. It is, however, consistent to admit this and still
think that there are such properties.
The thought that we ought not to care about whether things exemplify normative prop-
erties is not self-contradictory. It is consistent so long as we accept its implications–for
example, the implication that, if it’s true that we ought not to care about whether our ac-
tions exemplify normative properties, then we ought not to care that we ought not to care
about whether our actions exemplify normative properties.
2.4 Irreducibility
Normative truths and domain-specificity
I mentioned in §2.3 that Scanlon thinks that our practical deliberation does not give rise to
any live, non-trivial question as to why our reasons are normative for us. These questions,
Scanlon suggested, are suitably answered by the consideration that our reasons are reasons
for us. Nevertheless, Scanlon does admit that there is a meaningful, non-trivial question as
to why reasons are normative:
I believe that there can be meaningful external questions about a domain. But
these must be questions about whether the implications or presuppositions of
statements internal to the domain are fulfilled. (Scanlon 2014, p. 19)
Meaningful questions about why reasons are normative for us do not arise when agents
are deciding what to do. Whenwe are deciding what to do, we are asking the question “what
reasons do I have?” Considering questions about what reasons we have takes place from a
standpoint of “internal” reasoning, and it is, for Scanlon, the nature of “the point of view of
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internal reasoning that is primary in an investigation of reasons and normativity. From this
point of view the question of how reasons ‘get a grip on one’ properly disappears” (ibid.,
p. 14). The non-trivial question as to why reasons are normative for us surfaces when we
consider reasons from a standpoint external to the standpoint of a practical deliberator.
In saying that there can be meaningful external questions about a domain, I take Scanlon
to be saying, for example, that error theory is coherent. Error theory about normative claims,
again, is the theory that any positive ascriptions of normative properties are false.17 In
making this claim, the error theorist is answering “questions about whether the implications
or presuppositions of statements internal to the domain are fulfilled.” It makes sense, for
Scanlon, for error theorists to say that there are no normative truths. But in giving their
error-theoretic arguments, error theorists are making a crucial mistake: applying scientific
standards for specifying a body of truths to the normative domain in which these standards
are not appropriate.
It’s helpful to compare Scanlon’s thoughts about internal and external questions about
normativity to the foundational distinction I drew in §1 between what reasons are and what
the reasons are. Scanlon is saying that the kinds of questions we consider when engaging
in practical reasoning are questions about what the reasons are. The question what reasons
are is a question external to practical deliberation: our asking this question entails that we
are not engaging in practical reasoning. So when we are reasoning about my work in this
dissertation, which deals exclusively with questions about what reasons are, we are not
17Error theorists don’t think that all normative claims are false. For instance, they usually think that it’s
true that global warming is not bad. Not because they think that global warming is good, of course, but
because they do not think anything is bad and therefore think that it’s correct to deny that global warming
instantiates any normative properties such as goodness or badness.
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engaging in practical reasoning.
This phenomenon whereby engaging in practical reasoning “screens off” the meaning-
fulness of questions external to reasoning of this kind is a feature of other domains of rea-
soning as well. Scanlon writes,
I believe that the way of thinking about these matters that makes most sense is
a view that does not privilege science but takes as basic a range of domains, in-
cluding mathematics, science, and moral and practical reasoning. It holds that
statements within all of these domains are capable of truth and falsity, and that
the truth values of statements about one domain, insofar as they do not conflict
with statements of some other domain, are properly settled by the standards of
the domain that they are about. (ibid., p. 19)
The domain of mathematical reasoning carries with it a set of criteria for specifying the
truths of mathematics. Committing oneself to these mathematical truths does not produce
any ontological worries, since none of the mathematical truths conflict with truths specified
by the criteria for specifying the truths of other domains. In contrast, Scanlon thinks that
claims about the nature of poltergeists, demons and so on do conflict with truths about other
domains—namely, truths about the scientific domain. Theories of poltergeists and demons
make claims about magical or spiritual laws and so on, the existence of which conflicts
with the body of truths entailed by scientific criteria for specifying the scientific truths.
This gives us reason to reject any claims that would be true given the theory of poltergeists.
In case this is not fully clear, we can imagine that the theory of poltergeists states that
poltergeists have powers of telekenesis. At least, this is part of what popular culture seems
to think poltergeists would be like. However, our best psychological and physical theories
entail that there are no telekenetic powers. So the truths entailed by the theory of poltergeists
conflict with the truths entailed by scientific theories. We therefore have reason to reject
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claims whose only justification is that they are entailed by the theory of poltergeists. Scan-
lon is not clear as to why he thinks we should go with the scientific truths rather than the
purported truths about poltergeists in the case of this conflict, but I assume that my readers
have their own views as to why science rather than poltergeist theory is the way to go here.
One worry is that Scanlon’s approach licenses more legitimate domains of reasoning
than we have reason to believe there are. Take a religious reasoning systemR that specifies
its own set of domain-specific criteria for determining the extent and distribution of the
property of being sinful, but does not make claims that conflict with the domain of scientific
truth because R entails that sin will only play a causal role in determining our position in
an afterlife which is in principle causally isolated from our own universe. Since truths
about sin are domain-specific to R and do not conflict with the truths of science, one might
think Scanlon has to admit that there are truths about the distribution of sin. One response
Scanlon could make is that, although R does not make truth claims that overreach into the
domain of truth regulated by scientific criteria for truth-determination, the claims that R
entails about the role of sin in determining punishment in the afterlife overreach by making
claims that conflict with the domain of normative reasoning. Since we have more reason to
go with the normative criteria for determining truth than with criteria for determining truth
given by R, we ought to reject R.
This domain-specific view of truth that Scanlon is advancing here is not a pragmatist
view, because it does not say that the sole criterion of truth is that truth’s usefulness. Use-
fulness may be one criterion of truth in some domains, but it is not a criterion of truth in
every domain and certainly not the only criterion. Nor, I think, does Scanlon’s domain-
specific view entail that “true” is ambiguous, but rather that the criteria for truth vary from
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domain to domain. Scanlon’s view does bear similarities to Hirsch’s quantifier variance
view (Hirsch 2011, pp. 68-95) and Putnam’s conceptual relativism (Putnam 1987, p. 71).
Dodging metaphysics?
Scanlon, furthermore, is not claiming that objects exist only within a domain or relative to
a domain. In particular, he is emphatically opposed to the claim that there are normative
objects that exist in the normative domain but not in other domains. The use of the word
“domain” may give this impression, since in first-order logic we talk about domains of
discourse as the set of objects that bound variables take as values. In Scanlon’s usage of
“domain”, however, a domain is not a distinct set of objects, but a distinct set of truths
entailed by rules of that domain for specifying these truths. I take Scanlon to be saying
that domains are logical models. As such, domains have a domain of discourse, a language
of constants and predicates for forming sentences about objects in the domain, and a set
of non-logical axioms that, in addition to the logical axioms given by the domain’s logic,
specify which statements in that language are true. Importantly, for Scanlon, any domain
has the same set of objects for its domain of discourse. He writes,
The normative domain, for example, is not a distinct realm of objects. Things
in the natural world, such as persons and their actions, have normative
properties, and most normative claims are claims about such things. Even in
the case of arithmetic, although there are pure claims about numbers, there
are also numerical claims about the physical world. So a domain is better
understood in terms of the kind of claims it involves, and hence in terms of
concepts that it deals with, such as number, set, physical object, reason, or
morally right action. (Scanlon 2014, p. 19)
What is special about normative claims is thus not a matter of ontology
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in Quine’s sense (the things quantified over), but rather of what Quine called
“ideology” (the predicates employed). (ibid., p. 30)18
By refusing to postulate the existence of distinct normative entities, Scanlon takes him-
self to be avoiding any ontological commitment and therefore any philosophical concerns
that one might have about it. However, although Scanlon claims that he can avoid ontolog-
ical commitment and any problems associated with it, he is happy to admit that questions
about the reasons relation are “metaphysical” questions. He writes, “the basic element of
the normative domain is a relation, being a reason for, [which] can be seen as a claim about
the metaphysics of the normative” (ibid., pp. 25-26). The idea here seems to be that ontol-
ogy is a branch of metaphysics: the one that deals with the question what we should allow
to be taken as values of bound variables. Metaphysics is more capacious, including not only
these ontological questions, but questions about properties and relations as well. Since the
basic element of the normative domain is a relation—the favoring relation—discussion of
this relation falls under metaphysics. But since the normative domain entails no truth about
normativity that conflicts with the truths entailed by scientific theories, Scanlon holds that
there is nothing metaphysically objectionable about the ideology of normative properties
and relations.
Scanlon’s view here marks a significant break with the traditional understanding of
what’s at stake in postulating, as Scanlon does in his own way, the existence of distinct
normative properties. Critics of the intuitionisms of Moore, Prichard,19, Ewing20 Ross21
18The seminal discussion of this in Quine is (Quine 1951b).
19For example, (Prichard 1912).
20For example, (Ewing 1939).
21For example, (Ross 2007).
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et al have frequently charged intuitionists not with having a problematic ontology of ab-
stract normative objects, but with introducing additional, metaphysically problematic prop-
erties.22 I had mentioned in §1 that Moore and the other intuitionists held that goodness was
a “sui generis” property. By this, the intuitionists did not simply mean that the goodness
property was distinct from other properties; anyone who thinks that there is a goodness
property thinks that. Moore meant that goodness was a unique kind of property. Good-
ness, for Moore, was a property of neither the “natural” (i.e. observable, scientific) nor
the “metaphysical” (i.e. spiritual, theological) kind, but of some third kind, about whose
nature Moore had little to say. Moore’s view, then, was not only, to use a distinction from
(Lewis 1973, p. 87), less quantitatively parsimonious than the analytic naturalist views that
Moore rejected, but less qualitatively parsimonious as well. Since the analytic naturalists
identified the goodness property with some other natural property, such as pleasure, whose
existence Moore was happy to accept, Moore’s claim that there was a goodness property
that was not identical to any natural properties entailed that Moore’s ontology was quanti-
tatively more capacious by at least one property. Moore’s view that the goodness property
was sui generis also committed Moore to accepting an additional kind of property, which is
to say that his view was qualitatively less parsimonious as well. Most philosophers accept
qualitative parsimony to be a virtue of philosophical theories such that, ceterus paribus, a
more qualitatively parsimonious theory is to be preferred over a less qualitatively parsimo-
nious theory.
Scanlon’s turn to Quine’s theory of ontological commitment therefore does not answer
22The first discussion of these issues that I am aware of is at (Frankena 1963, pp. 86-7). The discussion
was of course popularized by (Mackie 1977, pp. 38-42) and is now omnipresent.
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the charge that Scanlon’s theory, like Moore’s, is not qualitatively parsimonious. Further-
more, the discussion of ideology doesn’t seem relevant either, since the metaphysical wor-
ries surface not from the nature of the predicates that feature in normative theories, but from
the properties and relations that these predicates denote.
Scanlon could answer the worries by applying Quine’s views on the nature of proper-
ties to the case of the favoring relation. Quine was an extensionalist about properties: he
believed that properties were nothing but classes, and that classes consisted of nothing but
their members. Quine writes,
Once classes are freed of any deceptive hint of tangibility, there is little reason
to distinguish them from properties. It matters little whether we read “x∃y”
as “x is a member of the class y” or “x has the property y.” If there is any
difference between classes and properties, it is merely this: classes are the same
when their members are the same, whereas it is not universally conceded that
properties are the same when possessed by the same objects.... But classes may
be thought of as properties if the latter notion is so qualified that properties
become identical when their instances are identical. (Quine 1951a, p. 120)
If he were to apply extensionalism about properties to the case of the favoring relation,
Scanlon could say that the favoring relation were nothing except some specified set of
reasons-apt tuples (i.e. some specified set of fact-agent-action-circumstance tuples). Call
this set Γ. Since nearly all parties in metaethics are fine with accepting that there are such
things as classes, facts, agents, actions and circumstances, the extensionalist reduction of
the favoring relation to the aforementioned set of quadruples would resolve any outstanding
worries about the metaphysical implications of Scanlon’s construal of the favoring relation.
However, Scanlon can’t accept that the favoring relation is nothing more than a class of
fact-agent-action-circumstance quadruples. The first reason is that he thinks that there are
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“irreducibly normative facts about reasons” (Scanlon 2014, p. 3). If the favoring relation
were nothing more than a class of quadruples Γ, then facts about something’s being a reason
would not be irreducible: they would just be facts about that fact’s being an element in a
quadruple in Γ.
The second reason is because Scanlon thinks that there is a sound open question argu-
ment about the favoring relation. Scanlon writes “I am quite willing to accept that ‘being
a reason for’ is an unanalyzable, normative, hence non-natural relation” (Scanlon 1998,
p. 18). He also writes, “[O]pen-question arguments show that neither claims about what
counts as evidence nor claims about what count as reasons for action can be plausibly un-
derstood as claims about natural facts (ibid., p. 60).
The open question argument was first articulated by Moore.23 Moore argued that our
concept of goodness was simple because there was no analysis of the goodness concept in
terms of simpler concepts. His argument for this latter claim was an inductive one. Moore
claimed that, for all definitions Y , if there is an object x such that a “yes” answer to the
question “object x satisfies definition Y , but is X good?” is informative, then Y is not a
correct and complete analysis of goodness. Moore then applied this principle to a variety of
different definitions of goodness that had been proposed in the literature at the time—that
“good” meant “pleasure”, or “utility” or “what we desire to desire”—and found that the
“yes” answer was in fact informative in all these cases. This forms the basis of an inductive
argument that no adequate analysis of the goodness concept in terms of simpler concepts
was to be had. Because there is no adequate analysis of the goodness concept, Moore
23Sidgwick did claim that “ought” was primitive and irreducible, but Sidgwick did not draw these conclu-
sions from open question considerations. Moore was the first to do that.
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ultimately concluded that the goodness property was distinct from any other property that
can be expressed by our other concepts.
To put it another way, the openness of so many questions about whether an entity with
such-and-such a property is good provides defeasible evidence that the fact of any entity’s
being good is distinct from any fact that that entity has some other property. The evidence
would be defeated in the event that someone asked such a question that lacked the openness.
But no one has ever done this.24 So the evidence in favor of the distinctness of goodness
from natural properties, though defeasible, continues to favor the irreducibility of goodness.
Scanlon accepts that there is a sound open question argument that establishes the irre-
ducibility of the favoring relation. For example, Scanlon would concur that “the quadruple
consisting of Peter Singer, the fact that there is a drowning baby in front of Singer, Singer’s
action of saving the drowning baby, and Singer’s circumstances is in the set Γ, but is the
fact that there is a drowning baby in front of Singer a reason for Singer to save the drown-
ing baby in those circumstances?” is an informative question that requests a non-trivial
answer. Since he is also committed to the soundness of the open question argument, he
should therefore conclude that the favoring relation is not identical to the set Γ, in other
words, that it can’t fully consist in this set and must be something over and above it.
In the next section, I give a detailed investigation and criticism of the use of the term
“non-naturalism” in metaethics literature. This section does not directly contribute to the
overall argument of this dissertation, and so readers pressed for time can skip it.
24Some people say that they have: Frank Jackson (Jackson 1998), Mark Schroeder (Schroeder 2007),
David Lewis (Johnston 1989), Michael Smith (Smith 1994).
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What “naturalism” doesn’t mean
Scanlon’s commitment to irreducibly normative facts makes him a kind of metaethicist
that’s known as a “non-naturalist”. Non-naturalism is the view that normativity is “what it is
and not another [natural] thing.” If this is confusing, it’s because the term “non-naturalism”
is itself a confusing term. In my view, it’s also quite unhelpful and probably should be
exorcised from contemporary metaethical discourse.25
First, it is misleading. In suggesting that normative properties are not natural properties,
it suggests that error theorists are non-naturalists, since error theorists think that there are
no normative properties and therefore that no natural properties are normative properties.
They should therefore happy to claim that normative properties are “non-natural” in the
sense that normative properties are not natural properties. But error theorists have been
among the most influential and incisive critics of those theories that have fallen under the
“non-naturalist” label.
Secondly, the term comes with a great deal of historical baggage. We owe the origin
of the term to Moore’s influential Principia Ethica which, despite its role in drawing the
distinctions that are responsible for the creation of metaethics as a discipline, features a lot
of arguments that, from our contemporary vantage point, strike us as immature and unsound.
No one thinks that Moore is right about everything he claims about metaethics.26
Thirdly, labeling a theory as “non-naturalist” tends to produces in many of us a feeling
of contempt and dismissal towards that theory that constrains our ability to accept or reject
25I’m not suggesting that it should be exorcised from general philosophical discourse, but just from
metaethical discourse.
26Including Moore, who rejects his own claims in chapter 1 of Principia at (Schilpp 1968, pp. 581-2).
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the theory on the basis of its merits.27
Most problematically, “non-naturalism” about normative properties is a denial of nat-
uralism about normative properties, but there is no agreement in metaethics on what nat-
uralism about these properties is supposed to be. Consequently, there is no agreement in
metaethics on what non-naturalism about these properties is supposed to be.
In the remainder of this section on irreducibility, I will discuss what metaethicists have
thought they meant by natural property, give some reasons why their suggestions are mis-
leading, and then offer my own alternative formulation of the issue metaethicists are talking
about when they talk about natural properties.
Sparse properties
One reasonable approach to resolving questions about what naturalism about normative
properties is would be to defer to professional metaphysicians. Although this would nor-
mally be a reasonable thing to do, it’s not a good strategy for uncovering what metaethicists
mean by “naturalism”.
Whenmetaphysicians talk about natural properties, they tend to be talking about “sparse
properties”: the fundamental constituent properties of the universe. These are contrasted
with “abundant” properties: the gruesome properties as well as other sorts of disjunctive
properties. Lewis describes perfectly natural properties in this way:
Sharing of [the perfectly natural properties] makes for qualitative similarity,
they carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly specific, the sets of
their instances are not ipso facto entirely miscellaneous, there are only just
27This knee-jerk skepticism about “non-naturalist” views is not unique to philosophers. My students have
it, and my mom and therapists do too.
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enough of them to characterize things completely and without redundancy.
(Lewis 1986, p. 86)
The sparse property interpretation of natural properties as metaethicists talk about them
is mistaken. For example, Frank Jackson argues that normative properties are disjunctive
properties (Jackson 1998). But everyone agrees that Jackson is a normative naturalist.
Furthermore, on Moore’s view, the goodness property is a simple, intrinsic property that’s
needed in order to characterize things completely. If this view of goodness were correct,
goodness would be a sparse property and therefore a natural property on Lewis’ usage of
the term “natural”. However, Moore is the paradigmatic normative non-naturalist. Whether
a theory entails that normative properties are among the abundant properties or the sparse
properties is therefore neither necessary nor sufficient for that theory’s being a natural or
non-natural theory of normativity, as metaethicists talk use the terms.
Ostensive definitions
On another characterization of natural property, natural properties are ones that are “similar
to” the properties of a certain set of things that we point to. Loosely, on the ostensive
approach, we point to some things, define a class of things Γ as the class of all the things
that are “like” the things we pointed to, then say that the natural properties are the properties
possessed by one or more of the elements in Γ.
Jackson proposes an ostensive characterization of naturalism in a discussion of natural-
ism in the philosophy of mind. He writes,
Physicalists can give an ostensive definition of what they mean by physi-
cal properties and relations by pointing to some exemplars of non-sentient
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objects—tables, chairs, mountains, and the like—and then say that by physical
properties and relations, they mean the kinds of properties and relations needed
to give a complete account of things like them. Their clearly non-trivial claim
is then that the kinds of properties and relations needed to account for the ex-
emplars of the non-sentient are enough to account for everything. (ibid., p. 7)
In the context of the philosophy of mind, it’s essential to the ostensive strategy for spec-
ifying the natural properties that the objects one points to in the ostension procedure be
non-sentient. Jackson is not a naturalist about consciousness, and so if conscious objects
were implicated in the ostension procedure, the ostension procedure would include con-
sciousness properties among the list of natural properties. Jackson does admit that the truth
of panpsychism—the view that all objects have consciousness properties—would frustrate
the ostensive strategy for demarcating the natural from the non-natural properties. How-
ever, Jackson is not bothered by this, since he thinks panpsychism is such a fringe view that
one does not need to take it seriously.
The worries about panpsychismmirror worries that onemay have about giving an osten-
sive characterization of non-natural properties with respect to the normative sphere. “Pan-
normativism”, unlike panpsychism, is not so fringe that we can dismiss it out of hand.28 It’s
quite plausible that all, or at least the vast majority, of objects that we could in fact indicate
in an ostensive procedure have normative properties. There are good and bad tables and
chairs, and mountains can be ugly or beautiful. Another way to put the worry is that, while
we do have a way to indicate, ostensively, which objects are non-sentient, we do not have
a way to indicate, ostensively, which objects are non-normative, since exemplifications
of normative properties are much more pervasive and ubiquitous than exemplifications of
28I also think that panpsychism is worth taking more seriously than Jackson takes it, especially given the




The proposal that one finds the most in metaethics discussion of conditions for natural prop-
erty is that natural properties are the properties denoted by the concepts constituting natural
scientific theories. Shafer-Landau’s account is a good example of this. He suggests that nat-
ural properties are whatever properties are objects of study by the natural sciences, where
natural sciences are understood to be those “sciences whose fundamental principles are dis-
coverable a posteriori, through reliance primarily on empirical evidence” (Shafer-Landau
2003, p. 212). Shafer-Landau claims that his characterization “is true to all instances of
avowed ethical naturalism that [he knows] of, and does seem to capture what many have
thought to be essential to the classification” (ibid., p. 212).
Shafer-Landau’s optimism is misplaced. The main objection I have to this is that that
sciences all accept, as fundamental principles, basic metaphysical necessities, at least some
of which are not discoverable a posteriori, even in principle. As a result, the definition
entails that no domains of inquiry are natural sciences.
Take for instance the right-to-left direction of the following infamous principle of meta-
physics:
Leibniz’s Law: ∀x∀y[x ≈ y ↔ (P (x) ↔ P (y))].
This is a principle that underlays every natural science. When physicists see the track in
the electron cloud chamber, they postulate the existence of one electron, not seven indis-
cernible, consistently co-located entities with one-seventh of the mass and charge of a typ-
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ical electron. But this principle is not discoverable a posteriori, even in principle. There is
nothing that we could do to test whether the entity that caused the track in the cloud cham-
ber is one electron or seven consistently co-located entities with one-seventh of the mass
and charge of a typical electron. There are also the logical laws, such as ∀x[x ≈ x], which
feature in scientific theories but are not discoverable a posteriori even in principle.
Shafer-Landau’s disciplinary criteria of natural property to work, it would need to be
subsidized with some kind of further limitation on which fundamental principles are the
ones that need to be discoverable a posteriori in order for the theory in which the principles
feature to qualify as a natural science. But this is to supplement the disciplinary approach
with an epistemic one. The most developed epistemic approach to characterizing natural
properties in metaethics is given by David Copp, and I’ll consider his approach in the next
section.
Epistemic criteria
David Copp offers the most detailed and sophisticated characterization, epistemic or not,
of natural properties in the metaethics literature. According to Copp, natural properties are
just natural* properties, where “natural*” is defined in the following way:
Copp’s Criteria: A property N is natural* if and only if (a) it is possible for N
to be instantiated and (b) there are propositions about the instantiation ofN that
are both synthetic and possibly true, and, (c) no such proposition is strongly a
priori. (Copp 2003, p. 183)
We can safely ignore the first (a) criterion. I’m actually not sure why Copp includes it,
as he never discusses this criterion in his work. Furthermore, it’s entailed by the Principle
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of Instantiation which is accepted by most theorists of properties. The Principle of Instanti-
ation states that there are no uninstantiated properties or, equivalently, that every property
is instantiated (Armstrong 1989, p. 75). Now, for any property N, if N is instantiated, then
it is possible for N to be instantiated. If this is true for properties in general, then it will be
true a forteriori for properties of a certain kind, such as the natural* kind of properties. So
we can just leave (a) to the side.
Copp’s notion in (c) of a strongly a priori proposition expands Hartry Field’s analysis of
an a priori proposition (Field 2001, pp. 117-118). Field specifies that an a priori proposition
is a proposition that is both weakly a priori and empirically indefeasible. A weakly a priori
proposition is a proposition that can be reasonably believed without empirical evidence.
An empirically indefeasible proposition is a proposition that admits no empirical evidence
against it. Strong apriority on Copp’s definition is a weakly a priori proposition that is
empirically indefeasible for an “ideal thinker”: “a thinker with no psychological weak-
nesses, with no computational limitations, and with a full conceptual repertoire” (Copp
2003, p. 190). Copp adds this last condition in order to avoid Phillip Kitcher’s concern
that our beliefs about certain mathematical properties—say, “being such that Fermat’s last
theorem is true”, would be defeated by possible testimonial evidence from mathematicians
that claim that they have discovered a counterexample (Kitcher 1983).
The (b) condition is meant to constrain the (c) condition only to those propositions about
the instantiation of a property that are synthetic. This is needed because propositions about
the instantiation of natural properties are sometimes analytic and therefore strongly a priori
(on standard readings of analyticity). The proposition “quarks are physical” is a proposition
about a certain property that quarks have: the property of being physical. It will come out
57
analytic, since the truth of this proposition follows from the meaning of “quark” alone, and
will therefore come out strongly a priori. There would then be a strongly a priori proposition
about the property of being physical, which would mean that the property of being physical
would fail to satisfy (c) and therefore not qualify as a natural property. That would be
horrible. So we need to restrict the strongly a priori propositions that interest us to non-
analytic propositions about the instantiation of properties in order for “being physical” and
many other natural properties to avoid coming out non-natural on Copp’s reading.
Unfortunately, the conditions Copp offers are not sufficient for a property’s being natu-
ral. Coppmakes the following claim: “For example, people who accept the story of creation
in Genesis as the literal truth hold that God caused the world to exist. It would muddy the
water to take their view as naturalistic” (Copp 2003, p. 184). However, Copp’s criteria
actually serve to categorize this view as naturalistic. Here is why.
Take the proposition “the universe is God-created”, by which I mean created by the
God of the Abrahamic traditions, with the standard properties of being all-powerful, all-
good and so on. “The universe is God-created” satisfies condition (a) of Copp’s criteria,
since it’s possible that the universe instantiates the property of being created by God.29
Condition (b) is satisfied, since, on orthodox theistic views, claims that God created
the universe are both true (therefore possibly true) and also synthetic rather than analytic.30
Even on Anselm’s rationalistic picture of divine knowlege, it is analytic that God exists, but
29This would be false if the Abrahamic God’s existence were metaphysically impossible. I take it that most
philosophers take the Abrahamic God not to exist, but not that God’s existence is impossible. In fact, one is
more likely to get closest to such claims not in atheist philosophers of religion but in orthodox theologians
such as Duns Scotus, who claims that God’s existence is either necessary or impossible.
30I am not claiming here that orthodox theistic views entail that there are no analytic truths about divine
reality. I’m only asserting that they assert that the truth or falsity of claims about God’s having created the
world are synthetic.
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not analytic that God created the universe. Anselm would have known that among the list
of medieval Christian dogmas is the dogma that God’s creation of the universe was free.
In other words, God was free not to have created the world. If knowledge of God’s nature
involves knowledge that God is free to create the world or not, then we would need an
additional piece of information to conclude which of these divine actions God chose. One
would need to supplement one’s concept of God with the further empirical (non-analytic)
fact that there is a world in order to be justified in one’s belief that God created the world.
Condition (c) is satisfied, since any claim that God created the universe is empirically
defeasible and therefore not strongly a priori on Field’s definition of strong apriority. Sup-
pose we were to look around the world and see an incomprehensible amount of unmerited
suffering. This would constitute empirical evidence that the world was not created by the
all-powerful, all-good deity that Abrahamic theists believe exists.
“God-created” then, satisfies all three of Copp’s criteria and would then qualify as a
natural property. But it’s not, by Copp’s own admission. So Copp’s criteria are insufficient
for establishing that a property is natural.
Here is another, more relevant counterexample to the sufficiency of Copp’s Criteria as
criteria for a property’s being natural. Copp’s criteria also qualify “prohibited by God” as
naturalistic. But it’s not.
On divine command theories, what it is for an action to be wrong is for that action to be
prohibited byGod or some other specified divine entity. However, onmost divine command
theories, the set of divine prohibitions is either revealed through somemiraculous event like
the Christ event (as John Calvin asserts), or such that at least some of the prohibitions are
knowable in virtue of their constituting part of the natural law (as Aquinas asserts). In other
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words, divine command theorists who believe in God31 don’t typically think that we have
a priori knowledge of the inner workings of God’s mind that can tell us what actions God
prohibits. In order for us to know anything about what actions are prohibited and therefore
what actions are wrong, God either has to manipulate the world through some miraculous
event (giving angels natural causal powers, writing the laws in stone tablets, etc) to make
known the set of prohibitions, or God has to have designed our intellects in such a way
that we can make good inferences into the nature of the divine mind from the fact that the
world that God created has the features that it does. But the epistemic conclusions that one
would draw in either of these ways would be synthetic (empirical). They would also not
be strongly a priori, even for an ideal thinker. This is because they would be empirically
defeasible: if we discovered that the golden plates were carved not by Moroni but by John
Smith, or that the world has different features than it in fact did, then we could be rationally
required to rethink our conclusions about what actions God is prohibiting. “Prohibited by
God” would therefore come out as a natural property, which, again, would “muddy the
waters” as to what ought to count as naturalistic. No one in metaethics thinks that, if the
property of being wrong just were the property of being prohibited by God, then wrongness
would be a naturalistic property. This goes to show that Copp’s Criteria not only fail to give
an account of natural property simpliciter, but they also fail to give an account of natural
property that respects the usage of the term “naturalism” in metaethics.32
31You could be a divine command theorist but fail to believe in God, in which case we’d have the “God is
dead; everything is permissible” situation that Dostoevsky writes so eloquently about.
32With heady terms like “naturalism”, with many different uses across myriad disciplines (philosophical
and not) one may reasonably wonder who gets to say what counts as natural and what does not. Someone, for
instance, might state that divine properties are perfectly natural and, in cases of disagreement such as these,
one can reasonably ask “Who’s right: this other person or me?” In my estimation, both are right–not because
this would be a case of faultless disagreement, but because “naturalism” is multiply ambiguous and admits
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Jettisoning “naturalism”
These previous reflections have aimed to show that there is no adequate characterization
of what it is for a property to be natural as metaethicists use the term. In my view, part
of why we have had trouble giving a characterization of natural property in metaethics is
because metaethicists themselves are guilty of inconsistent usage. For instance, take Brink,
a paradigmatic Cornell realist and a naturalist. Brink is a “non-reductive” realist: he thinks
that normative properties are constituted by, but not identical to, the other natural properties
that feature in the natural and social sciences. Shafer-Landau also thinks that normative
properties are constituted by, but not identical to, the other natural properties that feature
in the natural and social sciences. Yet Shafer-Landau is considered to be a non-naturalist
even though Brink is considered to be a naturalist.
This general inconsistency and confusion among metaethicists in their use of the terms
“natural” and “non-natural” is largely due to the terminological idiosyncrasies in Moore’s
original presentation of his variety of moral intuitionism. Moore himself gave four distinct
characterizations of natural properties in his Principia: as intrinsic properties, as properties
that exist in time, as properties that can be objects of perception, and as properties that
can exist by themselves. None of these characterizations make any sense,33 so it stands
to reason why philosophers to this day remain confused about what non-naturalism about
normative properties is supposed to be.
of a variety of definitions and possible precisifications. There is no one single definition of “naturalism” that
can make sense of uses of the term across the many disciplines that make use of it. Indeed, if I am right,
there is no one single definition of “naturalism” that can make sense of uses of the term even within the single
discipline of metaethics. It is for this reason that this dissertation uses the technical term “irreducibility”,
which I characterize in the next section, rather than the multiply ambiguous term “non-naturalism”.
33For more on why, see (Dreier 2006).
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As I said at the beginning of this discussion of “naturalism” and “non-naturalism”, I
think that the terms “natural” and “non-natural” carry so much historical baggage that we
should jettison them from our lexicon. Philosophers are happy to jettison confused and
ambiguous folk terms in order to achieve philosophical precision, and it seems tome that the
same principle can motivate jettisoning of confused and ambiguous philosophical terms as
well. Shafer-Landau is right, I think, in suggesting that “we need to ask just howmuch of the
[naturalism/non-naturalism] debate has become a matter of taxonomic bookkeeping, and
how much of philosophical significance is really at stake. What matters is not what we call
a view, but whether the view, whatever its denomination, can solve the central philosophical
problems that have generated the division between naturalists and non-naturalists” (Shafer-
Landau 2003, p. 62).
Furthermore, to the extent that the terms “naturalism” and “non-naturalism” in
metaethics do make sense, they most likely refer to distinct views in the epistemology of
normativity rather than the metaphysics of normativity. This is problematic, because the
natural/non-natural distinction is almost exclusively cached out as a distinction between
positions in the metaphysics of normativity. Jettisoning these terms and replacing them
with two kinds of distinctions—a distinction between positions in the metaphysics of nor-
mativity and a distinction between positions in the epistemology of normativity—will help
clarify the lines of debate and help metaethicists make more rapid progress.
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Characterizing irreducibility
In this subsection, I will give my own characterization, not of naturalism in metaethics,
whatever that is supposed to be, but of a view that I take to have clear philosophical sig-
nificance for the metaphysics of normative properties. That view is irreduciblism or irre-
ducibility. Irreducibility about the favoring relation, as I stated at the very beginning of
this chapter, is the view that the favoring relation is not normatively masked. Reducibility
about the favoring relation, in contrast, is the view that the favoring relation is normatively
masked. In order to explain what irreducibility and reducibility are, then, I have to explain
normative masking.
Normative masking
Here is the idea. You take all our non-demonstrative, n-ary predicate concepts and write
them all down in a list, along with their reference conditions. The list of predicate concepts
will include concepts like squareness, being tall, being morally good, and being a reason
for an action for an agent in a circumstance. They will not include the concept of a table or
Socrates, since these are not predicate concepts.34 The reference conditions for a predicate
concept will be those conditions thatmust be satisfied by a property in order for the predicate
concept to refer to it. Then add in all the predicate concepts that we would need to construct
all the true empirical theories, whatever those happen to be, along with their reference
conditions as well.
Now, divide these concept/reference-condition pairs into two sets: the set A consisting
of the normative concepts; and the set B consisting of (a) the non-normative concepts plus
34I assume, along with Scanlon, that there are no normative objects, but only normative properties.
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(b) the non-normative predicate concepts needed to express all true empirical theories. Each
of these pairs of concept and reference conditions will tell us what property or properties
fall under the concept in a given world. In some cases, the reference will be the empty set,
such as the concept pair consisting of the concept phlogiston and its reference condition. In
other cases, the reference will be non-empty, such as the concept “being tall”.
Take the set of all the properties denoted in a world w by one or more of the con-
cept/reference condition pairs in A and call that Rw(A). Take the set of all the properties
denoted by one of more of the concept/reference-condition pairs in B and call the Rw(B).
Some normative property P is normatively masked in w just if it is a non-empty member
of both Rw(A) and Rw(B). One is a reduciblist about P in w iff one holds that P is in-
stantiated (exists) in w and is normatively masked, and one is an irreduciblist about P in
w iff one holds that P is instantiated (exists) in w and is not normatively masked. In what
follows, I will just assume that the world in question is ours.
The “non-demonstrative” clause is important. Take the demonstrative concept “what
Jeff just denoted”. This probably qualifies as a non-normative concept and as such would
end up in one of the pairs in B. However, if Jeff just denoted the property of being morally
right, and “what Jeff just denoted” ended up in B in virtue of its being a non-normative
concept, then R(B) then includes moral rightness, moral rightness ends up being norma-
tively masked, and anyone who thinks that moral rightness is a property would qualify as a
reduciblist. Since I’m trying to give a procedure for distinguishing reduciblists from irre-
duciblists, I can’t allow this. So, as a response, I just exclude these sorts of demonstrative
concepts from my account.
The “true empirical theories” clause is also important. Suppose that our current empiri-
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cal theories are false and we have not yet done the empirical investigation needed to acquire
the concepts we would need to construct the set of true empirical theories, whatever those
may happen to turn out to be. Now we do that empirical investigation and gain the corre-
sponding concepts. Some future philosopher Jones then says that moral goodness denotes
some descriptive part of the world that we can’t currently refer to in a non-demonstrative
fashion. If the set of concept/reference-condition pairs in B do not include these new con-
cepts, then there would be no property in R(B) that C denotes, and Smith would be an
irreduciblist about moral goodness. But we should not consider Jones to be an irreducib-
list, since he is identifying moral goodness with a property that falls under a non-normative
concept.
We can’t actually enumerate all the concepts in A and B. In particular, my account
assures that we cannot do so, at least not yet, if we assume (reasonably, I think) that we
don’t yet possess all the concepts needed to express all true empirical theories. Fortunately,
I don’t need us to be able to enumerate all such concepts. All I need is for us, in principle,
to be able to distinguish between the normative concepts and the non-normative ones. By a
“normative” concept, I mean the broadest class of concepts that directly express any content
about how the world ought to be or could ought to be, and by a non-normative concept I
mean the broadest class of concepts and property that do not directly express any content
about how the world ought to be or could ought to be. I am, however, not providing a
procedure as to how to demarcate the normative concepts from the non-normative concepts.
I simply assume that there is such a procedure.35
35Many have been proposed. Searle, for instance, suggests that the distinction can be cashed out in terms of
direction of fit (Searle 1989, p. 91). Normative concepts, Searle suggests, have a “mind-to-world” direction of
fit, while non-normative concepts have a “world-to-mind” direction of fit. Also see (Schroeter and Schroeter
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All I am doing here is providing a formal characterization of what is at stake in debates
between what I’m calling irreduciblism and reduciblism about normative properties. In
general, these debates will map onto what has traditionally been understood to be the debate
between non-naturalism and naturalism about normative properties. However, as I have
said, I find these terms misleading and think that they have confused the lines of the debate
so that they no longer make much sense. I offer the characterization I offer here in an
attempt to make these lines sharper.
If the normative/non-normative concept distinction is hopelessly confused, as Jackson
worries (Jackson 1998, p. 121), then my proposed characterization of what’s at stake be-
tween irreduciblism and reduciblism about normative properties is a non-starter. However,
I think that this is a virtue of my approach. If the normative/non-normative concept dis-
tinction turns out to be a hopeless confusion, then we should not be surprised to find that
various other metaethical theses that rely on such a distinction are also a hopeless confusion.
Furthermore, I have already tried to argue that the naturalism/non-naturalism distinction is
already at least a confusion, if not a hopeless one, so if the distinction between normative
and non-normative concepts also turns out to be confused, nothing at least will have been
lost by adopting my approach.36
2014) for a review of various other attempts to cache out the distinction, as well as Schroeter and Schroeter’s
own novel theory.
36Lastly, there is a position in logical space according to which we do not have any normative concepts.
On this view, the normative/non-normative concept distinction is coherent, but we just happen not to have
any normative concepts. I’m construing the normative properties as properties that stand under normative
concepts. Since, on the no-normative-concept view, there are no normative concepts for properties to stand
under, such a person would count neither as a reduciblist nor as an irreduciblist on my characterization of
these views. However, I think that this is the correct result. The hypothetical defender of the no-normative-
concept position that I just described must admit that they have no conception of what it might mean for
a property to be a normative property, and so they would not be in a position to offer substantive theories
about the metaphysics of normative properties. Reduciblism and irreduciblism are substantive theories of
the metaphysics of normative properties, so defenders of the no-normative-concept view therefore cannot
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Normative masking in action
To see my account of irreduciblism at work, we can apply it to the example of reductive
hedonism about goodness: the view that goodness is numerically identical to pleasure and
the absence of pain. For the reductive hedonist, the goodness property stands under two
distinct concepts: the concept “good” (a normative concept), and the concept “pleasure and
the absence of pain” (which, we assume, is a non-normative concept). If reductive hedo-
nism about goodness is true, then goodness is normatively masked, since it is a normative
property but it stands under the non-normative concept of pleasure and the absence of pain.
Similarly, Schroeder is a reductivist or reduciblist about the favoring relation. For
Schroeder,
For some fact R to favor X to do action A in circumstances C is for there to be
some state of affairs p such that X has a desire whose object is p, and the truth
of R is part of what explains why X ’s doing A promotes p in C. (modified from
(Schroeder 2007, p. 59))
For Schroeder, the favoring relation F(R, X, A, C) stands under two concepts: the concept
of R’s favoring X’s A-ing in C (a normative concept); and the concept of R’s partially
explaining why A satisfies a desire of X in C (a non-normative concept). The favoring
relation is therefore normatively masked, since it is a normative property but stands under
a non-normative concept: that of a partial explanation of the promotion of a desire of an
agent in a circumstance. The irreduciblist will accept that there is such a thing as a partial
explanation of why an agent’s doing some action would satisfy one of her desires in some
accept either such theory. In terms of their semantics, I suspect that they would have to come out either as
error theorists or as quietists about normative discourse. I suspect that a lot of philosophers working outside
metaethics defend positions that do ultimately commit them to the no-normative-concept view. However,
since no one, to my knowledge, defends this position in print, I do not treat it more extensively in the body
of this dissertation.
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circumstance. The irreduciblist simply denies that this is what it is for a reason to favor
some action of an agent in a circumstance, since the irreduciblist about the favoring relation
simply claims that there is no non-normative concept that the favoring relation stands under.
Virtues of the normative masking approach
The reducibility/irreducibility issue is philosophically important and philosophically help-
ful. It is fundamentally the issue of what normative properties are. If Schroeder’s theory
reduciblist theory of reasons is true, then what it is to be a reason is to be a partial ex-
planation of why an agent’s doing some action would satisfy one of her desires in some
circumstance.
Casting the debate between reducibility and irreducibility also helps to isolate norma-
tive metaphysics from normative epistemology. Normative epistemology is really impor-
tant; however, it is not normative metaphysics and should be understood as a separate area
of metaethical inquiry. In particular, Brink and Shafer-Landau are both irreduciblists on
my account, but they differ on the question of moral epistemology: Shafer-Landau thinks
that ethics is an a priori discipline, while Brink thinks that it is a matter of a posteriori in-
vestigation into which irreducible properties causally regulate our use of normative terms.
Different reduciblists also take distinct approaches to moral metaphysics. Jackson, for in-
stance, is a reduciblist who thinks that ethics is an a priori discipline; while Boyd thinks that
moral goodness, for instance, reduces to those first-order systems that promote andmaintain
human homeostatic equilibria, and thus that we need empirical investigation to determine
what systems promote and maintain human homeostatic equilibria. There are, therefore, at




irreducibility e.g. Shafer-Landau e.g. Brink
reducibility e.g. Jackson e.g. Boyd
I have argued that the non-naturalism/naturalism distinction in metaethics is confused and
possibly incoherent. If the distinction does turn out to be coherent, I suspect that the dis-
tinction would have to amount to the distinction between, on the one hand, the a priori
irreduciblist position indicated in the typology chart, and, on the other, the other three posi-
tions indicated in the chart.37 This is an unhelpful way to divide the logical space expressed
in the chart, as it ignores important differences between the three views that “naturalism”
lumps together. My approach to understanding the logical space helps both to clarify the
lines of metaethical debate and to underscore that there are more positions in logical space
than the non-naturalism/naturalism distinction allows.
Virtues of irreduciblism
Why be an irreduciblist? In this section, I will give four arguments in irreduciblism’s favor.
First is the infamous open question argument, first articulated by Moore.38 Although,
on my view, Moore made important and hugely influential contributions to ethical theory,
37I actually expect that “naturalism” is ambiguous as to whether the a posteriori irreduciblist position
counts as naturalism. As I will discuss in §4, I think that Brink’s view is not clearly a naturalist view, despite
its commitment to an a posteriori epistemology of normativity.
38Sidgwick did claim that “ought” was primitive and irreducible, but Sidgwick did not draw these conclu-
sions from open question considerations. Moore was the first to do that.
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Moore’s version of the open question argument has issues. One major issue is its implicit
reliance on something like the following principle:
Primitivism-Entails-Irreducibility: For all terms that denote properties, if a
term expresses a primitive concept, then the property that that term denotes
is an irreducible property.
Moore made implicit appeal to this principle in the open question argument. However,
Primitivism-Entails-Irreducibility admits of many counterexamples. The concept “I” is
primitive and refers (in my mouth) to me. But the me that it refers to is whatever I am:
biological individual, set of interconnected memories or what have you. Our “heat” con-
cept is a primitive concept and refers to heat. But the heat that it refers to is molecular
motion. Our “time” concept is primitive and refers to time. But the time that it refers to is
a component of Minkowski spacetime. Me, heat, and time are not irreducible, since they
(we) reduce respectively to a biological individual, molecular motion, and a component of
Minkowski spacetime despite the primitivity of the concepts that denote them (us).
Although these are legitimate concerns about Moore’s argument, to dismiss Moore’s
views on the basis of one’s dismissal of this argument would be to too quickly dismiss
these views. Kit Fine (Fine 2002) claims that Moore’s real argument for the irreduciblist
nature of goodness was not the oft-cited material from Chapter 1 of Principia Ethica, but
rather a lesser-quoted article of Moore’s called “The Conception of Intrinsic Value”. The
insight expressed there, according to Fine, is not that “good” does not admit of an adequate
analysis, but that, for any purported real definition of goodness (say, of promoting pleasure
over pain), we have a strong intuition that something’s being good consists in something
more than the purported real definition. In other words, even if it were a conceptual truth
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that something is good iff it promotes pleasure over pain, there is still the question why this
would be the case. If the answer to this question were “something’s being good consists in
nothing over and above its promoting pleasure over pain”, then it would be reasonable to
suggest that the conceptual truth that something is good iff it promotes pleasure over pain
holds because goodness would then just be the promotion of pleasure over pain. However,
we have an intuition that goodness consists of something more than the promotion of plea-
sure over pain. So, even if it were a conceptual truth that something is good iff it promotes
pleasure over pain, this itself is not sufficient to establish that goodness just is the promotion
of pleasure over pain. Moore’s irreduciblist conclusions could then still be vindicated even
if someone does discover that, necessarily, for any x, x is good iff x promotes pleasure over
pain.
I think that Fine is right about this. I think that Fine is right that we have a metaphysical
intuition that the goodness of something consists in something over and above this thing’s
promotion of pleasure over pain, or any other property that this thing possesses. The truth
of this has important ramifications on our understanding of the relation between evidence
for irreducibility and the open question argument. I suggested earlier that, if there were
no nominal definition P of goodness such that there were a non-informative question of
the sort “x is P, but is x good?”, then this provides defeasible warrant for the irreduciblist
conclusion. It’s defeasible, of course, because we could discover a posteriori that good-
ness was coextensive with the promotion of pleasure over pain, which raises the issue of
reducibility. However, if someone were to propose “promotion of pleasure over pain” as
a real definition of goodness, the irreduciblist can call back on the Finean intuition that
something’s being good consists in something over and above its promoting pleasure over
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pain to defend irreduciblism even against the failure of open question phenomena.
A third argument is an argument from the existence of commitments and akrasia. “Com-
mitment” is an umbrella term that references a variety ofmental states and linguistic entities:
intentions, promises, convictions, to name a few. What they have in common is that they
set standards that we are committed to upholding. That’s why they are called commitments.
All of us can think of a time when we have had a commitment—to a deadline, a loved one,
a student—and failed to live up to it. In such a case, we experienced what is sometimes
called akrasia: weakness of will, a failure to live up to what one has willed to do. In fact,
it is possible for someone to be committed to something even if they never ever live up to
the standard. One stark example is athletic competition. For every Olympic sport, many
people are committed to winning it, yet only one will actually live up to this commitment.
The fact that one can have a commitment to some state of affairs X obtaining and yet never
live up to this standard indicates that a commitment to X cannot be simply a disposition to
X. Commitments, then, are a distinct kind of mental state than dispositions. But commit-
ments are normative. So commitments present an example of a normative state that fails to
reduce to non-normative states such as dispositions.
A fourth argument for irreduciblism is given by Brink (Brink 1989, pp. 158-159). Brink
argues that normative terms are causally regulated by multiply realizable normative prop-
erties. What this means, for example, is that, in our world, our term “injustice” will refer
to a certain concatenation of economic and social properties that realize the property of in-
justice. However, there will be other worlds in which these specific economic and social
properties will not realize the property of injustice, and worlds in which other economic and
social properties do realize the property of injustice. For example, the economic condition
72
in which Nestle owns all the water rights in large swaths of Kenya realizes injustice in our
world, but in worlds in which people in Kenya didn’t need water or had sufficient financial
assets to pay Nestle for water, this particular economic condition perhaps would not realize
the property of injustice. Furthermore, the economic condition of harvesting seaweed to
sell to consumers does not realize the property of injustice in our world, but they might in
worlds in which seaweed were sentient. Now, we could say that the property that causally
regulates “injustice” was some disjunctive property, in which case we could say that the
property that causally regulates “injustice” just was the property “monopolizing of water
access or harvesting sentient seaweed or ... or ....” However, there are no disjunctive prop-
erties. So we cannot say that this disjunctive property is the property that uniquely causally
regulates our use of “injustice”. Ditto for the other normative properties. I discuss this
argument for irreducibility in more detail in §4.
Concluding Irreducibility
In this section §2.5, I have discussed Scanlon’s approach to normative metaphysics, argued
that this approach is insufficient, discussed how this approach maps onto a position that
metaethicists call “non-naturalism”, argued that the use of this term is insufficiently precise
to delineate an actual metaethical position, offered my own characterization of positions on
amajor issue in normativemetaphysics that I think better delineates what these positions are
supposed to be, and then discussed virtues both of this characterization and of irreducibility
in general. In the next section, I will move on to motivating and characterizing the reasons
fundamentalist’s commitment to supervenience.
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2.5 Supervenience
Reasons fundamentalists agree with basically everyone that normative reality “covaries”
with non-normative reality: the world’s normative features cannot vary entirely indepen-
dently of the world’s non-normative features; variation in normative reality requires varia-
tion in non-normative reality.
Instead of using terms like “covariation”, most philosophers of normativity prefer the
term “supervenience”. I will follow the terminological tradition and use the term “superve-
nience” as well. Since I am concerned particularly about the supervenience of normative
properties on whatever they supervene upon (or don’t supervene upon), I’ll also use the
term “normative supervenience”.
In this section, I only discuss formulations of supervenience that characterize the sub-
vening (base) properties as non-normative properties. I will call these formulations “ad-
ditive” formulations of normative supervenience. I call them “additive” formulations be-
cause the picture of normativity that emerges from this view of normative supervenience,
is as something that is added on to non-normative reality–dropped on top of non-normative
reality from above, so to speak. On the additive picture of normativity, we can in principle
coherently and correctly imagine the following two things: our world, with all its normative
and non-normative features; and our world with just its non-normative features.
If it helps, consider the following pair of “normativity glasses”. Normativity glasses are
just like sunglasses, except for two things. First, unlike sunglasses, wearing them does not
filter out sunlight but filters out normativity instead. Second, unlike sunglasses, normativity
glasses don’t exist. This is a thought experiment.
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Normativity glasses work like this. When not wearing the glasses, one’s conception of
the world is as of possessing normative and non-normative features. But then, when one
puts the glasses on, one finds the normative features of the world stripped away, leaving
only the non-normative features that characterized one’s conception of the world when not
wearing the glasses. The additive picture of normativity is a picture of normativity on which
the normative sunglasses thought experiment is coherent.
Although I personally find this metaphor helpful, others may find the normativity
glasses metaphor to be confusing. Glasses, for instance, can do lots of things to our concep-
tion of the world. In addition to stripping away features from the perceptual experience of
the world, they can also distort the experience or add additional features. My normativity
glasses are doing one specific thing: stripping away from one’s conception of the world
the world’s normative features, leaving the non-normative features intact and undistorted.
However, I don’t need the normativity glasses metaphor to explain the additive picture of
normativity. Enough work is done by the term “additive”. Simply put, the additive con-
ception of normativity is a conception of the world’s normative features as being features
that we can conceive as being added to or subtracted from the objects of the world and their
non-normative features.39
Additive formulations of supervenience are contrasted with what I will call “transfor-
mative” formulations of supervenience, which specify that the subvening properties them-
selves be normative. Although I cannot talk in more detail about these formulations in this
chapter on reasons fundamentalism, I will talk in considerably more detail about them in
39Of course, if one accepts that normative reality supervenes on non-normative reality with metaphysical
necessity, it would not be possible to add or subtract normative features from the world, leaving the non-
normative features of that world intact and undistorted.
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§4.40
In this section, I’ll first talk in a more colloquial fashion about what normative superve-
nience is. I’ll then explain why it is so universally accepted. Then I’ll give a more precise
characterization of the kind of normative supervenience that is uncontroversially accepted.
The purpose of this work is to both motivate normative supervenience as an important
philosophical topic and provide a platform for my arguments in §3, where I will argue that
reasons fundmentalism cannot explain why the normative features of the world supervene
on the world’s descriptive features.
Any reasons fundamentalist who accepts supervenience will also be committed to some
sort of additive variety of supervenience. Here is Centrality again:
Centrality: For all facts F , F is a normative fact only if F is a reasons fact or
F embeds a reasons fact.
A reasons fact is just a fact that some other fact is a reason. I mentioned in §2.2 that one
potentially surprising implication of Centrality is that most reasons are not normative facts,
since most reasons are not facts about some other facts’ being a reason. So take again the
Tyranny Fact: Acts of terrorism against citizens of Western countries tend to
strengthen tyrannical impulses on the part of Western governments.
We’ll suppose again that, given our current global situation, Tyranny Fact is a reason for
critics of the West not to commit acts of terrorism against citizens of the West. However,
there is nothing about Tyranny Fact itself that has direct implications for how the world
40My inspiration for the additive/transformative distinction is an influential pair of papers by Matthew
Boyle, who uses a similar distinction in order to contrast two distinct interpretations of howAristotle conceives
of the relation between desires and reason–see (Boyle 2009) and (Boyle 2016).
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ought to be or could ought to be. On the reasons fundamentalist picture, a fact has direct
implications about how the world ought to be or could ought to be if it is a reasons fact:
a higher-order fact that some lower-order fact is a reason. This is what Centrality means.
Since Tyranny Fact is not a fact about some other fact’s being a reason, it does not itself
qualify as a normative fact. It is thoroughly non-normative.
Normative supervenience is a feature of normative properties such that, if something
instantiates a normative property, then anything relevantly like that thing also instantiates
the same normative property. Therefore, normative supervenience says that, if Tyranny
Fact is a reason, then anything relevantly similar to Tyranny Fact will also be a reason. Per
hypothesi, Tyranny Fact instantiates the normative property of being a reason. So normative
supervenience says that anything relevantly like Tyranny Fact instantiates the normative
property of being a reason as well.
Here, finally, is the argument that Centrality commits the reasons fundamentalist to a
specifically additive formulation of supervenience. Let the relevance properties of Tyranny
Fact be the set of properties P of Tyranny Fact such that anything instantiating all the
properties in P qualifies as being relevantly similar to Tyranny Fact for the purposes of the
supervenience claim. By Centrality, any normative property of Tyranny Fact will either
be the second-order normative fact that Tyranny Fact is a reason, or some purely formal,
higher-order fact built up out of the fact that Tyranny Fact is a reason. Therefore, the only
substantive normative property that’s available to us to construct the relevance properties
of Tyranny Fact is the property of being a reason. If the property of being a reason were
part of the relevance properties of Tyranny Fact, then the supervenience claim would be
trivial, since it would just state that, if Tyranny Fact is a reason, then anything that has
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the various relevance properties of Tyranny Fact and is also a reason is a reason as well.
Normative supervenience is not a trivial relation. Therefore, the relevance properties of
Tyranny Fact need to be all non-normative. If that’s true, then normative supervenience says
that, if any fact instantiates a normative property, then anything relevantly non-normatively
like that thing also instantiates the same normative property. But this just is the general
formulation of additive supervenience. Any reasons fundamentalist who accepts normative
supervenience at all is therefore committed to some additive variety of supervenience.
What is normative supervenience?
Roughly, A supervenes onB just if any change inA is accompanied by a change inB. You
have a lot ofH2O molecules in your Nalgene bottle right now. You also have water in that
Nalgene bottle. Now suppose that there were that same Nalgene bottle with those same
H2O molecules in it, but no water were there. Well, that can’t be: it’s impossible for there
to be a Nalgene bottle filled with H2O molecules that does not also contain water. After
all, water just is H2O molecules.
When we say that it’s impossible for there to be a Nalgene bottle filled with H2O
molecules but empty of water, we are making a claim about a certain relation that holds
between H2O molecules and water (in the presence of the Nalgene bottle): that whenever
you haveH2O molecules (in the presence of the Nalgene bottle), you will also have water.
In other words, the presence of water supervenes on the presence of H2O molecules: you
can’t have a state of affairs featuring the presence of H2O molecules without it also being
true of that state of affairs that water is present.
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In the water/H2O case, we also have an explanation as to why the presence of water
supervenes on the presence of H2O molecules. The explanation is that water just is H2O
molecules, where the “is” here is the “is” of identity. Clearly something can’t be present
unless it itself is present, so it stands to reason that water will be present whenever H2O
molecules are present.
Since we can explain the supervenience present in the water/H2O case by appealing to
the identity of water andH2O, it also turns out not only that the presence ofwater supervenes
on the presence ofH2O, but that the presence ofH2O supervenes on the presence of water.
H2O and water are the same thing, so whenever you have water present, it stands to reason
that you will also have H2O.41
Most cases of supervenience are not symmetrical in this way. In other words, when the
presence of something—a fact, property, object; just call it X—supervenes on the presence
of something else Y, it’s usually not also true that the presence of Y will supervene on the
presence of X. When an object is blue, for instance, that object must be colored. You can’t
take away the object’s “coloredness” (its property of being colored) without also taking
away its blueness. Therefore the coloredness of an object supervenes on the blueness of
that object.42 But it is not true that whenever an object is colored, it must be blue. It could
be green or red instead. You can easily take away the blueness of an object (replacing it
with redness, for instance) without taking away that object’s property of being colored. So
41Some formulations of supervenience, such as those found in the philosophy of science, do not allow
supervenience to be symmetrical in this way. The metaphysics and metaethics literature, in contrast, tend to
include symmetrical varieties of supervenience as genuine kinds of supervenience. I will use supervenience
in this latter, more capacious way.
42It also supervenes on the object’s redness, maroonness and so on, since taking away its coloredness
would also require that you take away its greenness, redness and so on.
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the object’s blueness does not supervene on that object’s coloredness.
Normative supervenience is an instance of this more typical, asymmetrical kind of su-
pervenience. When we say that normative reality supervenes on non-normative reality, we
mean something like this:
LetX denote a dictatorial leader. Now think of all the things thatX did: sign ex-
ecution orders for thousands of people, allocate the federal budget overwhelm-
ingly towards military spending, and so on. He was pretty morally bad, no?
Now imagine a person Y who is just like X, with just the same psychological
history and dispositions as X, placed in the same historical and political circum-
stances as X, and who made the same choices as X which had the same effects
on the world as X ’s did. That guy Y seems pretty morally bad too, right?
Yes, that guy Y does seem pretty morally bad. If you think that other guy Y is not only
morally bad but has to be morally bad given the moral badness of X—in other words, if
you think it couldn’t be otherwise that Y is morally bad when X is—you think that moral
badness supervenes (on some sense we have not specified) at least given all those other
causal, psychological, and historical features described in the quotation above.
Another way to think of normative supervenience is as a constraint on combinations of
properties denoted by distinct vocabulary sets. One set of vocabulary–the normative vocab-
ulary set–contains terms like “cruelty”, “goodness”, “honesty”, “beauty”; the other set (the
“non-normative vocabulary” set) contains terms like “redness”, “squareness”, “heat”, “im-
mobility”. The supervenience constraint is simply that any two objects that share the same
set of non-normative truths also share the same normative truths. To put it another way,
suppose that there are two numerically distinct objects x and y such that any non-normative
truth about x is also a non-normative truth about y, and any non-normative truth about y is
also a non-normative truth about x. Normative supervenience would then entail that any
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normative truth of x is a normative truth of y, and any normative truth of y is a normative
truth of x.43
This, very roughly, is normative supervenience. It is, however, another question entirely
why people do and should accept it. In the next subsection I’ll discuss why people accept
it, and I’ll follow that subsection with a precise formulation of what it is that metaethicists
seem to be minimally accepting when they accept normative supervenience.
The least controversial doctrine
There can be no normative difference without a non-normative difference–at least, that
is what we say. Normative supervenience is a doctrine that’s affirmed by everyone in
metaethics: realist irreduciblists44 as well as realist reduciblists,45, particularists46 as well
as generalists, and even the wide array of normative non-realists: error theorists (Olson
2012, p. 92), subjectivists (Smith 1994, pp. 21-22), constructivists (Meyers 2012, p. 12)
and expressivists47.
So uncontroversial is the doctrine of normative supervenience that its being uncontro-
versial is nearly as uncontroversial as the view itself.48 ThusMichael Smith claims, “Every-
43I myself think that this way to understand supervenience is somewhat misleading, since it construes the
supervenience constraint as a semantic constraint rather than a metaphysical one, a constraint on admissible
descriptions rather than a constraint on admissible property instantiations. I’ve found, however, that this way
of explaining supervenience has helped some interlocutors understand the phenomenon, so I include it here.
44e.g. (Shafer-Landau 2003, p. 77), (Enoch 2011, pp. 136-137), (Scanlon 2014, p. 33), (Parfit 2011,
p. 756), (Kaspar 2012, section on “Supervenience Problems”).
45e.g., (Jackson 1998, p. 118)
46 (Dancy 2004, pp. 86-7), (Strandberg 2008, pp. 129-158), (McDowell 1998, p. 202), (McNaughton
1988, p. 62).
47 (Hare 1984), (Blackburn 1993), (Gibbard 2003).
48 (Shafer-Landau 2003, p. 77), (Majors 2009, p. 29), (Sturgeon 2009, p. 53).
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one agrees that the normative features of things supervene on their natural features” (Smith
1994, p. 21) and that “everyone agrees that this is a platitude, an a priori truth” (ibid., p. 22).
Michael Ridge calls the supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive “a basic platitude”
(Ridge 2007, §6) and that “someone who denied a suitably formulated supervenience the-
sis would thereby give evidence that he is not a fully competent user of normative terms”
(ibid., p. 331).49
I have long found these claims disturbing. Philosophers are contentious folk, particu-
larly in the domain of moral theory; controversy over doctrines tends to be the norm rather
than the exception. Uncontroversy is unusual—even, we might say, a queer feature of our
metaethical discourse, one in need of explanation and defense. And yet, to my knowl-
edge, there are only two philosophers who explicitly state in print that they do not accept
additive supervenience. The first is Gideon Rosen, who is moved by considerations of neo-
essentialism to call supervenience into question. The second is Akeel Bilgrami, who argues
that there exists no coherently formulable statement of a normative supervenience doctrine.
I will discuss both of these views extensively in the later chapters of this dissertation.
Why does nearly everyone accept supervenience? Here are some reasons.
Supervenience and intuitions
The dictator illustration that I gave in the last section aimed to pump your intuitions about
normative supervenience. If you thought the dictator duplicate was morally bad on the
49Nicholas Sturgeon argues that normative supervenience is only uncontroversial as a general doctrine,
but that, when one teases apart the specific formulations that various theorists commit themselves to, we
find that there is no single precise formulation that everyone agrees with. However, the various formulations
Sturgeon describes concern how exactly to specify the nature of the non-normative reality that normative
reality is supposed to supervene on. He does not dispute that nearly everyone accepts that normative reality
supervenes on non-normative reality in some general sense.
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assumption that the real-world dictator was, then you have the normative supervenience
intuition. And if you have this intuition, you are also part of the very large majority of
philosophers who also say they share the intuition, because the vast majority of philosophers
say they do.
Non-philosophical folk may have the intuition as well. Frank Jackson, a renowned
champion of the folk, remarks that “the most salient and least controversial part of folk
moral theory is that normative properties supervene on descriptive [non-normative] prop-
erties, that the ethical way things are supervenes on the descriptive ]non-normative] way
things are” (Jackson 1998, p. 118). Since Jackson makes this claim without any additional
elaboration, it is not clear what Jackson means by this or why he thinks it is true. He has
not, as far as I know, measured reactions from non-philosophers by means of survey ques-
tionnaires or magnetic resonance imaging. My best guess is that he means that the folk
as well as the professional philosophers have the intuitions that underlie the dictator case
above. This, I take it, is probably true.
My take is that intuition-based defenses of philosophical positions are fine as they stand,
but they at best provide only defeasible support in favor of philosophical positions. Intu-
itions are subject to the tribunal of philosophical reflection. For instance, we can consider
a hypothetical error theorist, who might say, “Sure, Hitler seems pretty bad, but it turns out
that he’s not, because after all we have good theoretical reasons to think that there are no
instantiated normative properties at all.” Intuitions also face the tribunal of psychologically-
based etiological debunking, as Joshua Greene’s work as been keen to show (Greene 2007).
The second argument in favor of normative supervenience—the argument from folk
morality—is surprising. Supervenience, first of all, is a fairly obscure topic, and one that
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did not even merit much philosophical discussion until the past several decades. It is un-
likely that, as Brink says about moral motivational internalism, “any belief so recherche
could be part of common sense moral thinking” (Brink 1984). Second, folk morality is no-
toriously a mess of conflicting intuitions (Sverdlik 1985). In their attempts to impose some
systematicity into folk morality, there seems to be no aspect of it that moral philosophers
have left unchallenged. The utilitarian’s struggles with folk theories of love and friendship,
the error theorist’s dismissal of ethical truth—these are just two examples of the lengths
to which ethical theorists have been willing to pursue their theory at the expense of folk
morality. Even Jackson allows for some moral revisionism, since his own theory appeals
to the notion of a mature folk morality that can be achieved only through a process of moral
revisionism. One must wonder why supervenience has largely been immune to this sort of
revisionism, and that supervenience would survive the modifications that would need to be
made to actual folk morality for it to blossom into maturity.50
Normative explanation and evidence
In my view, the stronger defense of normative supervenience appeals to features of nor-
mative explanation. Let’s return again to the dictator case (last time, I promise). Suppose
hypothetical dictator Y were not morally bad. Perhaps Y ’s actions were not so horrific, or he
lacked political power, or maybe he was operating under some fundamental misconceptions
about the laws of the universe–perhaps he thought that sentencing people to concentration
camps would bring them pleasure or save their souls or what have you. If there were one
50Although there have been a number of objections raised against Jackson’s argument in chapter 5 of
(Jackson 1998), no one to my mind has raised the objection that the maturation process to which Jackson
appeals could result in the rejection of normative supervenience.
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of these differences, then one might be able to make a case that although dictator X were
morally bad, Y would not be. However, we have stipulated away that there are any such
differences. If X were morally bad and Y were not, this would be the only difference be-
tween X and Y. X is morally bad because X just is; Y is not morally bad because Y just is
not.
The example I gave was in terms of moral badness, but similar examples can be given
for reasons for action. Here again is the
Tyranny Fact: Acts of terrorism against citizens of Western countries tend to
strengthen tyrannical impulses on the part of Western governments.
Tyranny Fact is a reason for critics of the West to avoid engaging in acts of terrorism. Now
imagine a world just like ours, with just the same history and same political leaders with
the same psychological dispositions as our world, with the same causal laws as those that
obtain in our world. The only difference is that in that world, Tyranny Fact is not a reason
for critics of the West to avoid engaging in acts of terrorism. Tyranny Fact just is a reason
in our world, and just is not a reason in that other world we just described, and that’s all
there is to it. This would be really odd, and probably incomprehensible.
Oneway to understand the importance of supervenience is to contrast the normative case
to the case of phenomenal experience. In inverted spectrum thought experiments, we are
asked to imagine two people who are exactly alike, down to the last neurological molecule,
but different in the following way: when one of the people perceives some object, she has
a red experience; but when the other person perceives the same object in exactly the same
viewing conditions, she has a green experience.
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This kind of phenomenon could turn out to occur in our world, or not; but whether there
exist inverted spectra is not the point of my use of this thought experiment. What I want
to call attention to is the fact that an inverted spectrum situation is a conceivable situation.
We can imagine what it would be like for us, say, to remember our experiences and the
red and green content of these experiences; and then imagine that, in all these experiences,
the originally red content of the experiences were instead, green, and the originally green
content of the experiences were instead, red. There is nothing about the nature of red and
green that prohibits us from conceiving of our experiences in this way.
Normative properties may also admit of this same inversion. I do think it’s possible
for us to get into a mindset in which a dictator that signed execution orders for thousands
of people and overwhelmingly allocated the federal budget towards military spending was
morally good. After all, plenty of people have thought that particular dictatorial leaders
that have done these kinds of things in the past were morally good for doing so. Placing
ourselves in this mindset, however, reveals an important disanalogy between the phenom-
enal and normative cases. It is conceivable and comprehensible to say that two physically
indiscernible people, with the same history, in the same viewing conditions, could have
experiences of the same object as being of a different color. Metaphysically speaking, the
color experiences of people can, in principle, vary independently of the physical nature of
the experiencer, object, and viewing conditions. But it is neither conceivable nor compre-
hensible to say that two physically indiscernible people, with the same history, in the same
situations, could differ in their moral qualities. The reason for this is because normative
properties, unlike phenomenal properties, are conceptually such that, for normative prop-
erties to be instantiated in an object or person at all, there has to be an explanation of their
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instantiation, there has to be something else about that object or person that can serve to
explain why that object or person has the normative properties that she does. In the case of
color properties, there may very well be an explanation as to why certain experiences have
these properties and certain other experiences do not, but this is not a conceptual constraint
given by the nature of color properties.
To put the point another way, imagine again two physically indiscernible people with
the same history, in the same situation, looking at the same thing. You know that the first
person is experiencing the object as being red, and we also know that this same first per-
son is morally good. What color experience is the second person having? Probably a red
experience. But you could be wrong. It could be that whatever laws that govern the rela-
tion between physical and phenomenal properties are statistical or otherwise “chance-y”;
it could be that no laws govern the relation between physical and phenomenal properties
at all. There is nothing about phenomenal properties themselves that prohibit this kind of
variation of phenomenal properties despite a lack of physical difference or situational dif-
ference. Normative properties do not work this way. It makes no sense to say that the first
person is morally good but the second person is not, despite there being no other difference
between the two people and their situations that could explain the difference.
It’s true that some states of affairs have no explanation. They just are the way they
are. One example is the fundamental gravitational constant. Most of us (i.e., everyone but
necessitarians) think that it is metaphysically possible that the gravitational constant could
have been 6.675x10−11Nm2/kg2 rather than 6.674x10−11Nm2/kg2. Perhaps, as some
people try to do, the value of this fundamental constant can be explained by appealing to
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God or the multiverse hypothesis.51 Or perhaps, as Parfit says and I am inclined on most
days to believe, “It is random that reality is as it is... it has no explanation of any kind”
(Parfit 1998).52
Another example is the particular collapse of the wave function from superposed to
classical states. Why did the photon “land” in that place rather than one of the many other
places when we shot it at the double slit? Well, the wave function just collapsed that way.
Nothing more to be said. We can offer a partial explanation as to why the wave function
collapsed the way it did. We can say, for instance, why it landed on the photographic
film and didn’t quantum tunnel to the Andromeda galaxy instead: the first is much more
probable. But why it “landed” where it did rather than a little further away? Nothing more
to say.53
Although there are these descriptive features of our world that are at least to some extent
explanatarily opaque, and this is somewhat puzzling and concerning, it would be much
more puzzling and concerning if the moral features of our world were similarly devoid of
explanation. I’ll give two reasons to think this: one epistemological, the other metaphysical
51The appeal to God, to me, seems problematic just because there would still be a question as to why
God, who per hypothesi wants to bring about rational life, would pick this gravitational constant rather than
the actual gravitational constant plus ϵ, where ϵ just is a small enough number that the difference would not
affect outcomes in terms of the development of rational life. So there would still remain the question “Why
this constant rather than some other”? There is a kind of multiverse hypothesis that could explain why our
universe has the gravitational constant that it does because it can state that for every positive real value x, there
is a universe featuring fundamental laws that are exactly like ours except that they have x as their gravitational
constant.
52There is also the view, shared by Russell, van Fraassen and others, that the question whether the universe
has an explanation is incoherent. I think it’s perfectly coherent, but I’m discussing explanations of the universe
here purely for illustrative purposes and nothing argumentative in the dissertation hangs on it. To the extent
that it is relevant, the incoherence of the question might give more weight to the claim that there are no brute
(explanationless) facts, which actually helps my argument in §3 that the reasons fundamentalist has to claim
that the fact of additive supervenience is a brute fact.
53Aminority of theories of quantum phenomena are fully deterministic theories and therefore would deny
that there is “nothing more to say”.
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and conceptual.
First, in the empirical cases of brute facts or brute differences, we can use our senses to
tell whether the fundamental constant is one way or the other and whether the wave function
collapsed in one way rather than the other. The object would strike the ground at a different
time; the photographic film would have been marked in a different place. In the case of the
wave function, there are very many potential collapses of the wave function for any fully
determinate prior setup of the double slit experiment, so the collapse does not supervene
on these causal antecedents. In the case of the fundamental constants, it is strange to even
think about what the “prior setup” would even be, so the supervenience of the values of
the fundamental constants on the “prior setup” will probably turn out to be incoherent. The
point is that, because there is a failure of supervenience, there are no laws that we can apply
to the fully determinate prior setup and infer a priori what the fundamental constants will
be or how the wave function will collapse. We have to rely on further empirical evidence.
No such empirical tests exist to detect brute normative difference. If we did have a quasi-
perceptual faculty of moral sense, we could appeal to this faculty to justify our belief that
X is morally bad but Y is not. However, almost no one thinks we have a quasi-perceptual
moral sense.54 Moore is the philosopher most characteristically derided for believing in
the quasi-perceptual moral sense faculty, but even Moore would deny that you could use
this faculty to tell which of the two non-normatively indiscernible tyrannical dictators was
morally bad and which was not. This is because Moore believed in a variety of normative
supervenience. He writes:
54The only major published exception to this that I know of is (Oddie 2009).
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If a thing is good (in my sense), then that it is so follows from the fact that it
possesses certain natural intrinsic properties, which are such that from the fact
that it is good it does not follow conversely that it has those properties (Moore
1922, p. 261).
Without a quasi-perceptual moral sense with even more powerful capacities of epistemic
discrimination than the intuitive moral sense faculty that Moore thought we had, there is
nothing we can appeal to in order to justify any belief that failed to respect a supervenience
constraint. For instance, if we believed that tyrannical dictator X were morally bad while
his indiscernible duplicate were not, and we had no intuitive or quasi-sensory capacity to
justify this belief, it’s not clear to me what other epistemic capacity of ours could provide
justification for this belief. Normative supervenience then becomes a constraint on war-
ranted belief-formation about normative property instantiations for those of us who do not
want to accept that we have this very robust, quasi-perceptual faculty of moral sense.
Secondly, I want to argue that we need some sort of normative supervenience doctrine
in order to have normative explanation. Since we have reason to accept that there is such a
thing as normative explanation, we therefore need normative supervenience.
Take two utilitarians55 who are arguing about how best to allocate their resources. As
utilitarians, they agree that what you ought to do is engage in activities that alleviate the
most pain. One of them has recently been considerably moved by a speech given by Peter
Singer and is arguing that their resources morally ought to be donated to OxFam. The other
responds by citing her family situation. She indicates that her family is poor and needs
financial support; she thinks it would be morally better for her to transfer financial assets
to them. They both agree on the relevant non-normative facts: that donating resources to
55Specifically, non-scalar objective act utilitarians.
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OxFam will alleviate dehydration and that donating resources to the second utilitarian’s
family will alleviate their poverty. Now, the first utilitarian might say to the second, “I
agree that the situation of your family is quite bad. But consider OxFam’s recent campaign
in Afghanistan, where they are distributing water to people in areas who lost access to it
because of war and drought. Your family is poor, but they at least own a run-down house
and have limited governmental support. Starvation and dehydration are much more painful
than that. You are in a difficult situation because, after all, they are your family. But since
you are a utilitarian, it’s clear what you morally ought to do.”
The first utilitarian in this case is giving an explanation as to why donating to OxFam is
the morally right thing to do. We can think of it as a kind of deductive explanation, proceed
from a major normative premise (You morally ought to do things that alleviate the most
pain) and minor non-normative ones (dehydration and starvation is the most painful thing;
donating to OxFam alleviates starvation and dehydration), to a conclusion about what you
morally ought to do (donate to OxFam). The point of bringing this up is not the details
of this argument, which most of us I suspect would find either morally objectionable or
empirically misinformed. The point is rather to illustrate a feature of the major premise in
the argument. If the major premise holds, then it follows that, for any set consisting of the
possible courses of action that are open to you (call these options)56 and their consequences,
the facts about which options are morally right will be “fixed” by the facts about the various
options’ consequences. Call these sets of {option, consequence} pairs practical situations.
Given the major premise, any two non-normatively indiscernible practical situations will
56The notion of a practical option for an agent is much more involved than is indicated by my use of it
here. For more discussion of this, see (Rovane 2013, pp. 208-9) and (Levi 1986).
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also be indiscernible with respect to the facts about which options, given the practical sit-
uation, are morally right. But this is a supervenience claim. Moral explanations that are
given on the basis of major premises that bridge non-normative and moral facts therefore
presuppose a supervenience relationship between the non-normative facts and the moral
ones.
Here are somemore remarks that may help elucidate the connection. We can think of the
major premise serves as a function from practical situations to facts about moral rightness:
tell it which option alleviates the most pain, and it will tell you which option (or set of
options, in the case of options whose consequences alleviate identical quantities of pain) is
morally right. Even if it’s indeterminate which option alleviates the most pain, the function
would give us the result that it is indeterminate which option is morally right. In order to get
a different result, you would need to change at least the facts about it being indeterminate
which option alleviates the most pain. In other words, the output of the function supervenes
upon its input.
The above remarks aimed to show that we do have a practice of providing normative
explanations. Furthermore, this is not a practice that we can easily give up.57 Here is a
very helpful long quotation from Nick Zangwill that expresses the importance of normative
explanation fairly clearly:
Suppose... that I say that Billy is bad. You ask why. I reply, “No reason; he’s
just bad, that’s all.” This is utterly irresponsible and weird... For if Billy is
bad, there must be something that makes Billy bad. We must think that Billy is
bad because or in virtue of the way he is in other respects... Mackie was right
to mention, if only in passing, the problem of this because (“Just what in the
57Even error theorists are hesitant to give up practices of normative explanation. For more on this, see the
ending remarks on moral conservatism in (Olson 2012).
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world is signified by this ‘because’?” (Mackie 1977, p. 41)). Different theories
are possible here.... Nevertheless, everyone should agree on the existence and
centrality of this “because”. Moreover, this because is not just metaphysical
constraint on properties but also a constraint on our judgments (a “conceptual”
feature of them). The slogan might be: not just bad, but bad because: we judge
not that something is bad period, but that it is bad because of certain natural
properties. It is a priori that moral properties depend. Let us call the require-
ment to judge that something is M [moral] because it is N [non-normative] the
‘Because Constraint’. (Zangwill 2006, pp. 270-271)
There are two components to Zangwill’s claim. The Because Constraint is, first, a meta-
physical constraint: normative properties cannot be instantiated in an object or state of af-
fairs etc unless that object or state of affairs possesses some other, non-normative property
in virtue of which it also possesses the normative property. Secondly, it is a conceptual con-
straint: what it means for a property to be a normative property is partly for that property to
be instantiated in virtue of other, non-normative properties. Since the “Because Constraint”
is constitutive of (entailed by) any normative concept, the Because Constraint is therefore
a constitutive part of our practices of normative judgment. It makes no sense, for Zangwill,
to call a judgment a normative judgment unless it is a judgment that something has the par-
ticular normative property you’re judging it to have in virtue of some other, non-normative
property.58
Commitment to the Because Constraint entails commitment to some sort of normative
supervenience doctrine. Suppose Billy is bad in virtue of his disposition to bully other kids
on the playground. That’s to say that Billy’s disposition to bully fully explains Billy’s bad-
58Zangwill recognizes that sometimes we make normative judgments on the basis of testimonial evidence.
So if the Dalai Lama says that being greedy is wrong, and we believe that being greedy is wrong on this basis,
this testimonial evidence is not a feature of the greediness that we have judged is wrong. However, Zangwill
thinks that we do indirectly satisfy the Because Constraint even in this case, because it’s part of our deference
to the Dalai Lama that we take ourselves to have good reason to think that the Dalai Lama is making the moral
judgment about greediness on the basis of some non-normative feature that greediness possesses.
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ness given the nature of badness. Now, Billy’s friend Charlie has the same disposition to
bully kids on the playground. Charlie’s bullying would then provide us with a full expla-
nation of Charlie’s being bad. And if Charlie’s bullying also gives us a full explanation of
Charlie’s being bad, then Charlie is bad. Ditto for any other child who has the same dispo-
sition to bully. Badness then would supervene on childhood dispositions to bully, since you
can’t have a child who has the bullying disposition without that child being bad as well.
To see this, here is an argument from contradiction. Suppose Charlie had Billy’s same
disposition to bully, but Charlie was not bad. Charlie grew up in an abusive household
and developed depression and ADHD at an early age. Charlie is not bad; rather, he is a
victim of mental illness brought about by domestic abuse. Billy, in contrast, had the best
upbringing imaginable and just chooses not to be very nice. What this reveals, I think, is
that our previous explanation of Billy’s badness in terms of his dispositions to bully was not
a full explanation. It left something out. Billy is not bad simply because be is disposed to
bully kids on the playground. He is bad because he has this disposition and the disposition
is not the result of mental illness. Once our previously incomplete explanation of Billy’s
badness is expanded into a full explanation, Charlie turns out not to have properties that
provide a full explanation for the presence of badness in Charlie after all.
The existence of a full explanation for the presence of a normative property therefore en-
tails that the presence of that normative property supervenes on the presence of the features
that constitute the full explanation. We do of course offer explanations like the following:
the accident happened because the driver was drunk and there was ice on the road. Many
drivers drive drunk on icy roads and don’t cause accidents. So the presence of an accident
does not supervene on the presence of an intoxicated person driving on an icy road. This is
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not, however, a counterexample to the claim that full explanations entail supervenience. It
only reveals that most of our explanations are not full explanations. In this icy road expla-
nation of traffic accidents, lots of salient details were left out: the presence of other drivers
on the road, the absence of guardrails, the precise nature of the intoxication and distribution
of ice and so on. It would take a huge amount of effort to come up with the full range of fea-
tures that explain road accidents. We don’t usually invest this effort because the benefit of
coming up with a full explanation of road accidents does not outweigh the huge costs. In the
road accident case, incomplete explanations are good enough. We know that intoxication
and icy road conditions are strong predictors of road accidents. This knowledge provides
us with enough of a justification for public policies such as funding for ice removal and
laws against drunk driving.
Normative arbitrariness
Lest you are not already convinced that we should accept some sort of normative superve-
nience doctrine, here are a few closing remarks. The first remark is from Shafer-Landau,
who writes, “If the moral fails to supervene on the non-moral, then the non-moral world
does not control the moral world. But if that world does not control the moral world, then
the moral world is out of control. Moral assessments would be arbitrary” (Shafer-Landau
2003, p. 77). Normative supervenience (of whichmoral supervenience is a subset) allegedly
anchors the moral “world” to the non-normative world so that the moral world is not tossed
about by the tides of moral contingency.
And moral contingency is very bad. Consider Warnock, who writes, “The picture pre-
sented [in Warnock’s presentation of Moorean intuitionism] is that of a realm of moral
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qualities, sui generis and indefinable, floating, as it were, quite free from anything else
whatever, but cropping up here and there, quite contingently and for no reason, in bare
conjunction with more ordinary features of the everyday world” (Warnock 1967, p. 14).
Although one (for instance, myself) might draw issue with the description Warnock gives
here ofMoore’s views, the passage describes a characteristic that that I take it moral philoso-
phers across the board would want their preferred theory to lack. We don’t want the moral
features of the world to “float quite free from anything else whatsoever.” If normative su-
pervenience is false, we would, for instance, have to take seriously the thought that, even
though act utilitarianism is false and that it is therefore not morally prohibited for me to be
working on this paper right now instead of wiring all the many tens of dollars in my pos-
session to the Bernie Sanders campaign, quitting my program and joining an international
volunteer relief organization, the conjunction of the natural features of this world and the
truth of act utilitarianism may in fact be possible. It could be that act utilitarianism is true
in a non-normatively indiscernible world occupied by my trans-world counterpart.
This thought, from conversations that I have had, fills many people with apprehension.
The sources of this apprehension are both epistemological and personal. In terms of moral
theory, the denial of metaphysical necessity raises the question how we are to know that
we aren’t after all in the act utilitarian world. We can’t appeal only to descriptive features
of the world to explain why moral reality is how it is rather than some other way, since our
world and the act utilitarian world are stipulated to be descriptively indiscernible.59
The epistemological worry also raises a personal concern. Most of us who do not work
on Wall Street want to be morally good people; we want, according to the moral realist,
59A more rigorous investigation of these issues is provided in (Street 2008).
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to instantiate the property “morally good”. If act utilitarianism were true, I for one would
not qualify as a morally good person. I may be contributing to running classes that raise
social awareness and concern, either directly or indirectly, among a few hundred students.
I may in the future write popular books that produce beneficial social effects across an even
wider audience. Even in this ideal case, however, the fact remains that there is a surfeit
of very intelligent and highly skilled philosophers who would happily take any such job
and do just as well at it, and a paucity of very intelligent people willing to work with the
poorest and most exploited populations whose needs (including the need to think about
philosophical issues!) are so immediate and penetrating.60 If there turns out not to be an
adequate solution to the epistemological worry, we can continue our lives in the hope that
act utilitarianism is false. But we may be wrong. Even if we are correct, our belief in the
falsity of act utilitarianism may fall short of the certainty characteristic of knowledge, and
the apprehension that would result for those of us that care about being good and doing the
right thing would be something that most of us would want to avoid.
Clarifying normative supervenience
Supervenience relations are well-known and have been discussed and distinguished from
each other at endless length. In this section, I’ll be using that work to argue for the following
more precise characterization of normative supervenience which I take most metaethicists
to implicitly or explicitly endorse:
60These thoughts are somewhat personal in nature, but I think that thoughts like this are highly appropriate
in the context of a dissertation in moral philosophy: an area of philosophy whose subject matter is partly
constituted by issues of broad personal concern. I also imagine, too, that many moral philosophers have at
one time or another entertained thoughts like this—a fact that would, if true, underscore the relevance of these
remarks.
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Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience: For any possible worldsw1 and
w2 and any individuals i1 in w1 and i2 in w2, if i1 and i2 are intrinsically and
extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible andw1 andw2 are non-normatively
indiscernible, then, for any normative property P , i1 instantiates P if and only
if i2 instantiates P .
Since the reasons fundamentalist thinks that all that is normative consists in instantiations
of the favoring relation and purely formal higher-order features of instantiations of this
relation, the relevant application of Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience for the
formulation of reasons fundamentalism is
Additive Reasons Supervenience: For any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any
fact-agent-action-circumstance tuples T1 in w1 and T2 in w2, if T1 and T2 are
intrinsically and extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible andw1 and w2 are
non-normatively indiscernible, then T1 instantiates the favoring relation if and
only if T2 instantiates the favoring relation.
I’ll then be in a position to exploit Additive Reasons Supervenience in the argument pre-
sented in §3 and §4.
I’ll start with a distinction between weak and strong supervenience that we owe to Jaeg-
won Kim (Kim 1987).61. If B weakly supervenes on A, then you can’t have a B difference
without an A difference. This is also true for strong supervenience: if B strongly supervenes
on A, then you can’t have a B difference without an A difference. The difference between
weak and strong supervenience has to do with the way we quantify over possible worlds in
the supervenience formulation—or, alternatively, with the way we introduce modal opera-
tors. Weak supervenience is supervenience within a world, while strong supervenience is
supervenience across worlds. If Bweakly supervenes on A, then, for any world w, anything
61See also (Davidson 2001, pp. 170-183)
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that’s A-alike in w will also be B-alike in w. If B strongly supervenes on A, then any two
things that are A-alike will also be B-alike, no matter what world they’re in.
Here are some examples. In relativity theory, the energy of a universe weakly super-
venes on the total mass of that universe. This is because the total energy of a universe is
a function of the mass of that universe and the speed of light. However, the energy of a
universe does not strongly supervene on the total mass of that universe, because there are
metaphysically possible universes in which relativity theory holds but the speed of light is
different. Tallness also weakly supervenes on height. Any two people in a given world who
are 6’5” in height will also be alike with respect to whether they are tall. In this world, they
are. But tallness does not strongly supervene on height, since people who are 6’5” in height
will not be tall in worlds where Yao Ming’s height is just average.
Now for some examples of strong supervenience. The amount of heat in a system
strongly supervenes on the amount of mean kinetic molecular energy of that system since
heat necessarily is mean kinetic molecular energy. Whenever you have a newton of force
acting on a kilogram of mass, you will have one joule of heat, since that is what a joule
of heat is. Although the tallness of any person, as previously mentioned, does not strongly
supervene on that person’s height, the distribution of tallness across a population strongly
supervenes on the distribution of heights across that population. In any world with the
same distribution of heights as ours, Yao Ming will be tall; in any world in which the me-
dian height of the population is 10 feet but Yao Ming is the same height as he is in our
world, Yao Ming will not be tall.
In talking about supervenience so far, I’ve helped myself to language about possible
worlds. This is because supervenience relations are modal relations, and a natural way
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to talk about modality is to talk about it in terms of possible worlds. Most discussions of
supervenience in metaethics help themselves to possible worlds talk, and I will comply with
the conventions of my specialization’s discourse in adopting this way of speaking as well.
In saying this, I am not committing myself to the following Leibnizian conditionals in any
robust sense:
1. For all facts F , F is necessary ⇐⇒ F exists in all possible worlds; and
2. For all facts F , F is possible ⇐⇒ F exists in a possible world.
The reason I’m not committing myself to these conditionals is that I am neutral for the
purposes of this dissertation on the question whether there are possible (non-actual) worlds,
whether abstract or concrete, and therefore neutral on the question whether facts exist in
these non-actual possible worlds. I am happy to agree, if the reader prefers, that talk of
possible worlds is not more than a useful way of talking about modality (Rosen 1990).62
Here is what weak supervenience looks like when applied additively to the case of nor-
mative supervenience:
Weak Individual Additive Supervenience: For any possible world w and any
individuals i1 and i2 in w, if i1 and i2 are intrinsically non-normatively indis-
cernible, then, for any normative property P , P (i1) if and only if P (i2).
Weak Individual Additive Supervenience says that, if you take any two individuals in the
same world and those two individuals are exactly alike in all their intrinsic non-normative
properties (i.e. they are non-normative duplicates), then they will also be alike in all their
normative properties.
62I do think, though, that possible worlds talk is a useful way of talking about modality. I’m not neutral
on that.
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Weak Individual Additive Supervenience is called Weak Individual Additive Superve-
nience because it is strictly weaker than (it is entailed by, but does not entail) the following
relationship:
Strong Individual Additive Supervenience: For any possible worlds w1 and
w2 and any individuals i1 in w1 and i2 w2, if i1 and i2 are intrinsically non-
normatively indiscernible, then, for any normative property P , P (i1) if and
only if P (i2)
Strong Individual Additive Supervenience says that, if you take any two individuals in
two worlds and those two individuals are exactly alike in all their intrinsic, non-normative
properties (i.e. they are non-normative duplicates), then they will also be alike in all their
normative properties, no matter whether they are in the same world or a different world.
Strong Individual Additive Supervenience entails Weak Individual Additive Supervenience
because Weak Individual Additive Supervenience is what you get in those instances of
Strong Individual Additive Supervenience in which w1 ≈ w2.
Both Weak Additive Individual Normative Supervenience and Strong Individual Ad-
ditive Supervenience specify that the subvening properties are the non-normative proper-
ties. As mentioned in the introduction to this section on supervenience, I will call all such
formulations “additive” formulations of normative supervenience. I call them “additive”
formulations because the picture of normativity that emerges is as something that is kind of
dropped on top of non-normative reality from above.
Both varieties of supervenience are formulated in terms of quantification over possible
worlds. There are also formulations in second-order logic extended with modal operators.
Here they are:
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1. ∀x∀F ∈ A[Fx → ∃G ∈ B(Gx ∧ ∀y(Gy → Fy))]
2. ∀x∀F ∈ A[Fx → ∃G ∈ B(Gx ∧ ∀y(Gy → Fy))]
Formulation (1) is a formulation of weak supervenience. It says that if property setAweakly
supervenes on property set B, then, necessarily, if anything x has some property F in A,
then there is at least one property G in B such that x has G, and everything that has G has
F. Formulation (2) is a formulation of strong supervenience. It says that if property set A
strongly supervenes on property set B, then, necessarily, if anything x has some property F
in A, then there is at least one property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily everything
that has G has F. The only difference between the two formulations is the addition of the
second necessity operator.
There are some issues regarding equivalency relations between the quantification and
modal formulations. In particular, (Kim 1987, pp. 79-81) hadmaintained that the quantifier
formulations were equivalent to the modal formulations; this was disputed in (McLaughlin
1995). I am setting these issues to the side and using the quantification over possible worlds
formulations because I think these formulations will be clearer to readers.
Neither the weak nor the strong formulations of individual normative supervenience
that I have just given are ecumenical. Hare explicitly rejects Strong Individual Normative
Supervenience (Hare 1984, p. 4) in favor of the weak formulation. Hare argues for what
he calls universal prescriptivism: the view that moral judgments such as “it’s wrong to
take tips out of the cashier’s tip jar” are preferences that express principles that one takes
to be overriding and universal (Hare 1982, pp. 20-24, 107-16). By “overriding”, Hare
means that, when one expresses a moral judgment, one’s preference to act in accord with
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the principle outweighs whatever other preferences one might have. By “universal”, Hare
means that moral judgments express principles that one prefers everyone to obey, including
oneself. If I judge that it’s wrong to take tips out of the cashier’s tip jar, I prefer not only
that everyone else not take these tips but that I not take these tips as well. Hare’s universal
prescriptivism entails that wrongness weakly supervenes on those properties of acts that
one overridingly and universally prefers never to be done. For any two acts, if they are
both tip-stealing acts, then they are both wrong. However, wrongness does not strongly
supervene on the property of being an act of tip-stealing, since one’s counterparts can have
different preferences in different worlds, in which case, in those worlds, tip-stealing would
not come out as wrong.
Particularists deny both weak supervenience and strong supervenience in favor of global
supervenience,63 which we can formulate for the normative case as follows:
Global Additive Supervenience: For any twoworldsw1 andw2, ifw1 andw2 are
non-normatively indiscernible, then w1 and w2 are normatively indiscernible.
Particularists deny weak and strong individual supervenience because they hold that the
moral features of an object can always, in principle, be altered by the addition of new sit-
uational features that may, in Dancy’s terminology, enable, disable, intensify or attenuate
the moral properties in question. Enablers and disablers are features of a situation the in-
troduction of which makes a fact a reason, or makes a reason just a mere fact after all. An
intensifier or attenuator is a feature of a situation that strengthens or weakens the strength
of a reason, or the weight that we ought to assign the reason in our reasoning practices. The
63Dancy used to deny global supervenience, but he now accepts it at (Dancy 2004, p. 87). I can’t think of
other exceptions to the general claim that particularists accept global supervenience.
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goodness of giving to the Red Cross missions in Uganda can be intensified by the existence
of a wealthy donor who has pledged to match some Red Cross donations; it could be atten-
uated or disabled if the leader of Uganda has plans to confiscate some of the aid sent to Red
Cross in that country, and so on.
One can easily avoid the particularist worries mentioned above simply by going with a
global formulation of supervenience.64 However, global formulations are defective in that
they do not do the best justice to some of the reasons we want normative supervenience
in the first place. The intuition pumps in §2.5.1 and §2.5.2 were all of the following form:
imagine two individuals, indiscernible in all their intrinsic features and all relevant extrinsic
ones. The first individual has such-and-such normative property. Does the second one have
that same normative property as well? A “yes” answer to this offers support for formula-
tions of supervenience that place these individuals at the center of the formulation. Global
formulations of supervenience don’t do this; only individual formulations do. Furthermore,
the “Because Constraint” is the constraint that individuals instantiate normative properties
in virtue of their non-normative properties. Individual formulations of supervenience are
again more suited to capture this idea. In other words, we don’t want a formulation of
supervenience in terms of distribution of normative properties across non-normatively in-
discernible worlds, but a formulation of supervenience, suitably constrained, in terms of
distribution of the normative properties of non-normatively indiscernible individuals. So
instead of jumping ship on the individual formulations in order to accommodate particular-
64I want to accommodate the particularist because particularism is consistent with reasons fundamental-
ism. Reasons fundamentalism is a theory about the nature of reasons, while particularism is a theory of
normative explanation. I am looking for a formulation of normative supervenience that characterizes reasons
fundamentalism in general, not just reasons fundamentalisms that reject the normative explanatory views of
the particularist.
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ists, we should instead see if we can produce an individual formulation of supervenience
that answers to the particularist worries.
We can respond to the particularists’ worries by expanding the requirements for individ-
uals to qualify as “intrinsically non-normatively indiscernible” to include the requirement
that they be indiscernible with respect to all the potential enablers, disablers, attenuators and
intensifiers. Since, for the particularist, there is in principle no non-trivial limit to the num-
ber of facts (property instantiations) that could play this role, our ecumenical formulation
of normative supervenience should take all possible such properties into consideration.65.
In the Red Cross case, we should understand non-normative indiscernibility in such a way
that two acts of donating to the Red Cross mission in Uganda are not non-normatively indis-
cernible in the relevant sense unless these acts are also indiscernible with respect to relevant
extrinsic properties, such as their properties of being such that the leader of Uganda is not
corrupt. Really, in order to accommodate the most radical particularist, we should restrict
our supervenience claim to only those individuals that are indiscernible with respect not
only to their intrinsic non-normative properties, but also indiscernible in the sense that they
be identically situated in non-normatively indiscernible worlds. Wewant, in other words, to
build into our criteria for indiscernibility the requirement that there not be any more space
in a world for a non-normative property to turn up and enable/disable/attenuate/intensify
the normative properties that an individual has.
In order to accommodate the particularist worry, our formulation of supervenience has
to satisfy the following three desiderata:
65As well as, perhaps, the property of there not being any more potentially en-
abling/disabling/attenuating/intensifying properties to include.
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1. The two normatively indiscernible individuals must be intrinsically non-normatively
indiscernible;
2. The worlds of the normatively indiscernible individuals must be non-normatively
indiscernible; and
3. The two normatively indiscernible individuals must be extrinsically indiscernible.
Call any two individuals that meet all three desiderata maximally non-normatively indis-
cernible or fully non-normatively indiscernible.
We need (1) because intrinsic properties can be relevant to the determination of nor-
mative properties. Whether someone is beautiful, for example, can vary with variations in
that person’s intrinsic relational properties such as “having symmetrical features”. So we
need to hold the intrinsic properties fixed. We need (2) in order to make sure that there are
no differences between the worlds of the two individuals such that one world will provide
an enabler, disabler, attenuator or intensifier that the other does not. We need (3) in order
to make sure that the individuals are identically situated. Imagine an intrinsic duplicate of
Hitler in our world that has the same intrinsic dispositions and characteristics and so on,
but lives his whole life plugged into a computer simulation of early 20th century Germany.
Although Hitler and his intrinsic duplicate are intrinsically non-normatively indiscernible,
the real-life Hitler plausibly has certain moral properties that the intrinsic Hitler duplicate
lacks—for instance, the property of being such that assassinating him is morally justified.
This is because Hitler and the Hitler duplicate do differ in extrinsic properties: the Hitler
duplicate has the property of being plugged into a computer simulation the real-life Hitler
does not. By specifying that the individuals are also extrinsically indiscernible, we rule out
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these sorts of cases from our formulation of supervenience.
It is likely that the three desiderata I give are redundant. For example, if two individuals
are both intrinsically and extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible, then it seems likely
that this would entail that they were in non-normatively indiscernible worlds. This is be-
cause among the extrinsic properties of individuals will be properties like “such that there is
aWhite House at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, such that electrons have negative charge” and
so on, and you can likely give an exhaustive non-normative description of a world in terms
of extrinsic properties like these. Furthermore, if you think that the intrinsic/extrinsic prop-
erty distinction is incoherent, then (1) and (3) can just be collapsed into the requirement that
the individuals are non-normatively indiscernible simpliciter. I use the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction here because I think it better clarifies the argumentative structure of this part of
the dissertation.
When we incorporate this into a weak supervenience formulation, we get what I’ll call
Full Weak Individual Additive Supervenience:
Full Weak Individual Additive Supervenience: For any two possible worlds w1
and w2 and any individuals i1 in w1 and i2 in w2, if w1 ≈ w2 and i1 and i2
are intrinsically and extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible, then, for any
normative property P , P (i1) if and only if P (i2).
This is a formulation of weak supervenience because it specifies that the two worlds in
question are the same world. I formulate it this way because it will be more easily allow
us to revise this into a formulation of strong supervenience after I explain in the next few
paragraphs why Full Weak Individual Additive Supervenience is problematic.
Full Weak Individual Additive Supervenience turns out to be either trivial or vacuous.
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Take the case in which i1 and i2 denote the same individual. The conditional would then
be trivially true. If i1 and i2 were to pick out the same individual in the same world, then
they would trivially refer to individuals that were fully non-normatively indiscernible and
also normatively indiscernible in that world.66
If w1 ≈ w2, then i1 and i2 cannot denote numerically distinct individuals. Then the
antecedent would never be satisfied, because no two numerically distinct individuals in the
same world will ever be non-normatively indiscernible with respect to both their intrin-
sic and their extrinsic properties. Two non-normatively identical paintings, for instance,
will at least be located in a different region of spacetime, so they will fail to be fully non-
normatively indiscernible. You could in principle have a world that contained two indis-
cernible but numerically distinct individuals. There are of course the thought experiments
from the identity of indiscernibles—for instance, Max Black’s description of a world con-
taining nothing but two inert iron spheres (Black 1952, p. 156). These examples, however,
don’t help us in our quest to formulate normative supervenience, since these sorts of exam-
ples always involve specifying highly artificial states of affairs that don’t contain people,
actions, or any of the kinds of things that have moral properties. In worlds with instanti-
ated normative properties—and, of course, the one we most care about, ours—no two nu-
merically distinct individuals will be both intrinsically and extrinsically non-normatively
indiscernible. So the formulation turns out to be true but vacuous. This is a problem, since
normative supervenience, whatever else it might be, is a substantive doctrine. People accept
66This follows from the claim that every property of an individual is either intrinsic or extrinsic; and
Leibniz’s indiscernibility of identity doctrine, which, when understood as distinct from his identity of indis-
cernibles doctrine, is, as far as I can tell, wholly uncontroversial. Denying it entails logical contradiction,
since you’d be committed to saying that an individual both possesses and lacks a property.
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normative supervenience for substantive reasons, not because they think it is only trivially
or vacuously true.
Strong individual supervenience does not have this problem. Here is the relevantly
modified version of strong normative supervenience:
Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience: For any two possible worlds
w1 and w2 and any individuals i1 in w1 and i2 in w2, if w1 and w2 are non-
normatively indiscernible and i1 and i2 are intrinsically and extrinsically non-
normatively indiscernible, then, for any normative property P , P (i1) if and
only if P (i2).
Slightly more colloquially, Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience can be expressed
as follows:
Any two intrinsically and extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible individ-
uals, situated in non-normatively indiscernible worlds, are normatively indis-
cernible.
Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience replaces the condition from Full Weak
Individual Additive Supervenience that the two worlds be identical with the condition that
the worlds be non-normatively indiscernible. Although there may well be a problem with
finding distinct, descriptively indiscernible individuals within a single world, there is no
triviality/vacuity problem, at least notationally, in specifying two individuals in different
worlds that are fully non-normatively indiscernible but differ with respect to their normative
properties. It is still an open question at this point whether such a world is metaphysically
possible, but we can at least talk about the world.67
67I assume that there is some way to engage in meaningful discussion about metaphysically impossible
states of affairs—see, for instance, (Nolan 1997).
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We had originally been concerned about strong individual normative supervenience be-
cause we wanted an ecumenical formulation of moral supervenience, and strong individ-
ual supervenience was denied by Hare and Dancy. However, once we make the move
of limiting our formulation of strong normative supervenience to cover only only intrin-
sically and extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible individuals in non-normatively in-
discernible worlds, much of the motivation for ethicists to support weak rather than strong
supervenience evaporates. Hare, for instance, denied strong normative supervenience be-
cause he wanted to allow that non-normatively indiscernible actions could vary in whether
we ought to do them with differences in our rational universalizable prescriptions. Fully
non-normatively indiscernible individuals, however, can’t vary in this way, because they
could be distinguished by their property of being such that we rationally universally pre-
scribe them. Similarly, extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible individuals in non-
normatively indiscernible worlds cannot vary with respect to additional situational features
that might change the valence or intensity of their moral features, because adding any such
features would make the worlds non-normatively discernible.
For this reason, the formulation of supervenience that lays the best claim to being ec-
umenical is Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience. This is this kind of superve-
nience formulation that I take to be uncontroversial not only among realists but among the
anti-realists as well. It is, in other words, exactly what Dancy describes when he writes,
It is better just to think of supervenience as... expressed in the fully general
claim that if we start from a wrong action and move out to the entire non-moral
nature of the world in which it is situated, and then replicate that in a newworld,
we are certain to have a wrong action in the replicating world. There is nothing
more to supervenience than this. (Dancy 2004, p. 87)
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For the reasons fundamentalist, all that is normative consists in facts about which
reasons-apt tuples instantiate the favoring relation, and purely formal higher-order facts
about these facts. The relevant application of Full Strong Individual Additive Superve-
nience for the formulation of reasons fundamentalism is therefore
Additive Reasons Supervenience: For any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any
fact-agent-action-circumstance tuples T1 in w1 and T2 in w2, if T1 and T2 are
intrinsically and extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible andw1 and w2 are
non-normatively indiscernible, then T1 instantiates the favoring relation if and
only if T2 instantiates the favoring relation.




In this chapter, I argue that the conjunction of Primitivism, Irreduciblism and Additive Rea-
sons Supervenience presents an explanatory burden for the reasons fundamentalist that the
reasons fundamentalist cannot answer. Call a defender of both Irreduciblism and Primi-
tivism an irreduciblist primitivist. In this chapter, I argue that the irreduciblist primitivist
either needs to give up Additive Reasons Supervenience (hereafter: supervenience unless
otherwise specified), or accept that she cannot explain why Additive Reasons Superve-
nience expresses a metaphysical necessity. The failure to explain why Additive Reasons
Supervenience expresses a metaphysical necessity threatens to generate for the irreduciblist
primitivist the worries about denying supervenience that I discussed in chapter 2.
3.1 Explaining supervenience
The ban on mixed worlds
In the earlier chapter, in the section on supervenience, I discussed Zangwill’s concept of
a “Because Constraint” on normative properties: that normative properties can be instan-
tiated in an individual only if there is some non-normative feature of that individual in
virtue of which the individual instantiates the normative property. I argued that this was
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not only plausible, but that its truth also entails a normative supervenience claim. This, in
conjunction with the intuitive evidence and the worries about moral arbitrariness, provides
good reason to accept a normative supervenience claim of some sort. I have argued that
the kind of supervenience claim that we should believe on this basis is a strong individual
supervenience claim.
As philosophers, though, we will not be content simply with accepting a normative su-
pervenience claim on the basis of good reasons to accept it. There’s a further question: why
do normative and non-normative properties relate in this way? The Because Constraint, the
intuitive support for supervenience, and the worries about moral arbitrariness provide good
reasons to accept a normative supervenience claim, but they don’t tell us why properties of
these types relate in this way.
To be sure, the Because Constraint does say something about why normative properties
should supervene on non-normative properties. Zangwill argued that the Because Con-
straint is both a conceptually and metaphysically necessary feature of normative concepts
and properties. For Zangwill, it doesn’t make sense to say that a property is a normative
property unless it is instantiated in an individual, when it is instantiated in that individual,
because of non-normative properties that that individual possesses, and it’s also metaphys-
ically impossible for normative properties to be instantiated unless they are instantiated in
virtue of non-normative properties that the individual has. However, this sort of explana-
tion simply pushes the demand for explanation back a further step. We can grant all these
points that Zangwill wants us to grant, yet still wonder what sort of metaethical theory of
normative properties best accounts for these features that normative properties possess. In
other words, a metaethical theory that subscribes to normative supervenience should also
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be able to say something about what it is about normative properties that gives rise to their
supervenience on non-normative properties.
There is a long-standing concern, first presented by Simon Blackburn (Blackburn
1993), that the irreduciblist primitivist is not equipped to supply such an explanation. Since
reasons fundamentalists are committed to irreduciblism and primitivism, Blackburn’s con-
cern about irreduciblist primitivism is a forteriori a concern about reasons fundamentalism.
Blackburn claims that the irreduciblist primitivist cannot appeal to identity or analytic
entailment in her characterization of the relation between normative and non-normative
facts. Irreduciblists cannot appeal to identity, because they deny that normative properties
are identical to non-normative properties. Primitivists cannot appeal to analytic entailment,
because primitivists deny that there is any conceptual analysis of normative properties.
Without identity or analytic entailment, Blackburn asserts that the irreduciblist primitivist
cannot explain why there should be such a restriction on the space of possible worlds—or
a “ban on mixed worlds”, as Blackburn likes to put it—as normative supervenience is.
Normative supervenience restricts the space of possible worlds because, if it obtains,
then the relation rules out the possibility of worlds that are indiscernible with respect to
their non-normative features but discernible with respect to their normative features. To
illustrate, if in our world it is always and everywhere wrong to kill innocent people, the ban
on mixed worlds states that no such world non-normatively indiscernible with ours can also
be such that act utilitarianism is true.
Blackburn argues that the ban on mixed worlds requires an explanation that the ir-
reduciblist primitivist cannot give. Blackburn’s argument has exercised considerable in-
fluence over debates in metaethics, and, like the rest of Blackburn’s important work in
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metaethics, is worth serious attention.1
According to Blackburn, anyone who accepts normative supervenience is committed
to the view that non-normative truths “entail” the normative truth. This poses a special
problem for the irreduciblist primitivist, since the irreduciblist does not have resources to
explain why the supervenience relation obtains. A similar concern is expressed by Mackie:
What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of
deliberate cruelty—say, causing pain just for fun—and the moral fact that it is
wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not
merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be
“consequential” or “supervenient”; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate
cruelty. But what in the world is signified by this “because?” (Mackie 1977,
p. 44)
Although supervenience relations are covariance relations, particular sets of facts rarely
if ever merely covary: they usually do so for some reason. Facts about the existence of
mereological sums supervene on facts about the existence of these sums’ parts because the
parts compose the sum; facts about the computational processes of circuits supervene on the
electrical activity of these circuits because the electrical activity realizes the computational
processes, and so forth. The mere fact of covariance is not philosophically satisfying: we
want to know the how and the why.
In the quote from Mackie above, Mackie seems to mistakenly imply that the “because”
in question here could only be explained by the presence of a logical or semantic necessity.
The examples of parthood and realization show that there are more ways to explain superve-
nience than through an appeal to logical or semantic necessity. If the normative properties
are realized by or composed of the non-normative ones, the presence of the normative-
1Michael Ridge extends Blackburn’s argument in (Ridge 2007). See also (Olson 2012).
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nonnormative realization or composition relation would explain normative supervenience.
This is because, after all, realization and composition relations just are varieties of superve-
nience relations. In principle, the primitivist irreduciblist could appeal tomore specific vari-
eties of covariance in order to explain normative supervenience, thereby avoiding Mackie’s
concern. For example, Brink (Brink 1989) argues that normative properties are realized
by non-normative properties. I myself do not think this approach is likely to be successful,
and will argue against this approach in §4.3.2 below.
Blackburn calls his target the normative realist; however, the argument that he offers
against reduciblist formulations of realism is not the argument I’ve just given. His concern
with reduciblism is not that reduciblists lack an explanation of supervenience. Reduciblists
can trivially explain the supervenience of normative properties on descriptive properties
because reduciblists think that normative properties just are descriptive properties. Black-
burn’s objection to reduciblism is that the reduciblist can’t explain why supervenience is not
only a metaphysical constraint on normative property instantiation, but also a conceptual
constraint. This is also a concern that Blackburn has with irreduciblist primitivism.
Irreduciblist responses
Irreduciblists who take issue with Blackburn’s argument are disposed to bang their fist on
the point that an individual’s non-normative properties entail that individual’s normative
properties. Irreduciblists are fine with admitting that there is such an entailment. Moore
(the paradigmatic irreduciblist), for example, states, “If a thing is good (in my sense), then
that it is so follows from the fact that it possesses certain natural intrinsic properties, which
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are such that from the fact that it is good it does not follow conversely that it has those
properties” (Moore 1922, p. 261).
This sort of response has been developed by contemporary irreduciblist philosophers.
Consider, first, Russ Shafer-Landau, who argues contra Blackburn that irreduciblists of his
sort do have a ready explanation of why the normative supervenience relation obtains. Says
Shafer-Landau:
We can explain the ban on mixed worlds by claiming that a duly specified
set of non-moral properties metaphysically must give rise to a certain moral
property. The dependence relation referred to byMoore can take the form of an
entailment relation specifying metaphysically sufficient non-ethical conditions
for the instantiation of moral properties... Competent speakers can conceive
of a world in which the base properties that actually underlie particular moral
ones fail to do so. But there is no mystery here, since people can conceive of
many things that are not metaphysically possible. (Shafer-Landau 2003, p. 86)
The key point to note here is Shafer-Landau’s claim that the entailment relation that is
supposed to explain normative supervenience is construed as a relation that obtains with
metaphysical necessity.
This claim that the entailment between non-normative facts and normative facts ob-
tains with metaphysical necessity seems to be fairly common among the irreduciblists who
are interested in this question. The most radical, card-carrying contemporary irreduciblist,
David Enoch, writes,
What is the precise modal status of the basic moral norms? I am not sure what
to say here. It should be at least metaphysical necessity, so that there is no
world where the basic norms are different. (Enoch 2011, p. 146)
Scanlon’s views in Being Realistic About Reasons seem to lean in this direction as well.
He claims that the pure normative truths—things like “pain is ceterus paribus bad”—are in
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fact necessary and are not contingent in any metaphysical sense (Scanlon 2014, p. 41). As
such, the presence of any pain state will also “entail” the presence of badness in that state.
Both Enoch and Scanlon here are asserting that there are fundamental normative principles
such as “pain is bad” that are necessarily true as a matter of metaphysical necessity. There
are no metaphysically possible worlds in which this principle is false. Take some mental
state x that is a pain state. Because “pain is bad” is necessarily true, “pain is bad” will be
true in the world featuring x. Therefore x will also be bad, and we have a metaphysical
entailment from the fact that x is a pain state to the fact that x is bad.2
By “metaphysical necessity”, what Shafer-Landau, Enoch and Scanlon have in mind is
something like the following: something A entails something else B with metaphysically
necessity just if God doesn’t have to do anything other than to make A in order to make B.
As Kripke says,
Suppose we imagine God creating the world; what does He need to do to make
the identity of heat and molecular motion obtain? Here it would seem that all
He needs to do is to create the heat, that is, the molecular motion itself. If the
air molecules of this earth were sufficiently agitated, if there is a burning fire,
then the earth will be hot even if there were no observers to see it.... (Kripke
1980, p. 153).
To make heat, all God needs to do is to make the molecules move. To make cat-fusions,
all God has to do is make the cats. To make it not the case that chalk is not white, all God
has to do is make chalk white. No further divine effort need be expended. Similarly, if it’s
2Scanlon, Enoch and Shafer-Landau have distinct views as to what reasons are and to why the norma-
tive necessities are metaphysically necessary. For a treatment of these differences, the best place to look is
(Vayrynen 2016). I am not discussing these differences because I am focusing on the claim, common to all
three irreduciblists, that the normative necessities are metaphysical necessities.
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metaphysically necessary that pain be bad, all God needs to do to make pain states bad is
to make the pain states. Their badness will come for free.3
Kripke’s theistic metaphor of metaphysical necessity is just that: a metaphor. It’s not
meant to be an analysis of metaphysical necessity. There is no agreed-upon analysis of
metaphysical necessity in the literature, so unfortunately I can’t provide you with one. I
am talking about the Kripkean metaphor here just to give you a heuristic that you can use
to pump your intuitions about what entailment relations would count as metaphysically
necessary.4
Some philosophers argue that metaphysical necessity is a confused notion. In recent
work, Justin Clarke-Doane argues that there is no sense of metaphysical modality that has
the kind of privileged status that NYU-style philosophers grant to it. Asking whether some-
thing is metaphysically possible, for Clarke-Doane, is like asking whether the Parallel Pos-
tulate is true: there is no absolute sense of the Parallel Postulate such that it is either true or
false. What we rather say about the Parallel Postulate is that it is true of Euclidean geome-
tries and false of non-Euclidean geometries. Similarly, whether some proposition counts as
being “metaphysically” possible or necessary depends on what kind of restriction you’ve
already drawn on the space of worlds.
Clarke-Doane suggests that what this means is that there is no interesting question as to
what counts as metaphysically possible or necessary. The moral I draw from his argument
is somewhat different. I think that what Clarke-Doane has argued shows not that there is
3Even if it were metaphysically necessary that pain be bad, this does not provide a solution to the theo-
logical problem of evil, since there still remains the question why God created pain or anything else that is
bad as a matter of metaphysical necessity.
4I’m not the only one to do this, e.g. (Enoch 2011, p. 141) and (Chalmers 2002a, p. 146).
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no interesting question as to what is metaphysically possible and metaphysically necessary,
but rather that there are very many interesting questions as to what counts as metaphysi-
cally possible or metaphysically necessary. The sense of whether normative necessities are
metaphysical necessities that interests me in this dissertation is the sense in which Enoch,
Shafer-Landau and Scanlon mean it: whether, once one has specified all the non-normative
facts in a world, the normative facts that also exist in that world come for free.
To repeat, Shafer-Landau, Enoch and Scanlon are all irreduciblists who assert that the
non-normative facts “entail” the normative facts, and that the entailment in question should
be understood not as conceptual or analytic entailment but as metaphysical entailment, or
entailment with metaphysical necessity. Unfortunately, this kind of response misses the
point of Blackburn’s argument. Let’s grant with Enoch and Scanlon that the non-normative
facts necessitate the normative facts, given that the normative principles or pure norma-
tive truths are as they are. This would be to restrict the space of worlds to those worlds in
which the pure normative truths are as they are. I’ll follow Kit Fine in calling this kind of
necessity normative necessity. By itself, however, normative necessity does not immedi-
ately give us the metaphysical necessity that Enoch, Shafer-Landau and Scanlon want to
impute to the normative supervenience claim. We can imagine Max, a fan of Blackburn,
asking something like this: “I admit that the non-normative features of the world give rise
to the normative features that it does as a matter of normative necessity. However, I deny
that the non-normative features of the world give rise to the normative features that it does
as a matter of metaphysical necessity. For I deny that the normative necessities are meta-
physical necessities. Why should I think otherwise?” Although pure normative truths such
as “pain is bad” may, as Shafer-Landau argues, give us an entailment relation from pain
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states to badness, simply claiming that this entailment relation obtains with metaphysical
necessity does nothing to answer Max’s question. The lack of an answer to this question is
intolerable.
Perhaps metaphysical necessity in this case just comes for free. After all, metaphysical
necessity does come for free sometimes. Lewis, for example, argued that the mereological
facts come for free once one has assembled all facts about the mereological sums’ com-
positional bases. Humeans about physical laws argue that the physical laws come for free
once one has the Humean mosaic.
However, this sort of response won’t work for the irreduciblist. The reason why fusions
come for free with their parts is because, as Lewis says, “The fusion [of cats] is nothing over
and above the cats that compose it. It just is them. They just are it” (Lewis 1991, p. 81).
The reason why physical laws come for free is because laws, for the Humean, just are the
exceptionless constant conjunctions. Once you have the Humean mosaic, you have all the
exceptionless constant conjunctions and therefore all the laws.5 The irreduciblist, however,
specifically holds that the normative properties do not reduce: they are indeed something
over and above the non-normative properties that give rise to them. So the question arises:
why are the normative necessities metaphysical necessities? How can they come for free
when, for the irreduciblist, the normative facts don’t simply reduce to the non-normative
facts?6 Shafer-Landau asserts, true enough, that the non-normative/normative relations can
be metaphysically necessary even if they are not conceptually necessary. Of course. This,
5In saying this, I am not claiming that Hume himself held the Humean view of physical laws. Whether
Hume held this view is a difficult interpretive issue—see (Beebee 2006, pp. 108-141).
6Again, the irreduciblist can appeal to realization to offer an explanation here. I criticize this sort of
response in §3.3.2.
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however, is not in itself a reason to think that they are metaphysically necessary, but only
that theymay bemetaphysically necessary even if there is no conceptual entailment between
a full description of the non-normative features of a world and a description of the normative
features of that world. It seems clear, then, that, in this exchange, Blackburn has the better
hand.
A proponent of the claim that the normative necessities are metaphysical necessities
might simply put her foot down and say that the normative necessities are metaphysical ne-
cessities, full stop. I take it, though, that in debates about what is metaphysically necessary,
the burden of proof falls on the affirmer. A claim that some description is true of a world as a
matter of metaphysical necessity is ipso facto a claim that other descriptions of some world
that are inconsistent with the first are necessarily false. If one claims, for instance, that
it’s impossible that there be no homogenous, enriched uranium spheres that are one mile in
diameter, we want to know what is wrong with these spheres that makes them impossible.
After all, there’s no problem with homogenous lead spheres of that size, as far as we can
tell, and we have no problem accepting the metaphysical possibility of these lead spheres.
We assume that a description is a description of a metaphysically possible world until such
time that someone gives us a reason to think otherwise: say, formulates the description in
a way sufficiently precise to the details, and then points out some inner inconsistency or
incoherence in the concepts involved in the fuller description. As it turns out, spelling out
the notion of a mile-diameter enriched uranium sphere in further detail would reveal that
the alpha decay of a mass of enriched uranium even a fraction of that size would trigger
a chain reaction that would both fragmentize the mass and convert the enriched uranium
into something else. But in the absence of this sort of explanation and precisification of the
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details of the description, we tend to default to thinking that any given description describes
a possible rather than an impossible state of affairs. So it seems as though defenders of the
claim that the normative necessities are also metaphysical necessities need to do more than
stick to their guns. They do owe us an explanation—or at least an explanation as to why
they don’t owe us an explanation.
3.2 The Supervenience Dilemma
The Dilemma formulated
Here is a more concise statement of the problem that supervenience poses for the irreducib-
list primitivist:
1. Supervenience Disjunction: Additive Reasons Supervenience expresses a metaphys-
ical necessity, or it does not.
2. Brute Entailment: If Additive Reasons Supervenience expresses a metaphysical ne-
cessity, then the reasons fundamentalist can’t explain why.
3. Brute Normativity: If Additive Reasons Supervenience does not express a metaphys-
ical necessity, then reasons fundamentalists must either accept that there is a non-
additive formulation of supervenience that expresses a metaphysical necessity, or
reasons fundamentalists must accept that normativity is metaphysically arbitrary.
4. Additive Exclusion: The only variety of supervenience that reasons fundamentalists
can accept is Additive Reasons Supervenience.
5. Therefore, either the reasons fundamentalist cannot explain why Additive Reasons
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Supervenience expresses a metaphysical necessity, or reasons fundamentalists must
accept that normativity is metaphysically arbitrary.
Call this the Supervenience Dilemma for the irreduciblist primitivist.
Here’s a synopsis of the argument. The reason this is a Supervenience Dilemma for the
irreduciblist is because supervenience relations are entailment relations. IfB supervenes on
A, then whenever you have A, you haveB. A entailsB. It’s a Dilemma because either dis-
junct is bad for the reasons fundamentalist. Supervenience Disjunction is true because it’s a
logical tautology. Brute Entailment encapsulates the worry expressed in §3.1—namely, that
any irreduciblist primitivist does not have an explanation of why Additive Reasons Super-
venience expresses a metaphysical necessity. I believe that this is true, but will consider this
claim in substantially more detail in §3.3 below. Additive Exclusion is the conclusion from
the introduction to §2.5. In that section, I argued that Centrality commits any reasons fun-
damentalist that accepts normative supervenience to Additive Reasons Supervenience, and
furthermore that there is no other, non-trivial normative supervenience claim that they can
accept. Brute Normativity expresses the arbitrariness worries from §2.6.2 above—namely,
that if the normative laws were not metaphysically necessary, then they could have been
different than they are, in which case the fact that our world has the normative laws that it
does seems un-moored (“un-Moored”...?) from the non-normative features of our world in
a way that seems inexplicable and unsettling. The conclusion is that either that reasons fun-
damentalists can’t explain why Additive Reasons Supervenience expresses a metaphysical
necessity, or that they are committed to the metaphysical arbitrariness of normativity.
Note that the conclusion of the Supervenience Dilemma is only bad for the reasons
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fundamentalist. Critics of reasons fundamentalism can easily accept the conclusion, since
they can easily accept that their reasons fundamentalist opponents must choose between
one of the two unpalatable disjuncts expressed in the conclusion. Too bad for them.
However, for the reasons fundamentalist, the conclusion of the Supervenience Dilemma
is quite bad indeed. Every prominent metaethical theory (and probably the non-prominent
ones too) has major problems: the reduciblist has difficulty explaining open question intu-
itions and modal reference conditions for moral terms, error theories are quite revisionary,
noncognitivists face the Frege-Geach problem and Andy Egan’s concern that they are com-
mitted to “moral smugness” (Egan 2007), and so on. But what they do promise to offer, at
least, is an answer to the question what normative reality is and why it is the way it is rather
than some other way (or is not, for the error theorist). These two questions are arguably the
two defining questions of metaethical inquiry.
Irreduciblist primitivists have historically struggled with answering the first question—
the very name irreduciblism betrays this fact. A straightforward reading of the first chapters
of the Principia Ethica suggests that Moore is arguing that, if someone asks us what good-
ness is (as opposed to asking us what things are good), there is nothing we can positively
say. Moore gives us an unsatisfying via negativa for metaethical knowledge: we can’t truly
say anything about what goodness is, and can only truly say what it is not. If irreduciblists
can’t overcome the Supervenience Dilemma either, then it seems that irreduciblism can-
not answer the second defining question (why normative reality is as it is rather than some
other way), significantly lowering its prospects against the other views despite their own
deep challenges. Those who find these worries unsettling can of course just try to look
harder for a way to avoid Brute Entailment. We can do this, and we should. I will in fact
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attempt to do this in §3.3. The worry, however, is that we may find the explanation we are
searching for only by defecting from the irreduciblist primitivist camp.
Defending the Dilemma
Before considering the premises of the Supervenience Dilemma, I want to discuss objec-
tions that one might want to raise to the argument itself. Two objections in particular come
to mind. One objection is that one or more of the premises of the argument are incoherent,
which I’ll consider first. Another objection, which I’ll also consider, is that the premises of
the argument are coherent, but the argument itself is invalid.
Is non-normative/normative entailment coherent?
I mentioned in §2.6.1 that there are only two philosophers that explicitly fail to commit
themselves to the existence of a normative supervenience constraint on the distribution of
normative properties. The first is Rosen (Rosen 2002), who thinks that neo-essentialism
about modality gives us reason to think that normative supervenience is false. I discuss
Rosen’s concerns extensively in §3.3.3. The second is Bilgrami (Bilgrami 2006), who ar-
gues that we do not have a coherent concept of entailment relations between non-normative
properties and normative properties. I discuss Bilgrami’s argument in this section.
Bilgrami discusses normative supervenience in the context of an involved argument
for what Bilgrami calls perspectival duality. Perspectival duality (which is not, of course,
to be confused with substance dualism, property dualism, or dualism of other kinds) is
perspectival because it is a duality of distinct points of view: the first-person point of view
of agency and engagement within which norms and values are in play, and the third-person
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point of view of “detachment” from these norms. It is constitutive of practical agents that
they occupy the first-person point of view.
The duality of the perspectival duality refers to an interesting property of these points of
view: that they are such that it is impossible for an individual to occupy both of them at once.
Features of the world that are conceivable while occupying the agential perspective (call
these “agential features”) are not conceivable while occupying the detached perspective,
and features of the world that are conceivable while occupying the detached perspective
(call these “detached features”) are not conceivable while occupying the agential perspec-
tive.7
Bilgrami furthermore argues that there is no third, “straddling” perspective from which
one can conceptualize both the agential features of the world and the detached features of
the world at the same time. Occupying one point of view requires a switch in perspectives
such that the various features of the world that would have been present when occupying
the previous point of view are no longer able to be accessed and evaluated. Because we
cannot conceptualize agential features and detached features at the same time, we have no
way of conceptualizing relations between agential and detached features.
The result, Bilgrami argues, is that normative supervenience relations are incoherent.
Normative supervenience is a relation that obtains between the normative features of the
world and the non-normative features of the world. However, normative features of the
world are agential features: they are conceivable only while occupying the agential per-
spective. Non-normative features of the world are detached features: they are conceivable
7The phrases “agential features” and “detached features” are mine. To my knowledge, Bilgrami does not
use these exact phrases.
128
only while occupying the detached perspective. Normative supervenience is therefore a re-
lation that obtains between agential features of the world and detached features of the world.
But, as we just saw, it is not possible for us to conceive of relations between agential and
detached features of the world, since this would require us to occupy a third point of view
that straddles these two perspectives, and such a point of view does not exist. Therefore
normative supervenience is inconceivable and ultimately incoherent.
Explicit criticism of Bilgrami’s supervenience claim has focused not as much on the
existence of the agential and detached perspectives themselves, but on the claim that rela-
tions between them cannot be accessed. Baldwin and Normore, for instance, both suggest
that the sorts of facts that we access and evaluate when occupying the detached point of
view are precisely the ones that feature in practical reasoning, and therefore that agents are
capable of understanding and evaluating normative supervenience theses while occupying
the agential point of view (Baldwin 2010), (Normore 2010). Even if there exists no per-
spective that unites the agential and detached perspectives, Baldwin and Normore suggest
that the features of the world available to us while occupying the detached perspective are
also available to us while occupying the agential perspective. As Normore writes,
From your perspective you see me as having (say) needs in virtue of my low
caloric intake. You can indeed see the caloric intake itself as calling on you—
it’s too low—less than required to keep me in good health—and you conclude
something must be done about it. You plan to bring me meals on wheels. You
are five kilometers away. You are 15 minutes away as you drive and ten min-
utes away as your partner drives. My low caloric intake is partly a product of
circumstance and partly of a genetic disorder. There is nothing about the third
person perspective that you need to leave out in any of this. (ibid., p. 768)
Baldwin and Normore construe the detached perspective as an impoverished version of the
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agential perspective. Although we can occupy the detached perspective and thereby lose
access to the normative features of the world, simply switching back to the agential per-
spective brings back our access to these features without losing anything we were able to
access while occupying the detached perspective. Switching from one perspective to the
other is like putting on your normative sunglasses and then taking them off again. Now the
world is laden with normativity; now it’s not; that’s the only difference and all there is to
say. If all the features of the world available to us while occupying the detached perspective
are also available to us while occupying the agential perspective, then perspectival duality
gives us no reason to think that normative supervenience is incoherent. We can easily con-
ceive of the normative supervenience relation and evaluate it while occupying the agential
perspective, from which we can access both the detached and agential features of the world.
There does seem to be something prima facie plausible about Normore’s suggestion.
Surely we take facts about the caloric properties of certain substances into consideration
when preparing meals to victims of diabetes. However, I take it that the objection misses
the distinctive and radical feature of Bilgrami’s view. Bilgrami’s suggestion, I take it, is
not simply that occupying the agential point of view involves value judgment or even that
value-judgments are only understandable from the agential perspective. Bilgrami’s radical
suggestion is that occupying the agential point of view—which is to say, being an agent at
all—involves understanding the world as being “saturated” through and through with value
and normativity. As Bilgrami writes,
It makes all the difference that [in the agential point of view] I am describing
the person or persons as being in need. To do so is to observe a fact that is
laden with value in the sense that I perceive it to be making certain evaluative
or normative or imperatival demands on me... The first person point of view...
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sees the world in a way that is laden with value–in a way, therefore, that impli-
cates the perceiving agent, involves the perceiving agent’s engagement with it.
(Bilgrami 2006, pp. 256-257)
For Bilgrami, values and norms are not “additive” properties that sit atop a barren world
that is, in itself, “polar night of icy darkness”—a description Weber used to characterize
societies organized largely in accord with the demands of bureaucratic, means-ends instru-
mental rationality. There are no normative sunglasses that you can put on and take off at
your leisure. The world’s saturation with value is such that, once an agent ropes together
all the value-laden properties in order to formulate a supervenience claim, the set of prop-
erties that remain would not be sufficiently robust to form a supervenience base. Perhaps
there would not be any properties to rope together at all. The opposite problem harasses at-
tempts to formulate normative supervenience from outside the agential perspective. From
the detached, non-agential perspective, nothing is normative and nothing is value-laden.
Once such an individual ropes together all the non-normative features of the world (if such
a thing is even possible), there would be no properties left to play the supervening role.
Baldwin considers this sort of response but dismisses it as “absurd”. Calling a view absurd,
however, does not amount to an argument against that view.
I accept Bilgrami’s claim that there exists a perspectival duality between the first-person
and third-person points of view. I also accept that, since these points of view cannot be
occupied at the same time, claims about relations that hold between facts accessible only
from one perspective, and facts accessible only from the other perspective, are unintelligible
and therefore cannot be accessed. I furthermore accept that, when suitably spelled out, the
normative features of the world are accessible only from the agential perspective, and the
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non-normative features of the world are accessible only from the detached perspective. I
therefore accept that any supervenience doctrine that purports to express a relation between
normative and non-normative properties is unintelligible.
Additive formulations of supervenience, as I have described them, purport to express
a relation between normative and non-normative properties. I therefore conclude that ad-
ditive formulations of supervenience are unintelligible. However, the arguments in this
dissertation against additive supervenience will not draw on Bilgrami’s arguments. I am
not drawing on Bilgrami’s arguments simply because many philosophers don’t accept per-
spectival duality, and I want to convince them too. Fortunately for me, there are good
reasons even for critics of perspectival duality to fail to accept additive supervenience. I
give these reasons in §5.3. In what follows, then, I will leave perspectival duality behind
and argue as though I and other people understood what an additive supervenience relation
could be.8
Secondly, I will argue that Bilgrami’s arguments do not establish that normative super-
venience in general is incoherent. It establishes only that additive formulations of norma-
tive supervenience are incoherent, but leaves intact the coherence of supervenience relations
of other, non-additive kinds. In particular, I argue that it is coherent on the perspectival du-
ality picture to say that normative properties supervene on descriptive properties, provided
that these descriptive properties are also normative in some sense. I will exploit this idea
when developing and defending my own, non-additive (“transformative”) formulation of
8This strategy of arguing against views one takes as incoherent has a long tradition in philosophy. Al-
though Anselm thinks it’s incoherent to say that God does not exist, he still countenances the fool who sayeth
in his heart there is no God. Although Hume believes that philosophers do not have an idea of necessary
connection, he still argues with them as though he did. And so on.
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normative supervenience in §5.2 and §5.3.
Revising logic
Perhaps irreduciblist primitivists can avoid the Supervenience Dilemma by claiming that
the Supervenience Dilemma is invalid. The Dilemma is valid, of course, but in classical
logic, and irreduciblist primitivists can argue that classical validity is not the kind of validity
we are looking for when evaluating the validity of arguments such as the Supervenience
Dilemma. Perhaps we have reasons to think that classical logic is not the logic that best
captures the kind of reasoning at work when we consider the phenomena the argument
discusses.
Some phenomena don’t easily fit into classical logical models. Vagueness and the se-
mantic paradoxes are two good examples. Michel Foucault is definitely bald, and David
Chalmers is definitely not. What about Kit Fine? It’s not clear. One response to this lack of
clarity about how to apply vague predicates in borderline cases is to say that people on the
borderline of baldness are neither bald nor not bald, but rather indeterminately bald. The
introduction of indeterminate truth values entails a denial of the Law of Excluded Middle
and marks a departure from the semantics of classical logic.
Similarly, the sentence “This sentence is false” seems to be both true and false. If the
sentence is true, then it is false; if it is false, then it is true. One response to this apparent
overdetermination of truth values is to say that the sentence is neither “true and not false”
nor “false and not true” but rather “both true and false”. The introduction of overdeter-
mined truth values entails a denial of the Law of Bivalence and marks a departure from the
semantics of classical logic.
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Irreduciblists cannot avoid the Supervenience Dilemma by denying the Law of
Bivalence—say, by claiming both that the normative necessities are metaphysical neces-
sities and that the normative necessities are not metaphysical necessities. This actually
makes the case worse for them, since they would then be committed not just to one of the
bad consequences expressed in Brute Entailment and Brute Normativity, but rather both of
them.
Irreduciblists could deny the Law of Excluded Middle. This would allow them to
claim that it’s indeterminate whether the normative necessities are metaphysical necessi-
ties, which would allow them to navigate the horns of dilemma expressed in the argument’s
conclusion. I take it, though, that the rejection of classical disjunction, like claims that any
given description is in fact impossible, would amount to a rejection of a default view. Just
as we should hold that descriptions are default possible until given good reason to think
otherwise, we should hold that truth-apt sentences, like the disjuncts in Supervenience Dis-
junction, are default bivalence-conforming: such that they are either determinately true and
determinately not false, or determinately false and determinately not true. Revisions to
logic are very big deals indeed (e.g., (Williamson 1996)).
Perhaps the phenomena at stake in the Supervenience Dilemma are important enough to
motivate a rejection of classical logic. To be sure, there likely are some phenomena in the
philosophical universe that do require deviation from classical logic in order to make sense
of them, and too important to just give up entirely. Normativity, in my view, is to important
to give up. So, if normativity were one of these phenomena that required a deviation from
classical logic in order to make sense of it, then we should deviate from classical logic.
However, what’s at stake in Supervenience Dilemma is not normativity. It is irreducib-
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lism. And although irreduciblism has many virtues (I am an irreduciblist, and I wouldn’t be
one if I didn’t think it had virtues), it is not so important that we should sacrifice classical
logic for it. If we have to choose between irreduciblism or classical logic, we should go for
classical logic, no questions asked.
Furthermore, even if, for whatever reason, irreduciblism were important enough to sac-
rifice classical logic, we should sacrifice classical logic for it only if there were no other
way to save irreduciblism. This dissertation will argue in §5 that there is a way to save
irreduciblism that does not involve any revisions to classical logic. So we shouldn’t revise




Can irreduciblist primitivists reject Brute Entailment? In §3.1, I raised a problem for ir-
reduciblist primitivist’s capacity to explain why the non-normative features of our world
necessarily give rise to the normative features of the world that they do. I argued in §3.1
and §3.2 that the irreduciblist primitivist cannot explain this within the resources provided
by their account of normativity. However, it’s worth investigating whether they can sup-
ply such an account on the basis of resources provided by modal epistemology or modal
metaphysics. Specifically, the irreduciblist primitivists can attempt to find an independent
account of metaphysical modality such that this account provides an explanation of why
Additive Reasons Supervenience expresses a metaphysical necessity rather than simply a
normative necessity.
In this section, I’ll consider three distinct approaches to construing metaphysical neces-
sity and investigate whether they can help the irreduciblist reject Brute Entailment. The
three approaches to metaphysical necessity that I’ll consider are conceivability approaches,
specifically, the conceivability approach of Chalmers; causal regulation approaches, specif-
ically, the approach of Brink; and neo-essentialist approaches, specifically, the approach of
Kit Fine.
There are of course many more characterizations of metaphysical necessity than the
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ones that I’ll consider. In particular, I am considering in detail neither David Lewis’ modal
realism nor David Armstrong’s combinatorialism. About modal realism I have little to say,
finding it highly implausible. Armstrong has an ontology of simple particulars, simple uni-
versals and simple relations; his combinatorialism about modality is the view that all the
combinations of simple particulars, properties and relations that respect certain formal con-
straints constitute possibilities (Armstrong 1997, p. 160).1 On the recombination principle,
a particular combined with a simple normative property and relation like the reason relation
will be a possibility, and a particular combined with the absence of this property or relation
would constitute another possibility. So Armstrong’s combinatorialism would not generate
generate metaphysical necessity in the normative case.
I choose the conceivability, a posteriori and neo-essentialist approaches to metaphysical
possibility and necessity because of their current particular prominence in the literature on
modal epistemology and modal metaphysics. I will argue in this section that none of these
three approaches ultimately gives irreduciblist primitivists sufficient resources to explain
why Additive Reasons Supervenience expresses a metaphysical necessity.
4.1 Conceivability
Notions of necessity are closely linked to notions of possibility: a propositionP is necessary
just if¬P is not possible. An investigation into metaphysical possibility is therefore eo ipso
an investigation into metaphysical necessity.
Historically, the most common bridge to metaphysical possibility has been through con-
1A simple particular, property or relation is a particular, property or relation that cannot be further de-
composed into constituent particulars, properties or relations.
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ceivability. Conceivability-based arguments underlie many of the most famous arguments
in philosophy, from Anselm’s ontological argument to Descartes’ argument for the numer-
ical distinctness of mind and body. Notable examples in the 20th century include Moore’s
open question argument and Gettier’s argument against justified true belief analyses of
knowledge. Conceivability approaches faced a considerable challenge in the twentieth cen-
tury from Putnam, Burge and Kripke’s discovery of necessary a posteriori metaphysical
necessities. But the conceivability approach also enjoys prominent defenders. In this sub-
section, I will interact with the conceivability approach with the help of Chalmers’ helpful
distinctions between varieties of conceivability.
Chalmers defends a variety of modal rationalism. For Chalmers, there is a charac-
terization of conceivability such that all worlds conceivable in this way are possible. In
characterizing the kind of conceivability at stake in his modal rationalism claim, Chalmers
draws three binary distinctions across the conceivability space: ideal vs prima facie con-
ceivability, positive vs negative conceivability, and primary vs secondary conceivability.
The resulting framework therefore gives us a logical space of eight kinds of conceivability.
I will first introduce these three distinctions, then discuss their implications for metaphys-
ical necessity, and end with a consideration of whether Chalmers’ approach can help the
irreduciblist explain why additive supervenience is metaphysically necessary.
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Types of conceivability
Ideal vs prima facie conceivability
It is prima facie conceivable that 18593 × 4992 = 92716256. (It doesn’t, by the way.) At
first glance, maybe that’s the right answer. I am relatively good at arithmetic, but I am not a
computer (although, if Chalmers’s views on the singularity and personal identity are correct,
perhaps I might become one in the not-too-distant future). As it turns out, ideal reflection
tells me that that’s not the right answer. In fact, such reflection tells me that it could not
be the right answer.2 The prima facie conceivability of “18593 × 4992 = 92716256” is
therefore not a very reliable guide to what is truly possible. An appropriate specification of
the link between conceivability and possibility will then require that the conceivability be
ideal conceivability: conceivability on ideal rational reflection. Specifically, a hypothesis
S is ideally conceivable just if ideal rational reflection detects no contradiction in S; or,
equivalently, when ¬S is not ruled out a priori after ideal rational reflection.
Positive vs negative conceivability
We can positively imagine flying horses and means of production that are democratically
controlled. These are things that we can coherently imagine, or picture in our mind’s eye if
you will. We can also imagine invisible creatures, dark matter, angels, ectoplasm and so on.
These are things that we can’t picture in our mind’s eye (or at least, not without cheating),
but that we can nevertheless coherently imagine. Chalmers lumps both varieties of imag-
2For the extreme minority view according to which the truths of mathematics are metaphysically contin-
gent, see (Rosen 2002). Ayer of course worries that Mill’s theory makes the arithmetical truths contingent:
(Ayer 1952, p. 74).
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ination under the label modal imagination, which he leaves as an intuitive notion that he
thinks we all can grasp. I will follow him in this. Positively conceivable hypotheses are thus
hypotheses that we can coherently modally imagine, where coherently modally imaginable
hypotheses are hypotheses that we can either picture in our mind’s eye (flying horses), or
that we can imagine in the way that we imagine dark matter and invisible creatures.
Negatively conceivable worlds are worlds that we can’t coherently modally imagine,
but are nonetheless not ruled out a priori. In other words, a negatively conceivable world
W is one such that there is no apparent contradiction in W. Since positively conceivable
worlds are only ones that we can coherently imagine, positively conceivable worlds will
therefore also be negatively conceivable on this definition.
There is a clear link between negatively conceivable hypotheses and ideally conceivable
hypotheses. An ideally conceivable hypothesis is a hypothesis such that ideal rational re-
flection does not reveal any contradiction. A negatively conceivable hypothesis is one such
that reflection does not reveal an apparent contradiction. Since ideal rational reflection is a
species of reflection, an ideally conceivable hypothesis will therefore also be a negatively
conceivable hypothesis, on the definitions given here.
Primary and secondary conceivability
It is impossible to give an exposition of primary and secondary conceivability that’s both
adequate and concise. What I give here is as brief and clear of a presentation as I can, in
the context of a generic two-dimensionalist (2D) picture. Other introductions can be found
at (Chalmers 2004), (LaPorte 2006), and (Soames 2004).
Two-dimensionalism is a semantic theory that aims to reconcile aspects of Fregean se-
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mantics with the revolution in semantics launched by Kripke, Putnam, Burge and Devitt’s
discovery of, and investigation into, a posteriori necessities. I’ll start with a very slightly
technical description of the two-dimensionalist view and then move on to a more intuitive
characterization.
In its broadest formulation, two-dimensionalism is a variety of possible-worlds seman-
tic theory on which token utterances in a world are evaluated relative to not one but two
intensions (or “dimensions”), which we can call their primary and secondary intensions, or
1- and 2-intensions. Both primary and secondary intensions are functions from possibil-
ities to extensions. We can use (along with Chalmers) the term “scenario” to denote the
possibilities salient to evaluation relative to primary intensions, and the term “world” to
denote the possibilities salient to evaluation relative to secondary intensions. In addition,
each strong assertion is associated with a two-dimensional intension, which is a function
from {scenario, world} pairs to extensions.
On all two-dimensional frameworks, evaluation of a token utterance relative to its sec-
ondary intension is the standard Kripkean evaluation from worlds to extensions. A token
utterance of “water” has a secondary intension that takes a world as input and gives us an
extension consisting of all and only the H2O in that world. We can call this “secondary
evaluation” or “evaluation considered as counterfactual”. Chalmers calls it “evaluation
considered as counterfactual” because when we, say, consider the Twin Earth/XYZ world,
we are considering whether the Twin Earth world represents some other way the world
could have been. In actuality, the actual world is one in which H2O causally regulates our
use of “water”, and thus the rigidification of the term gives us an empty extension in the
XYZ world when we evaluate the XYZ world as counterfactual.
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The first dimension of evaluation is more complicated, and varies from two-
dimensionalist to two-dimensionalist. Loosely speaking, however, the first method of eval-
uationwill be evaluation relative to epistemic scenarios specified in such away as to capture
aspects of a Fregean view of meaning, where the scenario is elucidated in different ways
depending on the theory and the variety of phenomenon for which the 2D analysis is being
offered: as Kaplanian characters, Stalnakerian propositional content, descriptions, narrow
content, modes of presentation, centered worlds, and so on. We can call the method of eval-
uation relative to intensions of this kind “primary evaluation” or “evaluation considered as
actual”.
Here is an example. You know lots of things: things about reptilian biology, physics,
metaphysics, everyday facts, and so on. You receive a small package in the mail. Before
you open this box, your epistemic scenario will include all the things you knew before you
received the package, plus the fact that you just got a package in the mail. For all you know,
it might contain a diamond necklace, a box of chocolates, a book on the metaphysics of
modality, or nothing at all—these are all ways that the world could be, given the epistemic
scenario. In other words, if you consider a possible world in which the box contains a
diamond necklace, nothing about that possible world conflicts with anything you currently
know about the actual world. You do know, however, that the package does not contain
dragon eggs, a supernova, or Sylvan’s box. This is because there is something about each
of the possible worlds in which that box contains dragon eggs, a supernova, or Sylvan’s
box that conflicts with what you currently know about the actual world—namely, the facts
of reptilian biology, astrophysics, and metaphysics.
2D semantics uses these epistemic scenarios to explain our intuition that, if we were an
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early 18th-century chemist, for all we know, water could turn out to be XYZ. For a chemist
before 1750, water could turn out to be H2O, or it could turn out to be XYZ (or both!)—her
epistemic state doesn’t rule out either of them as being the way the world is. Any of these
scenarios regarding the compositionality of water could turn out to be the case given her
epistemic situation. Importantly, Chalmers holds that this is not in conflict with the Krip-
kean discovery of the necessary a posteriori, since necessary a posteriori claims are claims
not about how the world could turn out to be, but about how the world could have been. In-
tuitions about how the world could turn out to be and intuitions about how the world could
have been come apart for the 2D theorist because they are tracking two different intensions
of our token utterances. “Water could turn out to be XYZ” seems true to us because our
intuitions about what utterances could turn out to be true track the primary intensions of
these utterances, while “water could have been XYZ” seems false to us because our intu-
itions about what utterances could have been true track the secondary intensions of these
utterances. Primary and secondary intensions, for the 2D theorist, are distinct functions to
distinct sets of possible worlds. Primary intensions are functions from epistemic scenarios
to sets of worlds, while secondary intensions are functions from worlds to sets of worlds.
Two-dimensional semantics are employed to deal with issues concerning necessary a
posteriori truths, contingent a priori truths, indexicals, Kripkean puzzles about belief and
so forth. For instance, take the sentence “The Métre des Archives is one meter in length”,
where Métre des Archives is a name for the platinum meter stick in Paris that for a period
of time set the standard of lengths for the metric system. We’ll suppose for the sake of the
example that this is a bona fide example of the contingent a priori. It’s true that this meter
stick is one meter in length, and there is a sense in which it had to be so: after all, a meter
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was stipulated to be the length of that very stick. No matter what length in inches, say,
the meter stick happened to be, the causal baptism of “meter” as “the length of that stick”
guarantees that that stick has to be a meter in length. But there is another sense in which the
meter stick didn’t have to be a meter in length. The stick could have been under immense
pressure at the time of the baptism, in which case the stick would be shorter than a meter.
A two-dimensionalist tries to salvage both intuitions by holding that the sentence “The
Métre des Archives is one meter in length” has both a primary and a secondary intension
relative to which the truth of the sentence can be evaluated, and that the sentence comes
out true on the primary way of evaluation while false on the second way. Suppose we don’t
know whether the meter stick was under immense pressure or not. Then, as far as we know,
the meter stick could be one of any number of lengths expressed in inches. Either length
in inches would be consistent with our epistemic situation. But we do know a priori that
it’s a meter for the reasons discussed above, irrespective of whether it was under immense
pressure at the time of the baptism. We can illustrate this with the help of the following
chart:
Primary↓/Secondary→ normal pressure immense pressure
normal pressure T F
immense pressure F T
This chart gives us the two-dimensional intension of “The meter stick is one meter in
length”. A two-dimensional intension is a function from {scenario, world} pairs to truth
values. Take any of these pairs and the two-dimensional intension will give you a truth
value. The chart indicates that, on any scenario, the sentence comes out as actually true
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but only contingently so, since the stick would be some other length than a meter had the
pressure been different. The reason for this is that Métre des Archives rigidly designates
the stick, while the term “meter” rigidly designates the actual length of the stick. In any
world that would be counterfactual for a scenario had it turned out that that scenario were
actual, the same stick would have a different length than the length denoted by “meter”.
This explains the contingency of the sentence.
Conceivability and metaphysical possibility
The point of discussing Chalmers’ 2D framework is to investigate whether it offers the
irreduciblist resources to avoid Brute Entailment. So in this section, I’ll give the 2D char-
acterization of metaphysical necessity and then discuss upshots for the modal status of the
reasons fundamentalist’s supervenience claim.
A sentence S is metaphysically necessary in a world w iff the secondary intension of
S evaluated at w is true at all worlds. Alternatively, we can also say that a sentence S is
metaphysically necessary in a world w iff S evaluated at w is true at all worlds considered
as counterfactual at w.
We can know whether the secondary intension of a sentence is true at all worlds in
two ways. We can know this a posteriori, or we can know this a priori. The a posteriori
approach to demonstrating metaphysical necessity in Chalmers’ 2D framework is just the
Kripke-style causal regulation approach to demonstrating metaphysical necessity. I treat
this approach separately in §3.3.2. So, in this section, I will focus exclusively on the a
priori approach to demonstrating metaphysical necessity in the 2D framework.
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On Chalmers’ 2D conceivability framework, we can know a priori that S, given an
epistemic scenario, if S is true as a matter metaphysical necessity just by knowing whether
every suitably conceivable world that’s consistent with the epistemic scenario verifies S.
This is because, on Chalmers’ framework, suitably conceivable worlds are metaphysically
possible; therefore, if every suitably conceivable world that’s consistent with an epistemic
scenario verifies S, then it will be metaphysically necessary that S is true given that epis-
temic scenario. For example, if our epistemic scenario entails that John is a bachelor, then
it is a priori that the sentence “given that John is a bachelor, John is unmarried” is true as a
matter of metaphysical necessity. This is because every suitably conceivable world that’s
consistent with John’s being an bachelor will verify John’s being unmarried. Since there is
no suitably conceivable world that’s consistent with John’s being a bachelor but does not
verify John’s being unmarried, it’s not metaphysically possible for John to be a bachelor and
also be unmarried. So it is therefore metaphysically necessary that, if John is a bachelor,
then he is unmarried.
Given this framework, whether we know a priori that some S, given an epistemic sce-
nario, is true as a matter of metaphysical necessity will depend on our criteria for deter-
mining which scenarios are suitably conceivable and therefore whether the worlds they
represent are metaphysically possible. In the case of a priori knowledge, the relevant kind
of conceivability will certainly be primary conceivability, or conceivability as actual. As
Chalmers says, “If any variety of a priori conceivability entails possibility, it must be a va-
riety of ideal primary conceivability” (Chalmers 2002a, p. 171). Furthermore, Chalmers
asserts, plausibly enough, that “prima facie conceivability is an imperfect guide to possi-
bility” (ibid., p. 159). For example, the scenario described in the Grim Reaper paradox
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is prima facie positively conceivable. Here is the scenario: There are countably infinitely
many grim reapers. Grim reaper 1 will kill you with a scythe at 1pm if and only if you are
still alive at 1pm. Grim reaper 2 will kill you with a scythe at 12:30pm if any only if you
are still alive at 12:30pm. Grim reaper 3 will kill you with a scythe at 12:15 pm if and only
if you are still alive at 12:15pm. And so on. It’s prima facie conceivable that there could
be a countably infinite number of these grim reapers poised to kill you. But it’s not ideally
conceivable: ideal rational reflection shows that, although no grim reaper n can ever get
me (because I would be killed by grim reaper n + 1, there must be some grim reaper that
gets me at some point because I cannot survive past 12pm. This is just one example of why
prima facie positive conceivability is a poor guide to metaphysical possibility.
A further question is: what kind of ideal primary conceivability provides the best guide
to possibility? We have two options: negative ideal primary conceivability, and positive
ideal primary conceivability. A world is negatively ideally primarily conceivable given
an epistemic scenario just if the world verifies that epistemic scenario and ideal rational
reflection reveals no contradiction in the world. A world is positively ideally primarily
conceivable given an epistemic scenario just if it’s negatively ideally primarily possible
and it can also be coherently modally imagined, either in the way we can imagine flying
horses or in the way we can imagine dark matter and ectoplasm. Alternatively, an ideally
positively conceivable world just is a prima facie positively conceivable world that’s also
such that ideal rational reflection would reveal no contradiction in the world.
Negative and positive ideal primary conceivability can be used to construct the follow-
ing two conceivability-possibility entailment theses:
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Positive Possibility: Positive ideal primary conceivability entails metaphysical
possibility; and
Negative Possibility: Negative ideal primary conceivability entails metaphys-
ical possibility.
Chalmers states that Positive Possibility is “almost certainly true” and that Negative Possi-
bility is “very likely true” (ibid., p. 172).3
With this background of the last three subsections in place, we are now in a position
to evaluate whether the 2D characterization of metaphysical necessity provides the reasons
fundamentalist with resources to avoid Brute Entailment.
Conceivability, possibility, and reasons fundamentalism
The argumentative strategy
Here again is our supervenience claim:
Additive Reasons Supervenience: For any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any
fact-agent-action-circumstance tuples T1 in w1 and T2 in w2, if T1 and T2 are
intrinsically and extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible andw1 and w2 are
non-normatively indiscernible, then T1 instantiates the favoring relation if and
only if T2 instantiates the favoring relation.
Suppose Additive Reasons Supervenience expresses a metaphysical necessity in the sense
that the worlds that it quantifies over are all the metaphysically possible worlds. One prin-
ciple of logical entailment is universal instantiation: that, for any variable bound by a uni-
versal quantifier, you can eliminate the quantifier by substituting in a constant for the bound
3“Positive Possibility” and “Negative Possibility” are my terms, not Chalmers’, but they do express the
entailment theses that Chalmers gives at (Chalmers 2002a, p. 172).
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variable. If we construct a theorem by substituting in two particular fact-agent-action-
circumstance tuples (i.e. reasons-apt tuples) for the variables T1 and T2, this theorem alters
nothing about the scope of the quantifiers binding the world variables and therefore would
also express a metaphysical necessity. What this means is that, if we can show that, given
the conceivability framework, one of the theorems generated from substitution does not
express a metaphysical necessity, we thereby show that Additive Reasons Supervenience
does not express a metaphysical necessity. This opens up a door to counterexamples to the
metaphysical necessity of Additive Reasons Supervenience.
Additive supervenience relations in general state that, if two individuals are relevantly
non-normatively similar, then they will be normatively similar. Additive Reasons Super-
venience specifies a maximally restrictive notion of relevant similarity. In order to qual-
ify as normatively similar on Additive Reasons Supervenience, reasons-apt tuples must be
non-normatively indiscernible in every way: intrinsically non-normatively indiscernible,
extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible, and in non-normatively indiscernible worlds.
Call two reasons-apt tuples that are indiscernible in this way maximally non-normatively
indiscernible, and let the “maximal non-normative properties” of T1 and T2 express the
set of non-normative properties in virtue of which two reasons-apt tuples T1 and T2 are
maximally non-normatively indiscernible.4
4This set of properties is maximally non-normative because we built Additive Reasons Supervenience
specifically in order to guarantee that there were no additional descriptive properties in the universe that could
function as enablers, disablers, attenuators or intensifiers for one or more of the tuples in question. If there
were such additional non-normative properties, they could function in principle as enablers, disablers, atten-
uators and intensifiers for one of the relevantly non-normatively similar tuples but not as an enabler, disabler,
attenuator or intensifier as another relevantly non-normatively similar tuple, which would then would allow
us to produce counterexamples to our supervenience claim. We wanted to rule out these counterexamples in
an attempt to construct the most ecumenical and easily defended additive supervenience claim that we could
on behalf of the reasons fundamentalist.
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Additive Reasons Supervenience will express a metaphysical necessity just if, for every
instance of reason-apt tuple T at any world w1, either every suitably conceivable world w2
consistent with the maximally non-normative properties of T verifies T ’s being a reason, or
every suitably conceivable world w2 consistent with the maximally non-normative proper-
ties of T verifies T ’s not being a reason. In other words, the epistemic scenario relevant to
evaluating the modal status of some instance of Additive Reasons Supervenience will be the
epistemic scenario consisting of the maximally non-normative properties of that instance.
Since the maximally non-normative properties of any instance are stipulated to include all
the non-normative properties in the world containing that instance, our epistemic scenario
includes knowledge of all the non-normative facts constituting the world containing the in-
stance. If, given reasons fundamentalism, we can’t suitably conceive of any two maximally
non-normatively indiscernible reasons-apt tuples that differ in that one instantiates the fa-
voring relation and the other does not, then we have found an explanation on behalf of the
reasons fundamentalist of why Additive Reasons Supervenience expresses a metaphysical
necessity. That explanation would simply be that we can’t suitably conceive of any alterna-
tive to T ’s having the normative properties it does in non-normatively indiscernible worlds.
The reasons fundamentalist could therefore avoid Brute Entailment.
Here is moral philosophy’s favorite example of a reason-apt tuple: the fact of the drown-
ing baby, the action of pulling the baby out of the water, the agent Peter Singer, and the
circumstances in which Singer’s next to the baby, the baby is the only person in immediate
danger of death in the nearby vicinity, Singer is not traveling to be at the bedside of a dying
family member, etc. This tuple happens to instantiate the reason relation in our world. If
we substitute this reasons-apt tuple in for T1 in Additive Reasons Supervenience, we get
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the claim that any fact in some world w that there’s a drowning baby just like that one,
gives anyone just like Peter Singer in that world a reason to pull the baby out of the water
so long as they’re right next to the water, nobody else in the vicinity is in immediate danger
of death, and, by the way, everything else non-normatively salient about w is also just like
it is in our world in all non-normative respects.
Here is a counterexample to this Peter Singer instance of Additive Reasons Superve-
nience. Let w be a world non-normatively just like ours. Jamie Dimon’s counterpart gets
$20 million in compensation for the 2013 fiscal year for managing to limit to a mere $19.6
billion JP Morgan Chase’s settlements with the SEC for the bank’s role in producing the
2008 financial crisis (CNN 2014); Maximilian Kolbe’s counterpart offers his life for a
condemned stranger in Auschwitz; Singer’s counterpart stands next to the drowning baby,
and so on. The twist is that, in w, the actions Jamie Dimon’s counterpart took to earn that
USD$20 million are not morally dubious. Nor in w is Maximilian Kolbe’s counterpart
morally good, and Singer’s counterpart doesn’t have a reason to save the baby. In fact,
nothing is morally dubious or morally good or a reason in w at all: the moral statements of
its denizens are all false, and Parfit’s counterpart has, by his own lights, wasted many years
of his life in pursuit of ethical knowledge (Parfit 2011, section on moral naturalism). W is
the nihilistic universe. As it does not verify any normative facts (since no normative facts
exist in it), it does not verify the same set of normative facts as our universe. If the nihilis-
tic universe is suitably conceivable, then, on Chalmers’ conceivability framework, it will
not be a priori that all non-normatively indiscernible possible worlds are also normatively
indiscernible.
I will consider two approaches that one could take towards characterizing suitable con-
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ceivability on the Chalmers conceivability framework: the Negative Possibility and Posi-
tive Possibility routes discussed earlier.
Negative Possibility
If reasons fundamentalism is true, the nihilistic universe is certainly ideally negatively pri-
marily conceivable. This is because there is nothing about considering the nihilistic uni-
verse as actual, given the epistemic scenario consisting of all the non-normative facts of
our world, that generates a contradiction, even for an ideal rational subject. After all, the
conjunction of the non-normative facts of our world and the normative facts in our world
does not generate a contradiction for an ideal thinker when considering our world as actual,
so, a forteriori, the conjunction of all the non-normative facts simpliciter will not generate
a contradiction for an ideal thinker either.
If there were a conceptual entailment from the non-normative features of theworld to the
normative features of the world, then an ideal thinker’s imagining the non-normative fea-
tures of the world would give rise to thoughts about the normative features of the world for
that ideal thinker as a matter of conceptual necessity. For instance, if our concepts of plea-
sure and pain entailed that actions that increased pleasure and reduced pain were morally
right, then any ideal thinker’s thinking of all the pain, pleasure, and actions that produce
the pains and pleasures would also produce in that ideal thinker the entailed thoughts about
moral rightness.5 However, the Primitivity component of reasons fundamentalism assures
5This would not be true for any thinker whatsoever. It’s possible for me to think about green, for instance,
without also thinking that green is a color, even though it is a conceptual truth that green is a color. It’s also
a conceptual truth that 29 is the tenth prime number, but I can think about 29 (such as in the sentence “I
am 29 years old”) without thinking that 29 is the tenth prime number. In fact, I think I have never thought
about 29’s being the tenth prime number before today, despite the fact of my having been 29 for a while now.
However, we aren’t talking about me here. We’re taking about an ideal thinker. Ideal thinkers are stipulated
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that there is no conceptual entailment from non-normative concepts to normative concepts.
If there were such a conceptual entailment, then we would have at least a partial analysis
of our concept of the favoring relation in terms of the non-normative concepts that would
conceptually entail thoughts about the normative concepts by an ideal thinker.
Chalmers claims that Negative Possibility—in other words, the claim that ideal pri-
mary negative conceivability entails primary possibility—is “very likely true”. If Negative
Possibility is true, then the nihilistic universe is suitably conceivable and we have a coun-
terexample to the metaphysical necessity of Additive Reasons Supervenience.
However, Chalmers explicitly cites the irreduciblist primitivist conception of normative
concepts as a possible counterexample to his Negative Possibility thesis. He states that
“there do not seem to be distinct positively conceivable situations” in which both situations
verify the non-normative truths but only one verifies the normative truths. If, as reasons
fundamentalists think, the moral truths were not determined a priori by the non-normative
truths, we would then have a case in which the nihilistic universe is negatively ideally
primarily conceivable but not possible, which would constitute an objection to Negative
Possibility. This is a problem for Chalmers, since Chalmers wants Negative Possibility to
be true.
Chalmers himself does not have much to say regarding moral truths. (I was once in a
seminar of Derek Parfit’s in which Parfit asked Chalmers, “What do you think?” Chalmers
replied, “About what? Normativity? Too hard for me!”) But he does say a few things.
In particular, Chalmers suggests that the moral truths do not pose as much of a problem
for reduciblism about normativity as the phenomenal truths pose for reductivism in the
to be thinkers that, unlike me, always think through all the conceptual implications of their thoughts.
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philosophy of mind:
“There are two disanalogies [between the moral and phenomenal truths], how-
ever. First, there does not seem to be a conceivable world that is naturally
identical to ours but morally distinct, so it is unlikely that moral facts are fur-
ther facts in any strong sense. Second, moral facts are not phenomena that force
themselves on us. When it comes to the crunch, we can deny that moral facts
exist at all... The same strategy cannot be taken for phenomenal properties,
whose existence is forced upon us” (Chalmers. 1996, p. 83).
Chalmers here notes the potential tension between the Negative Possibility thesis and the
irreduciblist primitivist position on normative truths. He does not much care about norma-
tivity, so he is happy to either reduce it (such that the normative facts are not “further facts
in any strong sense”) or eliminate it altogether. The irreduciblist obviously can’t reduce
normativity or eliminate normativity. So the irreduciblist would have to reject the Negative
Possibility thesis and assert only the Positive Possibility thesis: that, for any scenario, only
if that scenario is positively ideally primarily conceivable can we conclude that worlds con-
sistent with that scenario are metaphysically possible. This brings us to an examination of
Positive Possibility and its implications for the metaphysical necessity of Additive Reasons
Supervenience.
Positive Possibility
I mentioned in §3.3.1 above that, for Chalmers, a scenario is positively ideally conceivable
if (a) we can picture the world in our mind’s eye like we can picture flying horses, or (b) we
can’t picture it in our mind’s eye, but nevertheless positively imagine it in a way similar to
the way we imagine ectoplasm6 or dark matter. The favoring relation is not something that
6Ectoplasm is a theoretical posit in the philosophy of mind literature. It is supposed to be some immaterial
substance that instantiates phenomenal properties and is frequently used in thought experiments about the
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we can visualize in either way. On the reasons fundamentalist picture, the favoring relation
does not have empirical properties, so it’s not something that we can visualize. And it isn’t
located in space like ectoplasm or dark matter, so it’s not something we can conceive of in
that way either.
However, Chalmers does not actually think that a scenario is positively ideally conceiv-
able only if you can imagine it in at least one of these two ways. Chalmers also thinks
that we can positively imagine mathematical truths, and the facts that these truths denote
also aren’t located in space or have empirical properties. Although the criteria for positive
conceivability are not well worked-out, we should assume that, whatever these criteria end
up turning out to be, we should be able to positively imagine at least actual normative sce-
narios, such as the scenario in which the fact of the drowning baby is a reason for Singer to
save it. The question, then, is whether the nihilistic universe construal of the Peter Singer
scenario—namely, the scenario in which fact of the drowning baby is not a reason for Singer
to save it—is positively conceivable in the same way.
I don’t actually know the answer to this. However, I think there is a good case to be
made that, if reasons fundamentalism is true, the nihilistic construal of the Singer scenario
is positively ideally conceivable. If it is positively ideally conceivable, then Positive Pos-
sibility does not give reasons fundamentalists resources to avoid Brute Entailment.
I will give two arguments for the claim that Positive Possibility does not give rea-
sons fundamentalists resources to avoid Brute Entailment. The first argument will adapt
Chalmers’ arguments for the positive conceivability of phenomenal zombies to the case of
normativity. The second will adapt Michael Smith’s permutation problem for Jackson’s an-
modal character of phenomenal properties.
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alytic moral functionalism to the case of reasons fundamentalism. As I said, I take neither
argument to be conclusive.
Phenomenal zombies . A phenomenal zombie, for Chalmers,
is just something physically identical to me, but which has no conscious
experience—all is dark inside. While this is probably empirically impossible,
it certainly seems that a coherent situation is described; I can discern no con-
tradiction in the description.... Almost everybody, it seems to me, is capable
of conceiving of this possibility. (ibid., p. 96).
Chalmers furthermore suggests that phenomenal zombies are positively conceivable. In
other words, for Chalmers, we not only can imagine a world featuring his zombie twin, but
also that the zombie twin is positively absent of phenomenal experience. There is notmerely
an absence of imagining the phenomenal properties, but an imagination of the absence of
these properties. Thus it is possible on the Chalmers conceivability framework for absences
to be positively conceivable.
In his 1996 book, Chalmers gives a sustained defense of the positive conceivability of
phenomenal zombies as part of his overall argument against reductive views in the philos-
ophy of mind. On one such reductive view, which Chalmers in later work calls “Type-C”
materialism7 (Chalmers 2002b), there appears to be a deep epistemic gap between the phys-
ical and phenomenal domains, but this gap is closeable in principle. Although it would have
been inconceivable to the pre-Socratics, for example, how matter could be energy, we later
experienced a conceptual revolution that allowed us to conceive this very thing. Similarly,
on type-Cmaterialism, it is currently inconceivable to us how consciousness could be phys-
7In this discussion about reductivist views in the philosophy of mind, I do not distinguish between “ma-
terialism”, “physicalism”, and “reductivism”. The terms are used synonymously.
157
ical, but there will in time come a conceptual revolution that will allow us to understand
this very thing. That’s the type-C reductivist view.
Another way to gloss the type-C reductivism view is as the claim that, although phe-
nomenal zombies are prima facie positively conceivable, they are not ideally conceivable.
They are not ideally conceivable according to type-C reductivism since, if we were ideal
thinkers, we would have access to the conceptual capacities that would allow us to see
how consciousness could be physical, in which case we would not be able to conceive of a
physical duplicate of myself that lacked consciousness.
Chalmers argues that the argument against the ideal positive conceivability of phenom-
enal zombies is unsound. His reasoning is simply that physical explanation is always given
in terms of structure and dynamics, and that there is nothing about structure and dynamics
that could explain phenomenal properties. No matter what the future physics looked like, it
would at least be a theory that purported to explain physical reality in terms of structure and
dynamics. Since these kinds of concepts are not suited in principle to explain the existence
of phenomenal properties, we should accept that there is would be no contradiction that
such an ideal thinker could generate if she were to try to conceive of phenomenal zombies.
Phenomenal zombies are therefore positively ideally conceivable.
A similar worry appears in the normative case. Like phenomenal zombies, it seems that
we can prima facie positively imagine the absence of normativity. Consider this interchange
that Primo Levi describes between himself and a guard at the camp in Auschwitz:
Driven by thirst, I eyed a fine icicle outside the window, within hand’s reach.
I opened the window and broke off the icicle but at once a large, heavy guard
prowling outside brutally snatched it away from me. “Warum?” I asked him
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in my poor German. “Hier ist kein warum” (there is no why here), he replied,
pushing me inside with a shove. (Levi 1993, p. 26)
In asking “warum?”, Levi is asking the guard for a practical normative reason, some sort
of justification for the guard’s behavior. The guard’s response was not “I didn’t do it for
any reason at all”, which would merely indicate something about the current absence of
motivating reasons on the part of the guard. His response to Levi, rather, is simply, “there
is no why here.”
I suspect that most of us know what that guard means. He means that there are no
reasons. He understands what Levi is asking him: that Levi’s request is a request to be given
a normative reason for the guard’s behavior, and that Levi is ultimately looking for some
sort of normative framework from which to understand the normatively incomprehensible
world in which he finds himself. Thus the guard says not simply “there is no why”, which
would indicate simply that there were no normative reason for ripping the icicle from Levi.
The guard says, rather, that there is no why “here”: not just in this minor act of cruelty, but
in the entire camp. The entire camp is devoid of normativity. There are orders and threats,
action and submission. But there are no reasons. Not here.8
We can’t understand the absence of normativity in this scenario simply as the guard’s
8This dovetails with a claim that Parfit made in seminar. Parfit indicated that the discovery of reasons
is particularly important because the kind of practical reasoning that characterizes people who lack this con-
cept can sometimes manifest as reasoning from duties and commands. This kind of moral reasoning, Parfit
suspects, was the primary mode of moral reasoning of soldiers and government officials serving in the Third
Reich. The theory of reasons is fundamentally opposed to a theory of duties and commands. You can, of
course, have reasons to obey commands, but you don’t need reasons to obey a command. This is because
commands are imperatives that issue from some authority that stands outside of your rational agency. (Ignore
Kant for our purposes here. We are not talking about moral rational imperatives but about commands issued
by authoritarian figures in positions of political power.) Acting from reasons, in contrast, always issues from
your own rational point of view and as such is not an entirely alienating experience. The discovery of reasons,
therefore, may help society mitigate the frequency of the kind of alienated moral experience that gave rise to
the horrors of the Nazi regime and could give rise to future authoritarianism as well.
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having an absence of normative imagination. The fact that the guard understood what Levi
is asking disallows this. In understanding what Levi was asking but stating that there was
no why in Auschwitz, the guard is expressing not that he is failing to imagine anything
normative at all, but that he is positively imagining the normativity’s absence. The case,
therefore, seems to suggest the prima facie positive conceivability of the nihilistic universe,
at least on a small scale.
A “normative type-C reductivist”might say that, although there is currently a conceptual
gap between the non-normative properties and the normative properties, future empirical
research could initiate a conceptual revolution in our non-normative concepts that would
allow us to see how the non-normative features of the world give rise to the normative
features that they do. If this were the case, then the nihilistic universe, for example, would
be prima facie positively conceivable but not ideally conceivable, since the ideal thinker
would have access to the concepts available after the conceptual revolution and would be
able to use these concepts to understand how the non-normative features of the world give
rise to the normative features that they do.
However, the non-normative features of the world, for the reasons fundamentalist, are
different than the normative features of the world in an important and radical way: they
are non-normative. Non-normative explanation is in principle unsuited to explain the exis-
tence of normativity. There can be no conceptual revolution that could give us concepts to
bridge this explanatory gap. For this reason, there is nothing about the prima facie positive
conceivability of the nihilistic universe that prevents an ideal thinker from conceiving it as
well, in which case the nihilistic universe is not only prima facie positively conceivable but
ideally conceivable as well.
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The nihilistic universe was stipulated to be indiscernible from our world in all non-
normative respects. If both the nihilistic universe and our own world, with its own norma-
tive features, are ideally positively conceivable, then, given the Positive Possibility thesis
that positive ideal conceivability entails metaphysical possibility, we have two metaphys-
ically possible worlds that are indiscernible with respect to their non-normative features
but discernible with respect to their normative features. Additive Reasons Supervenience
entails that no two non-normatively indiscernible worlds can differ with respect to their
normative features. Therefore, on the conceivability framework, Additive Reasons Super-
venience cannot express a metaphysical necessity, and Brute Entailment remains a problem
for reasons fundamentalism.
I’ll now move on to the second argument for why Positive Possibility does not help the
reasons fundamentalist avoid Brute Entailment.
The permutation problem . Reasons fundamentalists hold that the reasons relation is
primitive. This is to say that, according to reasons fundamentalism, is no direct conceptual
entailment from our concept of a reason to any conclusion about whether any particular
reasons-apt tuple instantiates the reasons relation. If the reasons fundamentalist wants to
explain why some reasons-apt tuple is a reason, he needs to appeal to something in addition
to the concept of a reason.
Scanlon’s own particular approach to explaining why particular reasons-apt tuples are
reasons appeals to what he calls the pure normative truths (Scanlon 2014, pp. 37-42). Pure
normative truths are metaphysically necessary truths that, along with the help of “mixed”
normative-nonnormative bridge laws, allow us to explain why any particular reasons-apt
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tuple is a reason. One example of a pure normative truth is “pain is bad”. When I rationally
judge that I have a reason not to slap Johnnie, what I am doing, according to Scanlon, is
grasping the pure normative truth that pain is bad, and then inferring from this and a mixed
normative truth such as “slapping people causes pain” to the conclusion that, for example,
I have a reason not to slap Johnnie even though I am really mad at him right now for not
doing the dishes.9
Pure normative truths do not admit of any explanation of their truth. Pain is bad; that’s
all there is to it. This is problematic for our purposes, becausewhat we are trying to do in this
section is to find a way to allow the reasons fundamentalist to avoid Brute Entailment. If we
do not have anyway to explain why “pain is bad” is true, we also don’t have a way to explain
why “pain is bad” is true as a matter of metaphysical necessity. Since all explanations of
why particular reasons-apt tuples are reasons involve an appeal to the pure normative truths,
the result is that we also lack an explanation of why any particular reasons-apt tuple’s being
a reason obtains with metaphysical necessity.
The pure normative truth approach is not the only approach that the reasons funda-
mentalist can take. It is open to the reasons fundamentalist to be an explanatory coheren-
tist instead. The reasons fundamentalist can say that we can explain why any particular
reasons-apt tuple is a reason by appealing to some other reasons fact along with additional
non-normative facts. We can explain why Johnnie’s skipping his dishes duty is not a reason
to slap Johnnie by appealing to some other reason, like “skipping dishes is not a reason to
cause people pain” and the non-normative fact that stabbing causes pain. We can explain
9Scanlon claims that we don’t have to consciously grasp the pure normative truth. He takes his view to
be consistent with our common experience of just “seeing” the reason and acting (or refraining from acting)
immediately, without having done any further conscious practical reasoning beforehand.
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why this is a reason by citing the fact that “infrequent forgetfulness don’t provide reasons
to cause people pain” and the non-normative fact that Johnnie forgot this time but he usu-
ally remembers. We can explain why this is a reason by saying “infrequent forgetfulness
doesn’t provide reasons to cause roommates pain” and the non-normative fact that Johnnie
is a roommate. And we can explain this with “take a petty action like slapping my room-
mate Johnnie for forgetting dishes duty—I definitely don’t have a reason to do that!” (Why
not? Because it will cause Johnnie pain, and so on.) In reality, the explanation scheme for
why any particular reasons-apt tuple is a reason will be more involved than this, but this
example at least illustrates what the explanatory coherentist scheme I’m proposing would
look like.
Here is the problem, which I adapt from a similar argument given against moral func-
tionalism byMichael Smith at (Smith 1994, pp. 48-55). You can take this entire explanatory
structure, but permute it into an explanation of why Johnnie’s skipping his dishes duty is a
reason for me to slap Johnnie. Here is what the permuted structure would look like. Jones
claims that Johnnie’s skipping his dishes duty is a reason for me to slap Johnnie because
slapping Johnnie will cause Johnnie pain, and Johnnie’s skipping his dishes duty is a reason
to cause Johnnie pain. This is a reason, Jones claims, because Johnnie infrequently forgets,
and this infrequent forgetfulness is a reason to cause Johnnie pain. Why? Because Johnnie
is my roommate, and if your roommate is infrequently forgetful, you should cause them
pain. Why? Well, Jones claims, my roommate Johnnie once forgot to do the dishes, and
that gave me a reason to slap him. Call the world as Jones sees it the permuted world.
The general idea behind permutation is this. Let the reasons valence of a reasons-apt
tuple be the reasons-apt tuple’s status as a reason. If a reasons-apt tuple has a positive
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reasons valence, it is a reason; if it has a negative reasons valence; it is not a reason. On the
coherentist scheme, the reasons valence of any particular reasons-apt tuple can be explained
by appealing to the valence of some other reasons-apt tuple, alongwith, in some cases, some
further non-normative facts. What I am suggesting is that there may be, in principle, no
(theoretical) reason why the reasons valences of an entire coherentist explanatory scheme
can’t be permuted in the way that I have just illustrated.
I’ll explain this with the help of a chart featuring all the reasons-apt tuples and their
valences from our Johnnie example. I leave out the agents and circumstances because they
don’t vary in this case, and I include the non-normative facts that are relevant to the expla-
nations.
Fact R-Valence Action Non-normative
J skips dishes No slap J N/A
J skips dishes No cause J pain stabbing→ pain
forgetting No cause J pain J forgot
forgetting No cause pain to roommate J is a roommate
J skips dishes No slap J My roommate J forgot to do dishes
Here is what the chart looks like after we permute all the reasons valences:
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Fact R-Valence Action Non-normative
J skips dishes Yes slap J N/A
J skips dishes Yes cause J pain stabbing→ pain
forgetting Yes cause J pain J forgot
forgetting Yes cause pain to roommates J is a roommate
J skips dishes Yes slap J My roommate J forgot to do dishes
As far as I can tell, both charts depict a coherent normative explanatory scheme. The
valence of each reason in each scheme has an explanation that appeals to the valence of
another reason in the scheme. The same non-normative facts appear in both explanatory
schemes, and this set of non-normative facts is mutually consistent. Other than the reasons
valences, there is no normative content in either explanatory scheme that one could use to
demonstrate some sort of inconsistency within the normative claims. On the reasons fun-
damentalist picture, furthermore, the concept of a reason is primitive. In itself, it gives us
no conceptual resources that we could use to show that the normative facts that exist in the
permuted world are inconsistent with the non-normative facts of that world. In order to
show such inconsistencies, one would have to find these inconsistencies from within the
normative explanatory scheme itself. However, there do not seem to be any such inconsis-
tencies. There is no clear way how you could convince someone who held these normative
beliefs why, by his own lights, he does not have an internally consistent and coherent theory
of which reasons-apt tuples are reasons and which are not.
What the possibility of permuting the reasons valences in an entire normative explana-
tory scheme suggests is that there are distinct, internally coherent theories of which reasons-
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apt tuples are reasons and which are not that generate distinct answers to questions about
whether any particular reasons-apt tuple is a reason or not. If these distinct explanatory
schemes are ideally positively conceivable, then, given the thesis that positive ideal con-
ceivability entails metaphysical possibility, we have a counterexample to Additive Reasons
Supervenience.
Furthermore, we do have some reason to think that both of the sample explanatory
schemes that I have are ideally positively conceivable. On Chalmers’ picture, an ideally
positively conceivable scenario is just a prima facie positively conceivable scenario that
reveals no contradiction even after rational reflection. Both of the explanatory schemes
I’ve given are prima facie positively conceivable. If Jones told us that the permuted world
was actually our own, we would think that Jones is certainly incorrect, not a very nice per-
son, and possibly mentally ill. But we would understand what he said, and we can even
get into the mindset of what it might be like for someone to conceive of normative real-
ity as he does. Given the non-normative facts of our world, his view of normative reality
would strike us as false but positively conceivable, at least prima facie. Furthermore, if the
permuted world is prima facie positively conceivable, and the permuted world’s normative
explanatory scheme was internally coherent, the permuted world must be ideally positively
conceivable as well. For without any internal inconsistency in the normative theory that
describes the normative reality of the permuted world, there would be no internal contra-
dictions that an ideal thinker could detect.
The explanatory scheme of the permuted world and the explanatory scheme that cor-
rectly expresses the normative nature of our world are mutually inconsistent. For example,
in the permuted world, your roommate’s failure to do dishes is a reason to slap him, whereas
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in our world, your roommate’s failure to do dishes is not a reason to slap him. It can’t be
the case that both are true. Because of this, it can’t be the case that there is a single possible
world that verifies both of them. If we can positively ideally conceive of either scheme, we
must be ideally positively conceiving of distinct worlds, in which case the conceivability
approach to metaphysical necessity would entail that there are two metaphysically possible
worlds which are non-normatively indiscernible but discernible with respect to the distribu-
tion of the favoring relation in each world. If this were the case, Additive Reasons Superve-
nience, which entails that two non-normatively indiscernible worlds cannot be discernible
with respect to the distribution of the favoring relation, could not express a metaphysical
necessity. This means that the conceivability approach to metaphysical necessity does not
help the reasons fundamentalist avoid Brute Entailment.
Some caveats. I have claimed that the permuted world is prima facie positively conceiv-
able. However, I am not claiming that the permuted world is ideally positively conceivable.
I am only claiming that there do not seem to be resources available to the reasons fundamen-
talist to resist the suggestion that the permuted world is not ideally positively conceivable.
If a different theory of normativity NT were true, it could well be the case that, despite
the permuted world’s prima facie positive conceivability, the permuted world would not be
ideally conceivable for an ideal thinker who understood the true theory NT in virtue of her
ideal thinkerhood.
Secondly, I don’t know if the permutation scheme would work for an entire coherentist
explanatory scheme. More work needs to be done on that question. There is indeed a debate
on whether there is a permutation problem for Jackson’s network analysis of normativity,
and my sense from this debate is that there are enough conceptual resources in Jackson’s
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theory to respond to this problem.10 However, no one, as far as I know, has attempted to
investigate the existence of this related permutation problem for the reasons fundamentalist.
Furthermore, the permutation problem for Jackson’s network analysis of normativity is
supposed to be a problem for Jackson’s reduciblism, while my rendition of the problem for
the reasons fundamentalist is meant to describe a problem for the reasons fundamentalist’s
use of the conceivability approach to metaphysical possibility to avoid Brute Entailment.
I do, however, take the prospects for developing my permutation problem for the reasons
fundamentalist to be better than the prospects for developing a permutation problem for
network analyses of normativity in general, since network analyses of normativity typically
allow for a whole host of thick normative concepts and complex normative concepts that
can be used to generate conceptual contradictions. Reasons fundamentalism, however, has
no conceptual resources to resist this outside of the single primitive concept of the favoring
relation.
Another problem with my argument here is the possibility of normative insularity.
Rovane argues that relativists about normativity are committed to the existence of distinct,
normatively insulated bodies of normative truths (Rovane 2013, p. 79). Sets of normative
truths Γ andH are normatively insulated from each other just if (a) any pair of sentences γ1
and γ2 in Γ stand in logical relations with each other, (b) any pair of sentences η1 and η2 in
H stand in logical relations with each other, and (c) there exists no pair of sentences γ in Γ
and η inH such that γ and η stand in logical relations with each other. In other words, sets
of normatively insulated truths form equivalence classes in which the equivalence relation
partitioning the truths into the equivalence classes is the relation of licensing logical infer-
10For more on this, see, for example, (Lenman 2006, §4.3).
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ence. For example, any two sentences γ1 and γ2 in Γ will license the following inference:
γ1 ⊢ γ1 ∨ γ2. However, if Γ and H are normatively insulated, there is no pair of sentences
γ in Γ and η in H that licenses γ ⊢ γ ∨ η.
Normative insularity is a problem for my claim that the ideal positive conceivability of
the permuted world because it could be the case that the bodies of normative truths that
feature in the two coherent explanatory schemes above are mutually normatively insulated
bodies of truths in our world. In order words, although it’s true that Johnnie’s not doing the
dishes is not a reason to slap him for all the reasons I have given, it might also be the case
that his not doing the dishes is a reason to slap him for all the reasons I’ve given, but that
these claims about reasons are normatively insulated and therefore do not license the kinds
of inferences that would show them to be mutually inconsistent. If we can positively ide-
ally imagine their normative insularity, then we no longer have to conclude that, when we
imagine each scenario expressed in the two coherent explanatory schemes, we are imag-
ining distinct metaphysically possible worlds. Our ability to ideally positively conceive
of the permuted world would therefore fail to generate a counterexample to the claim that
Additive Reasons Supervenience expresses a metaphysical necessity.
Whether the normative insularity objection succeeds against my argument depends
on (a) whether there are such things as normatively insulated bodies of truths, and on
(b) whether distinct bodies of truths are simultaneously ideally positively conceivable.
Whether this is the case is an area for further investigation, and one that I will not carry
out in this dissertation because my dissertation is already too long as it is.11
11See (Rovane 2013) for a detailed discussion of whether there are or could be normatively insulated
bodies of normative truths.
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In this section §3.3.1, I have argued that the reasons fundamentalist has significant hur-
dles to overcome in order to use the conceivability approach to explaining metaphysical
necessity as a means to avoid Brute Entailment. In the next section §3.3.2, I will exam-
ine the reasons fundamentalist’s prospects for avoiding Brute Entailment with the help of a
posteriori approaches to explaining metaphysical necessity.
4.2 Causal regulation
In this section, I consider the implications of a posteriori approaches to metaphysical neces-
sity on the prospects for reasons fundamentalists to avoid Brute Entailment. The a posteriori
approach is, of course, the avenue that Brink, Boyd and Copp in particular have elaborated
and defended in work done through the past 25 years.
There are a number of outstanding problems with these views, ones that I believe are
at this point definitive but have been sufficiently elaborated in other work.12 The question
in place for us here is not whether these views are defensible, but whether they give the
reasons fundamentalist resources avoid Brute Entailment. I think they do not. To argue for
this, I will consider the implications of this approach to explaining metaphysical necessity
through a critical analysis of David Brink’s normative irreduciblism, which I take to be
representative of the a posteriori approach to explaining normative supervenience.
12In particular, the views have trouble accounting for the intuitive force of counterexamples and intu-
itions about transworld disagreement (Horgan and Timmons 1991). Ken Yasenchuk has compiled a helpful
dissertation on the subject at (Yasenchuk 1995). Another helpful dissertation is (Rubin 2009).
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What is the causal regulation of reference?
Some a posteriori truths are necessary truths. Truths about the nature of the referents of
natural kind terms and proper names are two examples of such necessary a posteriori truths.
Putnam argued that natural kind terms acquire reference in two ways. They may acquire
reference through ostension, in which the linguistic community is presented with samples
of the natural kind and stipulates through a kind of speech act that the natural kind term is
to apply to that and only that natural kind presented in the samples. 16th century English
speakers go to the Indian subcontinent and see tigers for the first time; they declare that
whatever those things are shall be called “tiger”. The English term “tiger” thereby acquires
its reference as the natural biological kind that was baptized in this initial ostension proce-
dure. The reference of such terms is said to be “causally regulated”, since there is a complex
causal chain that connects the reference of any particular use of the term “tiger” today to
that first “dubbing ceremony” when “tiger” gained its reference.
Natural kind terms may also acquire reference by being associated with a particular
description and gaining their reference by being stipulated to denote the natural kind that
uniquely satisfies that description. Primitive English speakers say that “gold” is whatever
that yellowish stuff is that they put on all the religious artifacts; the English term “gold”
thereby acquires its reference as the natural kind that happened to be on all the religious
artifacts—namely, gold.
Since the ostension and description-specifying procedures fix the reference relations of
terms to natural kinds, the reference relations connect these terms to the natural kinds even
when these natural kinds no longer satisfy the initial reference-fixing description or the
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descriptions that would have been satisfied by the original samples. “Tiger” still refers to
the tiger it refers to after you paint that tiger maroon; “gold” still refers to gold even though
contemporary churches frequently just use gold-colored paint they picked up on discount at
Sherman Williams. Importantly, natural kind terms do this even in non-actual worlds. So
when we are talking about tigers and gold in possible, non-actual worlds, our words pick
out the natural kind tiger and the natural kind gold when we use these natural kind terms
to discuss these non-actual worlds as well. “Gold” and “tiger” refer to gold and tigers even
when we talk about worlds in which all the gold and tigers in that world are painted maroon
exceptionlessly. This is to say that the reference-fixing of natural kind terms specifies the
reference of natural kind terms necessarily: the terms refer to the same natural kind in all
possible worlds, even the ones in which all the tigers and gold are painted maroon. This
feature of natural kinds terms is called their rigid designation: in other words, when natural
kind terms whose reference is fixed in one of the two ways specified successfully refer to
a natural kind, they refer to that natural kind necessarily.
Since the ostension or description-specifying procedures fix the reference relations to
natural kinds necessarily, anything we discover about these natural kinds through empirical
investigation will be a discovery of necessary truths. For example, if we discover that gold
consists of atoms with atomic number 79, we learned that “what it is to be gold is to consist
of atoms with atomic number 79” is true. But we didn’t simply learn that “gold consists of
atoms with atomic number 79” is true; we learned that it is true necessarily, since “gold”
refers to gold necessarily, and what it is to be gold is to consist of atoms with atomic number
79.
Ostension and definition-specifying procedures can also fix the references of proper
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names, which opens the door to empirical discovery of necessary truths about individu-
als. Thus the ostension procedures that rigidly designated the references of “Hesperus” and
“Phosphorus” both as the planet Venus opened the door for empirical discovery that Hes-
perus and Phosphorus were identical, and therefore, given the rigidity of “Hesperus” and
“Phosphorus”, necessarily identical as well.
Causal regulation of the reference of normative terms
The fact that natural kind terms and proper names are rigid designators raises the ques-
tion whether other terms can rigidly designate their referents as well. Brink argues that
normative terms do. He endorses, for instance, the following thesis:
Each moral term t rigidly designates the [non-normative] property N that
uniquely causally regulates the use of t by humans. (Brink 2001, p. 165)13
Brink not only has this causal regulation view of the reference of normative terms, but
also has a view as to what properties causally regulate the reference of these normative
terms. Take all of the properties that stand under our non-normative concepts. Call these
the descriptive properties. Brink argues that no descriptive property or concatenation of
descriptive properties can causally regulate the reference of normative terms.14
To defend this claim, Brink gives an argument from the “multiple realizability” of nor-
mative properties. Properties are multiply realizable just if they are realizable by not one
property but multiple properties. Pain states are frequently said to be multiply realizable
13Brink here is actually quoting from (Horgan and Timmons 1991), but Brink also accepts this thesis.
14This does not mean that Brink is a non-naturalist. Brink thinks that he is ultimately a naturalist because
he holds that normative properties are natural properties, where the “are” here is the “are’ of constitution
rather than the “are” of identity.
173
in this way. Pain states can be realized by C-fiber firings, but they can also be realized
by firings of very different neural structures and even, most people think, activity of non-
carbon-based lifeforms. Brink thinks that normative properties are multiply realizable as
well. As Brink writes,
Both the property of injustice and the particular instances of injustice, in what-
ever social or economic conditions they are actually realized, could have been
realized by a variety of somewhat different configurations of social and eco-
nomic properties and property instances. Moral properties could have been
realized by an indefinite and perhaps infinite number of sets of natural [i.e. de-
scriptive] properties. If we deny that identity is a relation that can hold between
relata that are indefinitely or infinitely disjunctive—say, because we insist that
identity holds only between genuine properties and we deny that disjunctive
properties are genuine properties (Armstrong 1978, pp. 19-23)—then the mul-
tiple realizability of moral properties provides us with a reason for resisting the
identification of moral and natural [i.e. descriptive] properties. (Brink 1989,
pp. 158-159)
Here is Brink’s argument put differently. Normative properties are multiply realizable.
What this means is that, in our world, there will be a certain concatenation of economic
and social properties that realize the property of injustice. However, there will be other
worlds inwhich these specific economic and social properties will not realize the property of
injustice, and worlds in which other economic and social properties do realize the property
of injustice. For example, the economic condition in which Nestle owns all the water rights
in large swaths of Kenya realizes injustice in our world, but in worlds in which people in
Kenya didn’t need water or had money to pay Nestle, the economic condition in which
Nestle owns all the water rights in large swaths of Kenya perhaps would not realize the
property of injustice. Furthermore, the economic condition of harvesting seaweed to sell
to consumers does not realize the property of injustice in our world, but they might in
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worlds in which seaweed were sentient. Now, we could say that the property that causally
regulates “injustice” was some disjunctive property, in which case we could say that the
property that causally regulates “injustice” just was the descriptive property “monopolizing
of water access or harvesting sentient seaweed or ... or ...” However, there are no disjunctive
properties. So we cannot say that this disjunctive descriptive property is the property that
uniquely causally regulates our use of “injustice”. The argument extends mutatis mutandis
for the other normative properties.
One could take this argument as an argument against the causal regulation theory of
the reference of normative terms. Brink, however, does not do this. Instead, he claims that
the upshot of this argument is that “injustice” is causally regulated by—surprise—injustice.
But injustice is not identical to a descriptive property or some concatenation of descriptive
properties. It is, rather, fully constituted by but not identical to such properties (ibid.,
p. 158). Ditto for all the other normative properties.
Brink’s view is that injustice and the other normative properties are numerically distinct
from any properties that can be denoted by our non-normative concepts. Brink’s view of
normativity therefore is irreduciblist on the construal of irreduciblism that I gave in §2.5
above.
Brink’s view would count as a naturalism if one understood naturalism to be, as some
people do, the view that ethical properties are the object of study of the natural sciences.
Brink does think that the nature and identity of the normative properties are the object of
study of the natural sciences, in two ways. First, Brink states15 that the most appropriate
way to determine the identity of normative properties like injustice is to use scientific means
15In earlier work. His later work seems to move away from this view, for instance in (Brink 2001).
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of investigation into the identity of the properties that causally regulate our use of normative
terms. Secondly, once we have so identified these properties, we can use scientific means of
investigation to further discover the nature of these properties. I indicated in my discussion
of irreducibility, I am loathe to use the term “naturalism” because I believe it to be ambigu-
ous in the metaethical context, and because I worry that the term conflates metaphysical
and epistemological features of views that should be kept conceptually distinct. Readers
that do not have these qualms, or are otherwise willing to stipulate that natural properties
are properties whose identity and nature are suitable objects of scientific investigation, can
safely understand Brink’s view as a naturalism about normative properties.
I am neutral on whether there are disjunctive properties. However, if there were dis-
junctive properties, then the causal regulation view that would result from identifying the
normative properties with these disjunctive properties would give us a reduciblism, not an
irreduciblism, about normative properties. This chapter only concerns the prospects for
explaining normative supervenience for irreduciblist theories of normativity. So we can ig-
nore the case in which there are disjunctive properties. We can also ignore the case in which
the normative properties turn out not to be multiply realizable, because this too would result
in a reduciblist view given the structure of Brink’s argument.
What I have just described is a formal aspect of Brink’s theory of normativity. Brink’s
substantive theory of moral properties can be classified as a moral role functionalism about
moral properties. For Brink, moral properties are to be identified with the higher-order
properties of playing particular causal roles in specific characteristic activities of human
organisms (Brink 1984, p. 119). Those specific characteristic activities are those which
“bear upon the maintenance and flourishing of human organisms” (ibid., p. 120), where
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flourishing is spelled out in some suitably descriptive way. For example, in our world, there
is a complex causal system S that serves to distribute food and water to human beings. S
will have various lower-order descriptive properties, but goodness, according to Brink, is
not to be identified with any of these. Goodness is, rather, to be identified with the following
higher-order property of S: being such that S bears upon the maintenance and flourishing
of human organisms.
It’s probably most helpful at this point to explain Brink’s view through a comparison
between it and the more familiar discussions of functionalism in the philosophy of mind.
In philosophy of mind discussions of functionalism, there is a familiar distinction that is
drawn between “role” functionalism and “realizer” functionalism. Both sorts of function-
alism maintain that mental states are to be identified with properties that play a particular
role in some larger functional system.16 In the standard causal functionalist case, mental
properties would be identified with properties that play a particular role in a causal system.
The distinction between role and realizer functionalism has to do with how one prefers to
interpret the phrase “properties that play a particular role”. For the realizer functionalist,
the mental properties are identical to the lower-order properties that happen to realize the
mental property in question. For the role functionalist, the mental properties are identified
with the higher-order properties of being such that they play the particular role.
Lest this be interpreted to be a Byzantine and unimportant distinction, here is an il-
lustration. At certain points in the development of neuroscience, it was thought that pain
16Frequently, these systems are causal systems, but they need not be. For instance, the imaginary number
in complex analysis is sometimes said to be defined functionally: as the number such that its square is -1.
Similarly, the natural numbers in Peano arithmetic are defined in terms of the number 0 and applications of
the successor function, and so on.
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sensations were accompanied always by firings of C-fibers. Let’s pretend for a moment
that this is true. JJC Smart is well known in part for his suggestion that pain was not only
accompanied by C-fiber firings but identical to them. Such a view would qualify as a type-
identity theory of the mind. A realizer functionalist theory might instead say that pain is
identical, not to the C-fiber firings right off the bat, but to whatever happens to play the pain
role in the sophisticated causal structure that is disposed to produce some specified range of
characteristic human behavior. The pain role might be, say, an event brought about by bod-
ily injury and such as to produce anxiety, beliefs in one that something is wrong with one’s
body, the desire to be out of that state, and moaning or wincing behavior.17 Pain would
then be identical to C-fiber firings on the realizer functionalist view just if it turned out that
C-fiber firings played this causal role in the sophisticated causal structure that characterizes
human activity.
Block’s influential criticism of realizer functionalism had to do with the theory’s pur-
ported chauvinism (Block 1978). Suppose that there were an alien species composed not
of carbon but of silicon, or whose nerve fibers were optical fibers as opposed to neurons.
If realizer functionalism identifies various mental states, such as pain, with the firings of
C-fibers, then it seems that members of the aforementioned alien species lack mental states.
After all, the alien species doesn’t have any C-fibers, per hypothesi, so if there’s nothing
more to pain states than being C-fiber firings, the alien species cannot be in pain states. Is
it metaphysically impossible for aliens with a physiology quite different from us to have
pain states? Most of us don’t think so.
Role functionalism lacks this problem. According to role functionalism, mental prop-
17I draw this description of pain’s causal relations from (Levin 2013).
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erties are not identified with the lower-order properties that play the appropriate role in the
causal functional system, but with the higher-order properties of being such that they play
this role. On role functionalism, the pain of the alien species would be realized by what-
ever part of them happened to play the appropriate pain-causal role in the sophisticated
causal structure that characterized the alien’s activities. This opens up the possibility that
some aspect of the alien physiology, although quite different from ours, could still play the
appropriate mental causal role.
Brink’s explanation of normative supervenience
Brink goes on to argue that this not-identity-but-constitution view of the relation between
normative properties and descriptive properties provides a ready explanation of normative
supervenience. Supervenience relations are kinds of necessitation relations: if B super-
venes on A, then whenever you have A you must have B. Injustice, per hypothesi, is a
multiply realizable property. This means that there are many discrete concatenations of
descriptive properties that realize injustice. Call these discrete concatenations of descrip-
tive properties that realize injustice N1, N2, ...Nn. Since each Ni realizes injustice, then
whenever you have N1, you must have injustice; whenever you have N2, you must have
injustice, and so on. Injustice therefore supervenes on eachNi. We can assume for the sake
of argument that the necessity given by the realization relation is metaphysical necessity
(Melnyk 2003). So the supervenience that realization gives us is supervenience with meta-
physical necessity—in other words, the normative properties supervene on the descriptive
properties with metaphysical necessity.
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I argue that Brink’s theory of normative properties does not give us an explanation of
why Additive Reasons Supervenience expresses a metaphysical necessity.
Brink also holds that the multiple realizability of injustice is such that the various de-
scriptive properties that constitute injustice in our worldmay not constitute injustice in other
worlds. The example I gave was that the descriptive property of Nestle’s monopolizing wa-
ter distribution in poor areas of the world realizes injustice in our world, but it might not
in worlds in which water wasn’t a need. We can imagine a world in which water was like
perfume: it’s nice to have, but it’s not a need, and so it’s not a massive violation of human
rights to monopolize water distribution systems and deny access to people that can’t afford
to pay. So although it is the case that, in our world, whenever you have Nestle monopoliz-
ing water distribution and access in poor areas of the world, you will have injustice, it’s not
the case that in every world, whenever you have Nestle monopolizing water distribution
and access in poor areas of the world, you will have injustice. Injustice would then weakly
but not strongly supervene on economic conditions of monopolization of water distribution
and access.
Brink has a ready response to this objection. He can say that, although it’s true that
Nestle’s monopolization of water doesn’t realize injustice in every world, it’s still true that
Nestle’s monopolization of water realizes injustice in every world that’s exactly like ours
in non-normative respects. So although injustice will not strongly supervene on economic
conditions consisting of Nestle’s monopolization of water access in poor countries, it will
still strongly supervene on economic conditions consisting in Nestle’s monopolization of
water access in poor countries in worlds indiscernible from ours in all non-normative re-
spects.
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This argument succeeds at establishing a limited strong supervenience claim: that if
something realizes injustice in our world, then its duplicate will realize injustice in worlds
non-normatively indiscernible from ours. However, it does not succeed in establishing the
broader kind of strong supervenience of the sort that we are looking for. As we saw in
§2.6.3, the ecumenical formulation of normative supervenience was the view that any two
individuals in any two worlds that were exactly alike in non-normative respects will also
be such that these individuals will also be alike in all non-normative respects. As we put it
earlier:
Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience: For any possible worldsw1 and
w2 and any individuals i1 in w1 and i2 in w2, if i1 and i2 are intrinsically and
extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible andw1 andw2 are non-normatively
indiscernible, then, for any normative property P , i1 instantiates P if and only
if i2 instantiates P .
What the earlier argument on behalf of Brink establishes is that any two worlds that
are indiscernible from our world in all non-normative (purely descriptive) respects will
be indiscernible with respect to the distribution of injustice. Ditto for the other normative
properties and relations such as the favoring relation. So it establishes that any two worlds
that are indiscernible from our world in all non-normative respects will be indiscernible
in all normative respects. Since the kind of supervenience involved in realization holds
with metaphysical necessity, the argument establishes that it’s metaphysically necessary
that any two worlds that are indiscernible from our world in all non-normative respects
will be indiscernible with respect to the distribution of injustice.
However, this still leaves open the possibility that two worlds that are non-normatively
indiscernible from each other but non-normatively discernible from ours can differ in
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normative respects. For example, it leaves open the possibility that there are two non-
normatively indiscernible worlds in which seaweed is sentient, but discernible in that in
only one such world is the harvesting of seaweed to sell on the market unjust.
Brink can of course stipulate that these two non-normatively indiscernible sentient sea-
weed worlds have to be normatively indiscernible as well. We would then have strong
supervenience. But such a stipulation would not give us what the irreduciblist looking
for—namely, an explanation of why the two non-normatively indiscernible sentient sea-
weed worlds have to be normatively indiscernible.18
Causal regulation and contingent coextension
Brink’s approach to establishing the strong supervenience of normative properties on non-
normative properties with metaphysical necessity raises the concern that Brink’s commit-
ment to irreduciblism makes normative properties causally redundant and therefore unable
to uniquely causally regulate our use of normative terms. This section will spell out this
concern in more detail and its implications for explaining why the normative necessities are
metaphysical necessities.
There is an argument against a posteriori varieties of psychological role functionalism
by Jackson and Pettit (Jackson and Pettit 1993) that has been underappreciated in the phi-
losophy of mind and, as far as I can tell, never been discussed in the literature on necessary
a posteriori moral truths. Jackson’s argument, extremely briefly, is that a posteriori func-
tionalism in the philosophy of mind does not have the resources to distinguish between
18The argument I have hitherto given in this section is a modification and expansion of an argument given
in (Sonderholm 2008).
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psychological laws that hold of necessity and psychological laws that hold only contin-
gently. The result is that the resulting functional theory will not generate the correct results
when applied to counterfactual situations—or, if it did, it would do so only as a matter of im-
probable coincidence. In what follows, I give a similar argument, modified as appropriate
for the moral case.19
Brink emphasizes that the reference of moral terms is causally regulated by “features of
people, actions and institutions via [our] participation in an extended causal-historical chain
linking past and present speakers of [our] language to the moral features of the world....
Moral appraisers can thus use moral language, such as “right” and “wrong”, meaningfully,
and to refer, provided that their use is part of the causal-historical chain” (Brink 2001,
p. 163).20 Brink also suspects, as I mentioned above, that the relevant features are fea-
tures of causal systems whose effects conduce to the promotion and maintenance of human
flourishing.
The identity of the referents of our moral terms is, on his view, an empirical question,
and as far as I know, no philosopher has attempted to do the required empirical investigation
herself. (Understandably so, for it would be quite the undertaking.) Suppose, however, that
we grant Brink that the features that causally regulate our use of the moral terms are features
of causal systems that conduce to the promotion andmaintenance of human flourishing. We
can further suppose with Brink that goodness is regulated by objects or states of affairs that
are themselves constituents of human flourishing or that are causally disposed to produce
19In what follows, I also draw on the argumentative strategy of (Moffett 2010) and the literature on the
exclusion problem for non-reductivism about mental states.
20See (Sayre-McCord 1997) for comments on the nature and relevance of the distinction between causal
and non-causal regulation.
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such states, and rightness is a property of actions that are so disposed. This is a rough
exposition of a possible outcome of a moral functionalist empirical research programwhich
I offer here in the absence of any more worked-out such view in the literature (as far as I
know).
We now have two options: realizer functionalism or role functionalism about the ref-
erents of the moral terms. If Brink were a realizer moral functionalist, he could say that
goodness, for example, just was whatever constellation of properties realized the goodness-
causal role in the complex causal system that promotes and maintains human flourishing.
Presumably this causal system would include, as parts, systems that promoted equitable
distribution of water, Vitamin C and other vital nutrients to humans. This, however, gen-
erates worries analogous to the chauvinism worries that Block raised regarding realizer
functionalism in the philosophy of mind. The flourishing and maintenance of Block’s hy-
pothetical silicon-based Martians, we can plausibly assume, will be promoted not by an
equitable distribution of water and Vitamin C, but by equitable distributions of other nutri-
ents that silicon-based Martians would require for their own maintenance and flourishing.
If moral realizer functionalism identifies goodness with the distribution of water and Vi-
tamin C, then it seems that causal processes that promote the maintenance and flourishing
of members of the aforementioned alien species do not qualify as good. This, like in the
mental chauvinism case, is intuitively the wrong result.
Brink, of course, is not a moral realizer functionalist but a moral role functionalist. It
is open for a defender of such a position to hold that goodness is not to be identified with
the property of bringing about an equitable distribution of water and Vitamin C, but with
the property of bringing about an equitable distribution of whatever nutrients are needed to
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promote and maintain the flourishing of sentient organisms. This is a higher-order property
that will be shared both by the water-and-Vitamin-C-distribution processes that promote
and maintain human flourishing, as well as the other distribution processes that would pro-
mote and maintain the flourishing of the rational Martians. Such a view avoids the “moral
chauvinism” charge that I leveled at the above characterized moral realizer functionalist
view.
As it turns out, there are an indefinite number of distinct, higher-order, functionally
defined properties that are realized by the various lower-order causal processes that promote
the maintenance and flourishing of human beings. Consider these principles:
1. Goodness is the property of being a process that (b) is causally disposed to produce
featherless bipedal flourishing.
2. Goodness is the property of being a process that is causally disposed to produce hu-
man flourishing.
3. Goodness is the property of being a process that is causally disposed to produce ra-
tional carbon-based lifeform flourishing.
4. Goodness is the property of being a process that is causally disposed to produce ra-
tional organism flourishing.
Question: which of these role functional properties is the goodness property? All four are
(contingently) coextensive properties. Any object or state of affairs with the property of
being causally disposed to produce featherless bipedal flourishing also turns out, in our
world, to possess the property of being causally disposed to produce human flourishing,
rational organism flourishing, and vice versa. This is because the only featherless bipeds in
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our world are also all and only the humans, all and only the rational carbon-based lifeforms,
all and only the rational organisms, and so on. So we can’t appeal to a difference in exten-
sion to help us adjudicate the question which of these distinct, higher-order properties is the
property of goodness that’s realized in our world by processes such as water distribution
systems and so forth.
What most of us probably want to say is that goodness is the property of being a pro-
cess that is causally disposed to produce sentient organism functioning. This gives us the
intuitively correct result. But Brink is a causal regulation theorist about the reference con-
ditions of “good” and other normative terms. He cannot rely on intuitions to figure out what
“good” refers to. He has to do empirical investigation.
Brink himself alludes to this issue, although not explicitly as a potential problem for
his view. In a footnote, he mentions that, instead of thinking of moral properties as those
that play a causal role in the flourishing and maintenance of human organisms, they may
be ones that play, instead, a causal role in the activities which are characteristic of sentient
organisms (Brink 1984, p. 121). Brink gives no suggestion, as far as I can tell, as to how
we can go about determining whether the causal systems are ones characteristic of sentient
activity in general or human activity in particular. Later on, Brink does recognize this issue
when he says that “it is often difficult to identify a strong supervenience base, because it is
often difficult to be sure a set of base properties includes all the properties required literally
to necessitate a set of supervening properties. So we often settle for identifying a weak
supervenience base” (Brink 1989, p. 161).
Brink could maintain the following. Although it’s true that we are unable to determine
which of the contingently coextensive, higher-order properties is identical to goodness, we
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can know, nevertheless, that, whichever such property goodness happens to be, the lower-
order properties that realize goodness do so necessarily. Therefore the various lower-order
properties that realize this higher-order property will be such that they constitute a strong
supervenience base for goodness.
Brink cannot say exactly this since, as we saw before, he believes that it is possible
that the properties that actually realize the normative properties in our world can fail to
do so in other, non-nearby worlds. But Brink could say that this is not a problem, since
these other, non-nearby worlds are not going to be non-normatively indiscernible. To put
it another way, although this would function as a counterexample to something like Strong
Individual Additive Supervenience that we saw in §2.6, it’s not a counterexample to Full
Strong Individual Additive Supervenience. Brink can therefore claim something like this:
Necessary Goodness Realization: For any two possible worlds w1 and w2 and
any causal systems x in w1 and y in w2, if w1 and w2 are non-normatively
indiscernible and x and y are intrinsically and extrinsically non-normatively
indiscernible, then, if x realizes goodness in w1, then y realizes goodness in w2.
Since realization relations are metaphysically necessary, Brink would then have an expla-
nation of why goodness supervenes on non-normative reality with metaphysical necessity,
even though we can’t in principle know which of the higher-order properties it is that good-
ness happens to be.21
If Brinkwere not a causal regulation theorist about goodness, I think this responsewould
work. However, I think that NecessaryGoodness Regulation is problematic when conjoined
21This argumentative strategy will not work for Brink if the argument of the previous section is sound. In
this section, I set those concerns aside.
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with Brink’s causal regulation view of “good”. As stated above, Brink accepts the following
claim:
Each moral term t rigidly designates the [non-normative] property N that
uniquely causally regulates the use of t by humans. (Brink 2001, p. 165)
Applying this to the case of goodness, we get the result that “good” rigidly designates
the non-normative property that uniquely causally regulates the use of “good” by humans.
However, we also saw above that there are an indefinite number of higher-order properties
that contingently coextend with the good things: the property of being a process that is
causally disposed to produce human flourishing; or the property of being a process that is
causally disposed to produce sentient organism flourishing, and so on. There is a worry
here that contingently coextensive properties will be either causally redundant or causally
inefficacious and thus cannot uniquely causally regulate the use of “good” by humans.
To see this worry, we can look at another example from philosophy of mind. Jaegwon
Kim argued that non-reductive physicalists in the philosophy of mind face what he called
the exclusion problem: that, if non-reductivism about mental events is true, then mental
states and events are either causally efficacious or causally redundant (Kim 1989), (Kim
1998), (Kim 2005). The exclusion problem is generated from the tension present within
the following three claims:
1. Physical Causal Closure: All physical effects have sufficient physical causes.
2. Mental Causation: Some physical events have mental causes.
3. Non-Reductivism about Mental Causes: Mental causes are numerically distinct from
physical causes.
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Since all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, any mental cause of a physical
effect will be causally redundant in the sense that it overdetermines any physical effect
that it causes. If one furthermore accepts that there are no causally redundant causes, then
mental states and events cannot be causes of physical effects.
Here is a modification of Physical Causal Closure and Non-Reductivism about Mental
Causes that are tailored to the case of causally regulated normative terms:
1. First-Order Causal Closure: For any causally regulated term t, there is a property
or set of properties that constitute a sufficient first-order cause of any successfully
denoting use of t.
2. Causal Regulation of “Good”: All uses of “good” are uniquely causally regulated
by goodness.
3. Irreduciblism about Goodness: Goodness is not a first-order property.
(2) and (3) are aspects of Brink’s view. Let’s set the truth or falsity of (1) aside just briefly.
If, by (1), there is a first-order cause of any successfully denoting use of “good”, then “good”
is causally regulated by this first-order cause. But, by (2), all uses of “good” are uniquely
causally regulated by goodness. Goodness would therefore have to be whatever first-order
cause it was that causally regulates any successfully denoting use of “good”. However,
by (3), goodness is not a first-order property and therefore not numerically identical to the
first-order cause of successfully denoting uses of “good”. So goodness must be causally
redundant, which it can’t be, since, by (2), goodness is supposed to be the unique property
that causally regulates all successfully denoting uses of “good”.
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The irreduciblist has three options here. He can give up (3): the claim that goodness
is identical to a higher-order role property. He can instead claim that it is identical to a
first-order realizer property. In this case he becomes a reduciblist and therefore can’t give
the irreduciblists a route to explaining why normative supervenience is metaphysically nec-
essary. He also runs into the moral chauvinism worries discussed above.
The irreduciblist could give up (2), which is the causal regulation theory of the reference
of normative terms. If he does this, however, then he can’t use the causal regulation theory
to explain why normative supervenience is metaphysically necessary.
Therefore, irreduciblists who want to use the causal regulation theory of reference to
explain why normative supervenience is metaphysically necessary have to hold that (1) is
false. Brink would likely hold that (1) is false. Consider again from §3.3.1 the two ways
that causally regulated terms get their reference conditions. Causally regulated predicate
terms can get their reference conditions through ostension, in which case the linguistic
community gestures at some samples and stipulates through a kind of speech act that the
term is to apply to the property that these samples have in common. Applying this to the
case of goodness, we can imagine that the initial linguistic community took every sample
of goodness-instantiating things available to them and gestured at the entire set. Good-
ness, however, is multiply realizable, so there is not going to be a single first-order realizer
property that all the samples of goodness share in common.22 Causally regulated predicate
terms can also acquire reference by being associated with a particular description and gain-
ing their reference by being stipulated to be the property common to individuals that satisfy
22There would be such a property if Brink allowed disjunctive properties, but Brink does not allow for
disjunctive properties.
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that description. However, again, goodness is multiply realizable. So there is not going to
be a single first-order realizer property that all the samples of goodness share in common.
Brink can therefore deny (1).
However, the worry about causal redundancy comes up again even if we limit ourselves
to considering the causal impact of the higher-order role properties. I mentioned earlier
that there are an indefinite number of higher-order role properties that all good individuals
contingently share in common. Two examples I gave of these contingently coextensive,
higher-order properties were the properties of being such that these individuals promoted
the flourishing of human beings, and of being such that these individuals promoted the flour-
ishing of rational organisms. Suppose the causal regulation theory of “good” is true. The
initial linguistic community therefore assembled the sample of good things, either through
ostension or through some sort of initial description, and stipulated that goodness was the
property that all these samples had in common. Since goodness is multiply realizable, there
is no first-order property that the initial baptism could pick out. The samples do, however,
have in common an indefinite number of numerically distinct, higher-order role properties.
So here is a question: which of these does the initial baptism pick out?
If the initial baptism picks out none of them, then there is no property that causally reg-
ulates “good”. “Good” would then have no reference, and the causal reference approach
would just give us error theory rather than an irreduciblist variety of normative realism.
If the initial baptism picks out all of them, we have a contradiction, since it’s metaphys-
ically and conceptually impossible for a property to be numerically identical to multiple
numerically distinct properties.
So the initial baptism has to pick out a single one of the indefinitely many properties
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that all the samples share in common. However, this is also impossible. The causal reg-
ulation theory of reference says that any successfully denoting use of a causally regulated
term t successfully denotes its referent in virtue of a complex causal chain of events that
traces back through the initial baptism to the referent itself. It is the referent of t itself that
causes a use of t, through the initial baptism and the subsequent complex chain of causes,
to successfully denote its referent. However, in the case of role properties, there is an inter-
mediary step between the initial baptism and the role property that the baptism picks out.
That intermediary step is whatever realizer properties of the sample objects realize the role
property. Role properties are higher-order properties of the lower-order realizer properties
instantiated by the sample objects, so in order to get to the higher-order properties, you
need to go through the lower-order properties first. However, since the lower-order proper-
ties in question are lower-order properties of indefinitely many higher-order properties, the
lower-order properties create a kind of “causal bottleneck” that prevents the initial baptism
from “landing” on one unique role property. If it does manage to land on one unique role
property by means of some causal process, it is not at all clear what such a causal process
would look like.23
Importantly, the problem of identifying which higher-order properties causally regulate
our terms is not a problem for the standard cases of natural kind terms and proper names.
23One possibility is that the initial baptism did not simply baptize the term “good”, but rather baptized
a number of distinct, homographic terms “good1”, “good2, ... “goodn” ..., one for each of the indefinitely
many contingently coextensive higher-order role properties that the good things share. We could then say
that it is vague which of these terms we are using when we say “good” on any given occasion. If the type of
vagueness were epistemic vagueness a la (Williamson 1996), then each use of “good” would pick out a unique
role property and irreduciblists would be closer to having an explanation for why normative supervenience
is metaphysically necessary. This approach bears certain similarities to the theory of reference presented in
(LaPorte 2004). This may be a promising avenue for future research into solutions for the causal regulation
theory of the reference of normative terms. However, I will not explore this idea further here, hence its
relegation to this lowly footnote.
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The reason for this is that these standard cases are not cases of causal regulation by higher-
order role properties. The natural kind cases are cases of causal regulation by the first-order
properties that are essential to the natural kind that was implicated in the initial baptism. The
proper name cases are cases of causal regulation by individuals. So my comments here are
not meant to be a criticism of causal regulation theories of reference in general, but only for
causal regulation theories of predicate terms that take the properties that causally regulate
these terms to be some higher-order property that contingently coextends with numerically
distinct higher-order properties.
4.3 Neo-essentialism
There is a third approach to establishing metaphysical necessity that we should consider
alongside the conceivability and causal regulation approaches that we have discussed
above: Kit Fine’s essentialist account of modality (Fine 1994). In the next two paragraphs
I will give an extremely brief overview of Fine’s account in order to set the stage for an
argument that, on his account of metaphysical modality, we actually have reason to reject
irreduciblism.
Neo-essentialist metaphysical necessity
An individual’s essential properties are the properties that make individuals what they are.
They are the properties that are “non-accidental to” that individual; or, to put it slightly
differently, if P is an essential property, then it is in the nature of that individual that it has
P. On the influential modal characterization of essential properties, an individual’s essential
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properties are those and only those properties that an individual must possess in order to
be the individual that it is. Fine famously objects to modal characterizations of essential
properties. If Socrates exists, then necessarily the singleton containing Socrates as its only
member also exists. Intuitively, we do not want to say that it is essential to Socrates that
he belong to the singleton. Similarly, if Socrates exists, it is necessary that Socrates exist.
But we do not want to say that Socrates’ existence is essential to Socrates. Socrates is not
a necessary being.
Rejecting the modal analysis of essence raises a question as to how to characterize the
relation between modality and essence. Here is one way. If a certain property—say, ratio-
nality (or rational potential, as the Scholastics like to say)—is essential to Socrates, then,
necessarily, Socrates will be rational (or potentially rational) if he exists at all. Fine argues
that this gives rise to a number of sets of necessary truths, each of which are true in virtue
of an underlying essence of something. “Socrates is rational” is necessarily true in virtue of
the essence of Socrates, “Socrates belongs to the singleton Socrates” is necessarily true in
virtue of the essence of the singleton, and so forth. Fine suggests that metaphysical neces-
sity can be understood as the union of all these truths that are necessary in virtue of object
types:
[W]e should viewmetaphysical necessity as a special case of essence. For each
class of objects, be they concepts or individuals or entities of some other kind,
will give rise to its own domain of necessary truths, the truths which flow from
the nature of the objects in question. The metaphysically necessary truths can
then be identified with the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature
of all objects whatever. (ibid., p. 9)
By claiming that the metaphysically necessary truths can be identified with the propositions
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which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatsoever, Fine doesn’t mean that the
only metaphysically necessary truths are truths that are essential to every object whatsoever.
He means that the set of metaphysically necessary truths are the set of truths such that, for
each truth T in the set, there is an object x such that T is true of x in virtue of x’s essence.
For example, it is metaphysically necessary that Socrates, if Socrates exists, is rational,
even if “if Socrates exists, Socrates is rational” is not an essential truth of, say, the number
2. Furthermore, Fine uses the term “object” in a quite capacious way, to include not only
individuals with properties but also concepts.
Neo-essentialism and irreduciblism
Supervenience and necessary coextension
As it turns out, our Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience claim entails that for
every normative property—e.g., moral rightness—there exists a non-normative property
D* that is necessarily coextensive with it:
Necessary R-coextension: ∀x[R(x) ↔ D∗(x)].
A similar claim will be true of any normative property. So, if goodness is a normative
property, then, given Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience, there will also be a
fully non-normative property that is necessarily coextensive with goodness, and so on.
The way to construct the property involves using a Ramsification procedure that was
elaborated by Kim in his quest to construct psychophysical bridge laws and was applied to
the case of normative properties by Jackson.
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First, we take the set of all individuals in all possible worlds x1, x2, ..., xn... such
that R(xi), where R denotes moral rightness. Let w1, w2, ..., wn... be the worlds of
x1, x2, ..., xn... respectively. Second, for each xi, take every intrinsic and extrinsic non-
normative property that xi has and construct a property Di which is just a conjunction of
all of these intrinsic properties, extrinsic properties, and the property of being in a world
that’s non-normatively indiscernible to wi. Call any such property a complete description
property. Jackson assumes that every right individual has non-normative properties, but
this assumption is wholly uncontroversial as far as I can tell.
Third, we take the disjunction of complete description properties D1, D2, ..., Dn...,
which gives us D1 ∨D2 ∨ ...Dn.... Call this D*.24
It follows that ∀x[R(x) ↔ D∗(x)].
I’ll start with the left-to-right direction: ∀x[R(x) → D∗(x)]. ∀x[R(x) → D(x)]
because, necessarily, every right individual has non-normative properties and is located in
a world with non-normative features. The procedure then includes any Di such that R(xi)
as a disjunct of D∗. Therefore, because of the truth conditions of disjunction, ∀x[R(x) →
D∗(x)]. ∀x[R(x) → D∗(x)] because we ran the construction procedure for all morally
right individuals in all possible worlds.
Now for the right-to-left direction ∀x[D∗(x) → R(x)]. D∗(x) is a big disjunction
of complete descriptive properties D1, D2, ..., Dn... Therefore, by the truth conditions of
disjunction, any x such that D∗(x) will also be such that there is a property Di in D∗ such
that Di(x). Now, Jackson’s procedure included the complete description property Di as a
24I mentioned earlier in §3.3.2.2 that disjunctive properties are controversial. I discuss some of these issues
in §3.3.3.3 below.
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disjunct of D∗ only if ∃x[Di(x) ∧ R(x)]. Therefore, any x such that D∗(x) will also be
such that there is a property Di in D∗ such that Di(x) ∧ ∃y[Di(y) ∧R(y)].
Di is a complete description property. It is the property of being intrinsically and ex-
trinsically non-normatively indiscernible to xi in a world non-normatively indiscernible to
wi. Let’s compare that to Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience:
Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience: For any possible worldsw1 and
w2 and any individuals i1 in w1 and i2 in w2, if i1 and i2 are intrinsically and
extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible andw1 andw2 are non-normatively
indiscernible, then, for any normative property P , i1 instantiates P if and only
if i2 instantiates P .
Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience just says that if two individuals are intrin-
sically and extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible and are in non-normatively indis-
cernible worlds, then these two individuals will both have or lack all the same normative
properties. But if two individuals are intrinsically and extrinsically non-normatively indis-
cernible and are in non-normatively indiscernible worlds, this is just to say that these two
individuals have the same complete description properties. That’s what complete descrip-
tion properties are. So Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience tells us that if two
individuals have the same complete description properties, then they will also have and
lack all the same normative properties. Therefore, if it’s true that any x such that D∗(x)
will also be such that there is a property Di in D∗ such that Di(x) ∧ ∃y[Di(y) ∧ R(y)],
then Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience tells us that any x such thatD∗(x) will
also be such that R(x). ∀x[D∗(x) → R(x)]. ∀x[D∗(x) → R(x)] because we ran the
construction procedure for all morally right individuals in all possible worlds.
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Jackson’s procedure also works with sets of individuals and normative relations. So,
given Full Strong Individual Additive Supervenience, we could also use the procedure to
construct a fully non-normative property that was necessarily coextensive with the favoring
relation.
Irreduciblism, neo-essentialism, and necessary coextension
With that done, we are in a position to see why neo-essentialist accounts of metaphys-
ical modality don’t provide irreduciblists with an explanation of why Additive Reasons
Supervenience and other additive varieties of supervenience do not express metaphysical
necessities.
The argument I give here is essentially one that Gideon Rosen makes in unpublished
work. However, the conclusions Rosen and I draw are distinct. Rosen makes this argument
in order to give us reasons to call normative supervenience into question. My conclusion
is that the irreduciblist cannot appeal to neo-essentialist accounts of modality to explain
why Additive Reasons Supervenience does not express a metaphysical necessity. Further-
more, the extension of Rosen’s argument to respond to someone who denies the existence
of disjunctive properties is my own work.
Let’s assume that Jackson’s construction procedure generated the following claims:
Pleasure Promotion entails Rightness: Necessarily, for all individuals x, if x promotes
pleasure over pain, then x is morally right; and
Rightness entails Pleasure Promotion: Necessarily, for all individuals x, if x is
morally right, then x promotes pleasure over pain;
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where, in both cases, the promotion of pleasure over pain is thoroughly non-normative. The
reduciblist who accepts both claims claims that moral rightness is identical to the promotion
of pleasure over pain. Since the reduciblist thinks that moral rightness is identical to the
promotion of pleasure over pain, the reduciblist will accept that being morally right consists
in nothing over and above the promotion of pleasure over pain.25 Jackson’s construction
procedure forces the irreduciblist to agree with the reduciblist that moral rightness is neces-
sarily coextensive with the promotion of pleasure over pain, but the irreduciblist will claim
that moral rightness consists in something over and above the promotion of pleasure over
pain.
Suppose that the neo-essentialist account of modality were true. Then irreduciblism
about moral rightness must be false. Here is an argument from contradiction to show that
this is the case.
On the neo-essentialist account of modality, it is a metaphysical necessity that Socrates
belong to the singleton (if the singleton exists), because it is part of the essence of the
singleton Socrates that Socrates belong to the singleton Socrates. In other words, what it is
to be the singleton Socrates is for Socrates to belong to it.
Similarly, it would be a metaphysical necessity that actions that promote pleasure over
pain were morally right just if it were part of the essence of pleasure promotion that actions
that promote pleasure promotion be morally right. In other words, if it were a metaphysical
necessity that actions that promote pleasure over pain weremorally right, then what it would
25The reduciblist, of course, will not think that the promotion of pleasure over pain is non-normative,
since, after all, the reduciblist thinks that moral rightness just is the promotion of pleasure over pain, and that
moral rightness is normative. Reduciblists about normativity are not eliminativists about normativity. The
reduciblist would say that the promotion of pleasure over pain is not a non-normative property but rather a
normative property that is also a descriptive property.
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be for an action to be an action of promoting pleasure over pain is for that action to be
morally right.
But this is to say that it is part of the essence of promoting pleasure over pain that the pro-
motion of pleasure over pain be normative. If this were true, then we have a contradiction.
For the promotion of pleasure over pain was ex hypothesi thoroughly non-normative. Jack-
son’s construction procedure was a procedure that constructed a thoroughly non-normative
property that necessarily coextended with moral rightness. Full Strong Individual Additive
Supervenience guarantees that there is such a property. Therefore Jackson’s construction
procedure could not generate the promotion of pleasure over pain as a property that’s nec-
essarily coextensive with moral rightness.
The upshot of this argument is that, if the irreduciblist accepts the neo-essentialist ac-
count of modality, she cannot conclude that it’s metaphysically necessary that actions that
promote pleasure over pain aremorally right. If she cannot conclude that it’s metaphysically
necessary that actions that promote pleasure over pain are morally right, then a forteriori
she cannot conclude that it’s metaphysically necessary that actions promote pleasure over
pain if and only if they are morally right. The normative necessity that actions promote
pleasure over pain if and only if they are morally right therefore fails to be a metaphysical
necessity.
The irreduciblist could claim that it is essential to morally right actions that morally
right actions promote pleasure over pain. The irreduciblist is committed to the claim that
moral rightness consists in something more than the promotion of pleasure over pain, but
she can still claim that moral rightness consists at least partly in the promotion of pleasure
over pain. This claim would be consistent with the irreduciblist view. However, if it were
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essential to morally right actions that morally right actions promote pleasure over pain, then
this truth would be true in virtue of the nature of moral rightness. It would establish, in other
words, that it were essential to the normative that morally right actions promoted pleasure
over pain. This gives us a necessary truth, but the kind of necessary truth it gives us is a
normative necessity. It would not do anything to show that this truth, which is a normative
necessity, is also a metaphysical necessity.
An aside on disjunctive properties
Jackson’s construction procedure assumes that the set of properties is closed under disjunc-
tion. In other words, it assumes that, for all P andQ, if P andQ are properties, then P ∨Q
is a property. I mentioned in the previous section §3.3.2.2 on causal regulation approaches
to metaphysical necessity that this disjunctive closure principle is controversial. However,
in the example I am using here of rightness as pleasure promotion, no disjunctive properties
are implicated. So the argument I have made succeeds irrespective of whether one accepts
or denies the existence of disjunctive properties.
It’s true that Jackson’s construction procedure does not guarantee the existence of a nec-
essarily coextensive property if we do not accept that properties are closed under disjunc-
tion. However, if there is not a fully non-normative property that is necessarily coextensive
with rightness, then it is even less plausible that it is in the essence of any non-normative
property that objects instantiating that property be normative. After all, if rightness is not
necessarily coextensive with pleasure promotion, then there will either be an instance of
pleasure promotion that is not an instance of rightness, or an instance of rightness that is
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not an instance of pleasure promotion. If there is a possible instance of pleasure promotion
that is not an instance of rightness, then it can’t be essential to pleasure promotion—it can-
not be part of what it is to be pleasure promotion—that pleasure promotion be right. If it
were, then any action would have to be right in order to be an instance of pleasure promo-
tion. That’s part of what it means for a property to be an essential property. There would
therefore could not be any instance of pleasure promotion that were not right. It would be
metaphysically impossible.
Now suppose that there were an instance of rightness that were not an instance of plea-
sure promotion. You tell the Nazis at your door that there are Jews in your basement, and
this, we’ll assume is morally right even though your honesty gets you and all the Jews killed.
Either every truth-telling action is necessarily right, or it is not. If it is not, then it will not
be essential to actions of truth-telling that they be right, for the reasons mentioned above.
If it is, then we can generate the following two principles:
Pleasure Promotion entails Rightness: Necessarily, for all individuals x, if x promotes
pleasure over pain, then x is morally right and
Honesty entails Rightness: Necessarily, for all individuals x, if x is an instance of
truth-telling, then x is morally right.
Now, “being such as to promote pleasure over pain” and “telling the truth” are non-
normative properties, or they are not. If they are not, then it’s not essential to either property
that actions with these properties be right, which, on the neo-essentialist picture, means that
the necessity is not metaphysical necessity. If they are, then they will also count as nor-
mative properties and will not support an additive supervenience claim, for the reasons
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In the previous chapters 3 and 4, I argued that the prospects for an irreduciblist explanation
of why normative reality strongly supervenes on non-normative reality (or, in other words,
that it supervenes additively) are dim. In this chapter, I argue that the irreduciblist should
give up on additive supervenience in favor of what I call transformative supervenience.
They can give up on additive supervenience by either denying it outright or by accepting
Bilgrami’s claim that additive supervenience is incoherent. By accepting transformative
supervenience, irreduciblists gain the resources to explain why the transformative superve-
nience relation obtains while simultaneously doing justice to the motivations for accepting
a supervenience claim in the first place and generating an attractive and novel theory1 of the
relation between normativity and the world. The result, however, will entail a significant
departure from most other commitments of the reasons fundamentalist view described in
§2.
The view that I defend in this chapter is a variety of what Susan Hurley calls non-
centralism about thin properties (Hurley 1989, pp. 9-29). If you’re a centralist about thin
concepts and properties, you think that thin concepts are conceptually independent of thick
concepts, and that thin properties are explanatarily prior to thick properties. The conceptual
1I should clarify that it’s presumptuous to describe what I give in this chapter as a “theory”. It’s more like
a sketch of a theory, or a direction that theorizing could go.
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independence here should be understood as follows: A is “conceptually prior to B just if
one can correctly grasp A without grasping B. The centralist will also hold that the thin
properties are constitutively more fundamental to the thick properties in that part of what it
is for a thick property to be present is for a thin property to be present as well.2
If you’re a non-centralist about thin properties, you deny centralism about thin proper-
ties. There are two ways of being a non-centralist. You can hold, as Hurley does, that the
thick and thin concepts and properties are conceptually and constitutively inter-dependent.
Or you can hold, as I will, that the thick concepts and properties are conceptually indepen-
dent and of and constitutively more fundamental to thin concepts and thin properties. I am,
however, not opposed to Hurley’s interdependence view and will make some remarks about
this view later on in this chapter.
Here is the list of claims that will feature in the theory of normativity that I will develop
across this chapter. Note the similarities and differences with the components of reasons
fundamentalism.
Reasons Thin Centrality: For all facts F , F is a thin normative fact only if F is a
reasons fact or F embeds a reasons fact.
Extended Reasons Relationality: Any reason fact is normative in virtue of its standing
in the favoring relation with a quintuple consisting of a fact, an agent, an action, a
circumstance, a contrast class of actions, and a feature of the action with respect to
which the fact is a reason.
Answers Account of Reasons: Reasons are partial correct answers to questions why
2This description is is accurate to the centralist position that Hurley describes, but she doesn’t quite put
things like this.
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an agent should perform an action rather than not, in a particular circumstance, with
respect to a thick property that the action would promote.
Reasons Irreducibility: The favoring relation is not normatively masked.
Transformative Reasons Supervenience (TRS): For any possible worlds w1 and w2
and any reasons-apt tuples T1 in w1 and T2 in w2, if T1 and T2 are intrinsically and
extrinsically descriptively indiscernible andw1 andw2 are descriptively indiscernible,
then T1 instantiates the favoring relation if and only if T2 instantiates the favoring
relation.
I ignore theNon-Humean NormativeMotivation conjunct because, as I mentioned in §2.7.2,
the truth or falsity of this conjunct is largely independent of the two primary topics of this
dissertation: the role that the favoring relation plays in the structure of normative reality,
and the nature of the relation between normative reality and non-normative reality.
There are a lot of changes between these claims and the components of reasons fun-
damentalism that I stated at the beginning of §2. Of the five claims here, four of them are
modified versions of conjuncts that I claimed constituted reasons fundamentalism at the be-
ginning of §2. The only one of the five characterizing features of reasons fundamentalism
that my proposed theory preserves in its original form is Irreducibility.
Reasons Thin Centrality limits the Reasons Centrality claim from §2 only to thin nor-
mative facts. Thin normative facts are instantiations of thin normative properties. I charac-
terized thin normative properties as normative properties that are not descriptive properties.
Normative properties are properties whose instantiations have direct consequences for the
way the world ought to be or could ought to be. Descriptive properties are properties whose
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instantiation makes or would make the world the way it is or could be. “Thick” properties
are properties that are both descriptive and normative: their instantiations both make or
could make the world the way it is or could be, and their instantiations also have direct
consequences for the way the world ought to be or could ought to be.
I am attracted to Reasons Thin Centrality because it is an implication of Scanlon’s buck-
passing view of thin properties. I mentioned earlier that Scanlon has influentially argued
that thin properties such as goodness, value and wrongness are purely formal, higher-order
properties of objects and actions that have lower-order properties that provide reasons of
the goodness kind, the value kind, or the wrongness kind. I find Scanlon’s arguments for
this view in (Scanlon 1998) to be convincing.3 However, this dissertation will not offer any
arguments for Reasons Thin Centrality.4 It will only describe what the theory I sketch here
would look like if Reasons Thin Centrality were also incorporated. I give this description
in §5.6, at which point the other aspects of my theoretical sketch will be in place.
Extended Reasons Relationality states that reasons-apt tuples (in other words, those tu-
ples that are apt for instantiating the reasons relation) are not four-place tuples but rather
six-place tuples. The success of my argument for this also turns out to generate an inter-
esting response to the reasons fundamentalist’s commitment to Reasons Primitivity. Ac-
cording to the Answers Account of Reasons component of the theory of normativity that I
am defending, our concept of a reason does indeed admit of a non-trivial analysis in terms
3Scanlon of course adopts a buck-passing view of all normative properties other than the favoring re-
lation. I do not follow him in this, since, as I argued, I believe that this commits him to Additive Reasons
Supervenience, which I argued generates problems for explaining why the normative supervenience relation
that he accepts holds with metaphysical necessity. I only follow him in adopting the buck-passing view of
thin normative properties.
4If the reader wants such arguments, the place to look is chapters 1 and 2 of (Scanlon 1998).
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of answers to questions why an agent’s performing an action in a particular circumstance
will promote a thick property. Answers Account of Reasons is meant to be both an analysis
of our concept of a reason as well as a real definition (i.e. an account of what reasons are
essentially).
Finally, Transformative Reasons Supervenience (TRS) formulates the supervenience of
reasons as the supervenience of the favoring relation on the distribution of descriptive prop-
erties. TRS is a strictly weaker supervenience claim than Additive Reasons Supervenience
(ARS). TRS is strictly weaker because the set of descriptive properties that feature in my
statement of TRS includes the set of thick properties along with the set of non-normative
(purely descriptive) properties. The class of descriptive properties is strictly broader than
the class of non-normative (purely descriptive) properties. Therefore, anyone who accepts
ARS is also accepting a stronger version of TRS. One can, however, accept TRS without
accepting ARS since one can hold, in principle, that differences among the distribution of
thick properties in a world are also relevant to determining whether two reasons-apt tuples
are relevantly similar for the purpose of evaluating the supervenience claim.
I worry that this is not clear, so here is a toy example to illustrate the point. Suppose
Lee says that SAT scores are a test of intelligence—in other words, that the score that you
get when you take the SAT is fixed by your intelligence. On Lee’s view, since your SAT
score is totally fixed by your intelligence, there is no room for something like extensive
test prep to make any impact on what score you receive. Mary disagrees. She thinks that,
yes, intelligence does play a role, but that test prep also makes a significant difference as
to how well you perform on the SAT. Mary, for instance, thinks that two people with equal
intelligences could still achieve unequal SAT scores if one person had access to a lot of
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test prep services that the other person did not. Mary’s view is more permissive than Lee’s
in the sense that she thinks it’s possible, and Lee does not, that two people have the same
intelligence but differing SAT scores. When I say that TRS is more permissive than ARS, I
mean something similar: that it’s open for the advocate of TRS to hold that two worlds that
are non-normatively indiscernible can be normatively discernible due to a difference in the
distribution of thick properties. This possibility is not open for the advocate of ARS.
After talking more about what thick properties are in §5.1, I will start this chapter with a
discussion in §5.2 and §5.3 of why TRS can help an irreduciblist avoid the concerns about
Brute Entailment and Brute Normativity that I raised in §3.1 for reasons fundamentalist
views. I’ll then move on in §5.4 and §5.5 to develop arguments for Extended Reasons Re-
lationality, and Answers Account of Reasons. I will not be offering arguments for Reasons
Thin Centrality, but I will give some indications in §5.6 as to what a theory that accepted
Extended Reasons Relationality, Answers Account of Reasons, and Transformative Rea-
sons Supervenience would look like if it also accepted Reasons Thin Centrality.
5.1 What are thick properties?
The term “thick concept” traces to (Williams 1985, p. 143). Previously, Foot and Hare had
discussed thick concepts, but not under that label. Williams’ discussion of thick concepts
appears in the context of his discussion of the fact-value distinction and the central role that
this distinction played in the moral philosophy of that time.
What has happened is that the theorists have brought the fact-value distinction
to language rather than finding it revealed there. What they have found are a
lot of those “thicker” or more specific ethical notions I have already referred to,
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such as treachery and promise and brutality and courage, which seem to express
a union of fact and value. The way these notions are applied is determined by
what the world is like (for instance, by how someone has behaved), and yet,
at the same time, their application usually involves a certain valuation of the
situation, of persons or actions. Moreover, they usually (though not necessarily
directly) provide reasons for action. (ibid., pp. 129-130)
Terms like “brutality” and “courage”, on this picture, express thick concepts, which are
concepts composed of both “fact” content and normative content. Similarly, we can say
that a thick property is a property that is both a “fact” property and a normative property.
The “fact property” locution, though, is misleading. Normative properties would trivially
be “fact properties” in the sense that there are normative facts, and that normative properties
partially constitute them. Sarah is good. That’s a fact. Goodness is trivially a “fact prop-
erty” just in virtue that it is a property, and as such can partly constitute facts, such as the fact
that Sarah is good and so on. Instead of characterizing thick properties as properties that
are both fact properties and normative properties, it is less misleading to characterize thick
properties as properties that are both descriptive and normative. Descriptive properties are
just properties that partially constitute facts about how the world is or could be, whereas
normative properties are properties that partially constitute facts about how the world ought
to be or could ought to be.
It is important to distinguish between thick concepts and thick properties in part because
we are error theorists about many thick concepts. Take Gibbard’s example term “gopa”,
which is a term in the language of a fictional indigenous people that Gibbard introduces in
a thought experiment aimed at discovering the semantics of thick concepts (Blackburn and
Gibbard 1992, pp. 267-268). “Gopa” is an adjective used by the fictional people for glorious
acts of killing outsiders. It’s a thought experiment, so we will just take Gibbard’s word that
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this is the appropriate translation to the term in the fictional language. We don’t think
that killing outsiders is glorious, so we don’t think acts are gopa. We are, in other words,
error theorists about gopahood. Additionally, the distinction matters because, as Blackburn
notes (ibid.), the most compelling examples of thick concepts are ethnic pejoratives. Ethnic
pejoratives are terms that express a concept of being of a certain ethnicity and somehow
morally inferior for being so. We are error theorists about ethnically pejorative statements
because we do not think that there are any people who are morally inferior in virtue of
their ethnicity. Williams is therefore correct to claim that thick ethical notions only usually
provide reasons for action, since ethical pejoratives don’t denote properties and therefore,
a forteriori, cannot denote properties that constitute facts that provide reasons for action.
Thick normative concepts are commonly distinguished from normative concepts that
lack descriptive content. These purely normative concepts are called “thin” normative con-
cepts. Purely normative concepts are called “thin” concepts because they lack the “thick-
ness” of descriptive content; there is no descriptive content that is just theirs.5 They are gen-
erally thought to include the terms “good” and “right”, which can be consistently predicated
to objects or actions independently of whatever other descriptive properties those objects
or actions possess. If we say that Sarah instantiates a thick property such as courage, we
make certain descriptive claims of Sarah–for instance, that she is disposed to try to control
her fear responses in the face of perceived danger. We would contradict ourselves to say
that Sarah was courageous and never tried to avoid running away from danger. However,
5There is an interesting relation between this claim andMoore’s claim, discussed earlier in the “Jettisoning
Naturalism” section in the chapter 2 discussion of irreducibility and naturalism, that a “natural” property is
a property that is visible. Moore may be operating under an assumption that meaningful content, in other
words content that we can say something about, is only given by visible or otherwise empirically detectible
properties. Goodness being an invisible property leads Moore to conclude that it is therefore a “non-natural”
property, or a property that we can’t say anything meaningful about.
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there is no contradiction generated by saying that Sarah is good and never tries to avoid
running away from danger.6 This is because the concept of goodness, unlike the concept of
courage, does not contain descriptive content that can generate inconsistencies such as the
one that I have described in the case of courage. Similarly, if we say that an action is brutal,
we can’t also consistently say that the action pleases many people and harms no one. But
we could say without conceptual contradiction that an action is wrong and that it pleases
many people while harming no one. We could still be wrong about this, but we would not
be guilty of a conceptual contradiction if we were to say it. This is because the concept
of brutality partly includes descriptive content such as harming some sentient being, but
wrongness does not include any such descriptive content.
It’s true that there would be a conceptual mistake involved in saying that Sarah was
right. Rightness can only be a property of actions, and Sarah is not an action. There is a
sense, then, that even the thinnest ethical concepts entail some constraints about the kinds
of entities that they can be consistently predicated of. Unfortunately, there is hardly any
discussion of this issue in the literature. So here is my own attempt to understand what the
thick/thin normative concept distinction amounts to.
Thin concepts are not concepts that can be exceptionlessly consistently predicated of
anything whatsoever. They are concepts that have no descriptive content that could conflict
with the descriptive features of an individual beyondwhat you can read off of the underlying
metaphysics given by the grammar of the terms denoting that individual. “Sarah is morally
6I understand courage as a commitment to control one’s emotional responses in the face of perceived
danger rather than a disposition to control one’s fear responses. Given this understanding of courage, it is
possible for a person to have a commitment to courage and yet lack the disposition to courageous behavior. I
understand a commitment to X in a situation Y to be a first-order mental state that an agent has if and only if
that agent is disposed to try to X in Y. I owe these clarifications and general view to Carol Rovane and Akeel
Bilgrami.
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right” generates a contradiction because we know from the grammar of this sentence that
Sarah is a person, and persons cannot be morally right. “Sarah is morally good” does not
generate a contradiction merely from the grammar, since persons are among the types of
entities that can instantiate moral goodness. The possibility of these sorts of contradictions
is irrelevant to the determination of whether a concept is thick or thin.
The difference between thick and thin concepts has to do, rather, with whether a con-
ceptual contradiction could immediately result from spelling out the descriptive nature of
the individual instantiating the normative property in more detail. If we said that Sarah is
courageous, this could immediately generate a conceptual contradiction if Sarah turned out
to always dissociate from fearful situations. We could say “But Sarah is not courageous,
since she dissociates in the presence of fearful situations”. However, no purely descriptive
fact that could be true of Sarah would immediately generate a conceptual contradiction from
the assertion that Sarah is morally good. It might, of course, implicate that given further
assumptions about moral goodness. We could discover that Sarah profits off of predatory
lending practices, in which case Sarah would not be morally good. But there is nothing
about the concept of moral goodness in itself that entails this. You would need additional
background theory about the nature of moral goodness. Much more would need to be said
about the approach to demarcating thick and thin normative concepts that I give here, but
hopefully these remarks do a little more to clarify what I take the salient distinction between
the thick and thin normative concepts happens to be.
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5.2 Transformative Supervenience and Brute Entailment
Here is Transformative Reasons Supervenience again:
Transformative Reasons Supervenience (TRS): For any possible worldsw1 and
w2 and any reasons-apt tuples T1 in w1 and T2 in w2, if T1 and T2 are intrinsi-
cally and extrinsically descriptively indiscernible and w1 and w2 are descrip-
tively indiscernible, then T1 instantiates the favoring relation if and only if T2
instantiates the favoring relation.
It may not seem like much of a change from Additive Reasons Supervenience, but it
makes all the difference for the irreduciblist’s avoidance of Brute Entailment.
In particular, the irreduciblist can avoid Brute Entailment if she accepts some version
of the following claim:
Thick Essence of Reasons: There is a descriptive wayW of relating to a thick
property such that what it is for a reasons-apt tuple T to instantiate the favoring
relation is for there to be a thick property P such that T relates to P in theW
way.
Thick Essence of Reasons is confusing. But all it says is this. Johnnie’s forgetting to do
the dishes is a reason for me to have an uncomfortable talk with him, but it’s not a reason
to stab him with a kitchen knife. What’s the difference? Thick Essence of Reasons says
that the difference has to do with a difference in the way that the distinct pairs of facts and
actions relate to thick concepts.7 Johnnie’s forgetting to do the dishes is a reason for me
to have an uncomfortable talk with him because there’s at least one thick property that’s
relevantly descriptively related to that fact-action pair; and Johnnie’s forgetting to do the
dishes is not a reason for me to stab him with the knife because there is no thick property
that’s relevantly descriptively related to that fact-action pair.
7I leave out the agents and circumstances for the sake of easier comprehension.
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If Thick Essence of Reasons is true, then TRS provides us with the resources to meet all
of the four desiderata I listed in §2.6.1 that we need supervenience in order to satisfy. Those
four desiderata are: supervenience is intuitive; supervenience is a conceptual constraint on
the distribution of normative properties; supervenience is needed for normative explanation;
supervenience is required to make sure that it’s not arbitrary that normative reality is the
way that it is.
First of all, we can satisfy the intuitions that two tyrannical dictators are both morally
bad by appealing to a similarity in their thick properties—e.g., that both are cruel and did
cruel things.
Second, Thick Essence of Reasons is, I will argue, a conceptual truth. Thick Essence
of Reasons also entails TRS. Since it also entails TRS, TRS also comes out as a conceptual
truth. Thick Essence of Reasons entails TRS because Thick Essence of Reasons tells us
what reasons are: they’re facts that are part of reasons-apt tuples that bear a specific relation
to a thick property. Any time you have a reasons-apt tuple that bears that specific relation
to a thick property, the fact in that reasons-apt tuple has to be a reason. That’s what it is
to be a reason. Now replicate all the non-normative properties and the thick properties and
the descriptive relations between them. In any such world, the counterparts to the original
reasons-apt tuple, thick property, and specific descriptive relation between them will all be
there exactly the same as they were. So the counterpart to the reasons-apt tuple has to give
us a reason as well. But that’s just to say that Thick Essence of Reasons entails TRS. So
Thick Essence of Reasons entails TRS, and TRS is therefore a conceptual truth given that
Thick Essence of Reasons is a conceptual truth.
Third, Since TRS is a conceptual truth, we can fully explain why any particular reasons-
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apt tuple is a reason by appealing to TRS and to the distribution of the descriptive properties.
Why is such-and-such fact a reason? Well, it is part of a reasons-apt tuple that bears the
relevant relation to a thick property. It’s a conceptual truth that any such fact is a reason.
So such-and-such fact is a reason. That’s a full and completely adequate explanation.
Fourth, the truth of TRS fixes normative reality to descriptive reality so that, for ex-
ample, it is not possible for there to be a world descriptively just like ours except that act
utilitarianism is true. Furthermore, if Thick Essence of Reasons is true (and we can explain
its truth), then we have an explanation of why the descriptive nature of the world fixes the
normative nature of the world with metaphysical necessity. There are two kinds of norma-
tive properties: thick properties and thin properties. I’ll start with thick properties. Thick
properties are descriptive properties, so obviously any complete fixing of the descriptive
properties will also fix the thick properties. And they will do so with metaphysical ne-
cessity because it’s metaphysically impossible (and also incoherent) for all the descriptive
features of the world to be one way and also a different way. If you like the metaphors we
used to describe metaphysical necessity in §3.1, the thick properties come for free with the
descriptive properties. Once God makes all the descriptive property instantiations, there’s
nothing more he has to do to make thick property instantiations. He’s already done that.
Nothing more to do.
Now take the thin properties. These include the favoring relation as well as the prop-
erties of being good, being right, and so on. We’ll start with the favoring relation. Once
you have all of a world’s descriptive nature, you’ll have will have all the non-normative
features, all the thick features, and all the descriptive ways that they relate to each other. If
Thick Essence of Reasons is true (and we can explain its truth), for a fact to favor an action
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just is for that fact and action to be relevantly descriptively related to a thick property. So
once you have a world’s descriptive nature, you’ll also have all the descriptive ways that
facts, actions and thick properties relate to each other. In other words, you have the favoring
relation, since the favoring relation just is one of these descriptive ways that facts, actions
and thick properties relate to each other. Once we have the distribution of the favoring
relation, Reasons Thin Centrality secures the other thin normative properties as well.8
To summarize. I have just emptied a gift bag of claims into this section and argued that,
if these claims were true, then the irreduciblist can give an explanation of why her super-
venience claim expresses a metaphysical necessity. I had argued in §3.1 that a theory’s not
being able to give such an explanation would constitute strong reasons to reject that theory.
I then argued that we had strong reasons to reject reasons fundamentalism because reasons
fundamentalism, as far as I could tell, could not offer a compelling explanation of why its
supervenience claim expressed a metaphysical necessity. The argument I have just given in
this section therefore purports to show that, although brute entailment concerns are serious
concerns for irreduciblists of the reasons fundamentalist variety, they need not be serious
concerns for other irreduciblists who reject reasons fundamentalism. In particular, they
need not be serious concerns for irreduciblists who accept some version of Thick Essence
of Reasons.
I have not yet done two important things, however. First, I have not talked at all about
the relation between the thick properties and purely descriptive (non-normative) properties
8Reasons Thin Centrality may not secure them with metaphysical necessity, but they would do so if we
adopted a buck-passing account of the thin properties. If we adopt such an account, what it is for any thin
property P is to be just a purely formal higher-order property of having properties that provide reasons of
a certain kind. Once you have all the reasons, the higher-order properties of these reasons come for free;
therefore, the thin properties would come for free as well.
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that I’ve made such a big deal about. Second, I’ve given no reason to accept any of these
claims except for the fact that it would be convenient for the irreduciblist if they were true.
The audience that would take that to be a compelling reason to accept any of these claims
is very small. Let’s deal with these concerns one at a time. I will consider the relation
between thick properties and purely descriptive (non-normative) properties in §5.3, and
will give independent reasons for accepting my own particular version of Thick Essence
of Reasons in §5.4 and §5.5. I’ll then end in §5.6 with a discussion of how Reasons Thin
Centrality fits into the sketch of a theory of normativity that I provide in §5.4 and §5.5.
5.3 Does Additive Supervenience entail Transformative
Supervenience?
A problem for my view
Here is a supervenience claim that, if true, would be really bad for me:
Supervenience of Thick Properties: For any possible worlds w1 and w2 and
any individual i1 in w1 and i2 in w2, if i1 and i2 are intrinsically and extrin-
sically non-normatively indiscernible and w1 and w2 are non-normatively in-
discernible, then, for any thick property P , i1 instantiates P if and only if i2
instantiates P .
Supervenience of Thick Properties says that the non-normative features of the world fix
the thick normative features of the world. If this were true, then Transformative Reasons
Supervenience would not be more permissive than Additive Supervenience after all. I had
argued earlier that irreduciblists faced serious difficulties in explaining why Additive Su-
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pervenience expressed a metaphysical necessity, and appealed to Transformative Reasons
Supervenience and Thick Essence of Reasons in order to help the irreduciblist avoid this
worry. But if Supervenience of Thick Properties is true, then my commitment to Trans-
formative Reasons Supervenience would also entail a commitment to Additive Reasons
Supervenience.
Why? Because supervenience is reflexive and transitive. Supervenience is reflexive:
sets of properties always supervene on themselves. Supervenience is also transitive: if A
fixes A∧B, and A∧B fixes C, then A fixes C. Let A be the non-normative properties, B
be the thick properties, and C be the favoring relation. If the non-normative properties fix
the thick properties, as Supervenience of Thick Properties says they do, the non-normative
properties fix both the thick properties and the non-normative properties (by reflexivity).
And if, additionally, the non-normative properties and thick properties jointly fix the dis-
tribution of the favoring relation, as Transformative Reasons Supervenience says they do,
then the non-normative properties will also fix the distribution of the favoring relation.
I, qua irreduciblist, would then run into the same problems with explaining why Ad-
ditive Supervenience expresses a metaphysical necessity that I tried to avoid by adopting
Transformative Supervenience. The particular question that I would not be able to answer
is: what is it about the distribution of non-normative properties that make it the case that
they fix the distribution of the favoring relation with metaphysical necessity? We could no
longer appeal to the distribution of thick properties, since we would then still face the fur-
ther question of what it is about the distribution of the non-normative properties that make
it the case that they fix the distribution of thick properties with metaphysical necessity.
There is an intuitive case for Supervenience of Thick Properties. Here is a completely
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non-normative description of Sarah. Sarah sits outside the campus steps at 12:24pm as
part of a line of ten students carrying signs that described some of the economic failures of
state support for capitalist modes of production. Sarah sees the policeman coming with the
pepper spray. Sarah tries to hide her face with the lining of the turtleneck collar but does not
move. The policeman walks up and down the line spraying all the protesters with pepper
spray.9 Surely Sarah is courageous. And surely anyone just in Sarah’s position would also
be courageous. As Zangwill would say, it’s insane and irresponsible to think otherwise.
That’s the intuitive case.
In response, I argue that Supervenience of Thick Properties is either incoherent or false.
Asmentioned in §3.2.1, I agree with Bilgrami that we cannot coherently imagine entailment
relations between normative and non-normative properties. Supervenience of Thick Prop-
erties states an entailment relation between non-normative properties and those normative
properties that are also thick properties. So I think that Supervenience of Thick Properties
is incoherent. However, I will not give an argument for my views that this is incoherent,
both because Bilgrami already gives these arguments in (Bilgrami 2006) and also because
I want to also convince philosopher’s who don’t accept those arguments that they should
not accept Supervenience of Thick Properties either. So in this section, I will argue that
Supervenience of Thick Properties is false.
My argument will adapt Merricks’ argument against the supervenience of mental states
on microphysical states to the case of thick properties. The general thrust of the argument
is that many commonly accepted supervenience relations are false, and that their falseness
is surprising but unproblematic. There is nothing about the falsity of Supervenience of
9I’m referring of course to the incident at UC Davis that occurred in 2011 (Today 2011).
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Thick Properties that produces deleterious consequences for the irreduciblist so long as the
irreduciblist accepts Transformative Reasons Supervenience.
Merricks’ argument against microphysical supervenience
Supervenience is not wholly uncontroversial even in the less controversial cases, like the
supervenience of table facts on facts about parts arranged tablewise. When I describe su-
pervenience to undergraduates (and I don’t think I am alone in this), I find it helpful to say
something like the following. “Look at this thing. It’s a table! And all of its parts, all the
pieces that make it up, those are parts of a table. Now take all of those parts and make
copies of them that are just like the originals, and put them all together in just the same way
that these parts are put together now. What is that thing I just made?” My students have
near exceptionlessly said that it is, in fact, a table. But perhaps this surface appearance
is misleading. Take, for instance, the following modification of an argument by Trenton
Merricks (Merricks 1998).
It is intuitively plausible that the property of being a table supervenes on the properties
and relations of the table’s basic parts.10 So take some table, which we can call Big Table.
If you make duplicates of all the basic parts of Big Table, preserving these parts’ intrinsic
properties and restricted part-to-part relations,11 then the result, whatever else might be
true of it, will also be a table. That’s the intuition, at least, that all of my students have
consistently had.
10We can construe these parts as whatever the fundamental material constituents of the universe happen
to be.
11I am assuming, asMerricks does, that we share an intuitive notion of intrinsicality for the purposes of this
argument, modulo all the appropriate and important caveats about the intrinsicality debate in contemporary
metaphysics.
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Now, annihilate one of the basic parts of Big Table. Intuitively, the addition or subtrac-
tion of a basic part makes no difference as to whether something is a table. So the parts
that survive the annihilation of a single part will still compose a table, which we will call
Little Table. Intuitively, again, the property of being a table supervenes on the intrinsic
properties and relations of the table’s parts. If you make a duplicate of all the basic parts of
Little Table, preserving these parts’ intrinsic properties and restricted part-to-part relations,
then the result, whatever else might be true of it, will also be a table.
Little Tablewas generated by annihilating one part fromBig Table and taking everything
that was left over. We can further suppose that stripping away a single part from Big Table
does not disrupt the other restricted part-to-part relations that obtain between the parts that
remain. It is merely a single part, after all.12 So Little Table is a proper part of Big Table.
Now if it’s true that the property of being a table supervenes on the intrinsic properties and
restricted part-to-part relations of the parts that compose the table, then a duplicate of Little
Table will be a table no matter what else might be true of the extrinsic situation. Well, one
possible extrinsic situation is the situation in which Little Table constitutes a proper part
of Big Table. The supervenience claim therefore entails that, if something is a duplicate
of Big Table, not only is it itself a table, but it also has a proper part, a duplicate of Little
Table, which is also a table. The supervenience claim therefore entails either that (a) if Big
Table exists, then two tables exist;13 or (b) there are no tables.14 Alternatively, we can save
12This is, granted, an empirical question to which I don’t know the answer. But even if the relations of the
remaining parts would not be perfectly preserved, even for an instant, we can probably come up with some
situation that would guarantee the preservation: Merlin’s spell momentarily suspends certain alterations, say
(Schaffer 2000), (Lewis 2000). This is a thought experiment.
13In fact, indefinitely many tables would exist, given the vast number of parts that we could choose to
annihilate in the thought experiment
14The elimination of tables from our ontology would satisfy the supervenience claim, since any two du-
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the common sense view that there is only one table by rejecting the supervenience claim.
Merrick’s argument can be adapted and applied to the case of normative properties with
the help of some assumptions about the metaphysics of action provided by Jennifer Hornsby
in her very insightful article (Hornsby 2012). In my case, I am adapting Merrick’s argu-
ments against supervenience to the case of thick properties.15 So the property that I use for
this purpose needs to be a thick property. We’ll take Sarah’s courageous act of raising the
turtleneck collar to her face.
Hornsby’s metaphysics of action
Hornsby distinguishes actions into two types: activities and performances. Activities are
“temporal stuff” in the sense that, for any activity, you can always take a proper temporal
part of that activity and it will turn out that that proper part is still the same kind of activity
as the larger activity of which it is a proper part. One example of an activity is walking.
You’re walking aimlessly around campus between 4am and 5am to clear your head after a
night of dissertation writing. If you just take the part of that activity that extends from 4am
to 4:30am, that proper part that you just isolated still qualifies as walking. Other examples
of activities are painting, raising your arm, and so on.
Performances are further distinguished into two types: accomplishments and achieve-
ments. The difference between accomplishments and achievements has to do with dura-
plicates of any set of parts would be alike in their property of failing to compose a table.
15It came to my attention after finishing the first draft of this section that a similar application of Merricks’
results had already been given in (Walsh 2011). However, Walsh aims only to argue that there are no intrinsic
normative properties. My argument goes further: it aims to show that the distribution of thick properties does
not supervene on the distribution of non-normative properties. Furthermore, my own argument is much more
detailed and makes use of resources in the philosophy of action that Walsh does not use.
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tion: accomplishments have a temporal duration, while achievements do not. Looking for
a book is an accomplishment because it is a process that extends over time: you look under
the covers, you look in the refrigerator (where, in my absent-mindedness and exhaustion
from dissertation-writing, I frequently leave many things) and so on. Finding the book is
an achievement: it is something that occurs in an instant. Similarly, running a 100-meter
dash is an accomplishment, and making it across that 100-meter dash is an achievement.
Achievements are time-slices of accomplishments that culminate and complete the accom-
plishments.
Accomplishments are sortal events that are composed of activity stuff. My accomplish-
ment of running the race is composed of the activity of running. Accomplishments are
distinct from mere stretches of activity in that any accomplishment, unlike any activity,
involves some kind of outcome such that, if that outcome occurs, the outcome will be an
achievement of the accomplishment and mark a completion and culmination of that accom-
plishment. Stretches of activity do not involve any outcome that marks their completion.
To see the difference, imagine that you’re running on the racetrack but the referee took
away the finish line, so that there is no longer any way to win the race. Your running the
100 meters would still be a stretch of running activity. But it would no longer be an accom-
plishment because there is no longer any outcome such that achieving that outcome would
mark a culmination to what you’re doing. Another way to see the difference is to imagine
continuing to run past the finish line. You’re still running after you pass the finish line, but
any running you do past the finish line will not be part of the accomplishment of running
the 100-meter race. Running the 100-meter race was over when you crossed the finish line,
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even though your running was not over.16
Accomplishments can be incomplete. I can look for my book and give up before finding
it, and I can also be running a 100-meter dash and get vaporized by a nuclear weapon before
making it across the finish line. In these cases, the accomplishment is the stretch of activity
that begins with the beginning of your engaging in the activity, and ends when the stretch
of activity ends.
Sometimes there are many time-slices that satisfy the achievement conditions of an
accomplishment. If Aldous Huxley stopped writing Brave New World one word sooner
than he did, his accomplishment of writing Brave New World would have culminated in
the achievement of Brave New World’s having been written.17 However, since Huxley
continued to write anyway, the actual time-slice that constitutes the achievement of having
written Brave New World would be the instant that Huxley lifts up the pen for the last time.
After all, right before he lifts up the pen, Huxley’s still writing Brave NewWorld. Although
Huxley could have accomplished the writing of Brave New World sooner simply by lifting
his pen, the fact that he continued to write anyway means that, at the time that he is writing
that last period, Brave New World is still being written. It’s not done yet. I imagine that
any academic reading this would recognize the feeling.18
Importantly, accomplishments are not stuff. They are not such that any proper part of an
accomplishment is itself the same accomplishment. When you are running the 100-meter
16I think that using “accomplishment” to denote the kind of action that it does is confusing. I use the term
“accomplishment” because that’s the term that Hornsby uses. Hornsby herself takes it from (Mourelatos
1978).
17After looking at the last few words of the book again, I think that this is a safe assumption to make.
18This paragraph represents my own argument. As far as I know, Hornsby does not herself make this
point.
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dash, there are many stretches of running activity, but there is only one instance of running
a 100-meter dash.
With that background in place, we are now in a position to construct our argument
against the supervenience of thick properties on non-normative properties.
Why thick properties don’t supervene on non-normative properties
Sarah’s action of raising her turtleneck collar is an accomplishment that is composed of
the activity of raising her collar and culminates with the collar’s being raised. Call this
accomplishment Big Accomplishment.
We all agree that something about what Sarah did is courageous. The options for what
about her action is courageous are: the achievement of the raised collar, the accomplish-
ment of raising the collar to her face, or the activity of collar raising that constitutes the
accomplishment. The courageous thing in this case happens to be the accomplishment (Big
Accomplishment). The achievement itself is not courageous, since what Sarah did would
still be courageous if suddenly her arm started to shake from fear and she didn’t manage to
raise the collar all the way. Furthermore, there are two reasons why we should not think
that the activity itself is courageous. Activity is infinitely divisible, so Sarah is engaging in
an infinite number of stretches of collar-raising activity. If what was courageous was the
activity, Sarah would therefore be doing in fact an infinite number of courageous things.
What Sarah did was very courageous, but there is still only one courageous thing that Sarah
did. Secondly, suppose Sarah pressed the collar to her face even harder than she did. In
this case, there is more collar raising activity stuff. However, it is implausible to think that
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Sarah would be more courageous for pressing the collar to her face harder. She is already
courageous enough as she is. And she would not be less courageous if she engaged in less
collar-raising activity because her arm started shaking from fear.
Now imagine a world that’s exactly the same as Sarah’s except that, in this other world,
Sarah’s counterpart does not press the collar as hard against her face as she did. Call this
world World 1. Let Sarah’s world (not the world of Sarah’s counterpart, but the world of
Sarah) be called Big World. In World 1, Sarah’s counterpart is still doing an action that’s an
accomplishment, since her collar-raising is oriented towards the outcome of having a raised
collar. Sarah’s counterpart’s accomplishment is also complete, since it culminates with the
achievement of having the collar raised to her face. Call this accomplishment in World
1 Little World 1 Accomplishment. Furthermore, her accomplishment is still courageous,
since, intuitively, the loss of a little bit of collar-raising activity would not change the fact
that what Sarah did is courageous.
Suppose furthermore that the only thing that’s different about Big World and World 1
is this difference in the presence or absence of the little bit of collar-raising activity. In
other words, nothing about the absence of a small bit of collar-raising did anything to make
anything else about World 1 any different from the way that its counterparts are in Big
World.19 Given this, all of the activity that constitutes Little Accomplishment is intrinsically
just the same as its counterpart in Big Accomplishment. In other words, there is a proper
19Suppose there’s a wizard or what have you keeping the lack of this activity from having any other effect
on anything else. The actual biology and physics of what’s going on does not matter because this argument
and Merricks’ argument are both arguments that proceed from thought experiment. I also get to talk about
wizards having strange causal powers because Jonathan Schaffer gets to (Schaffer 2000), even in The Journal
of Philosophy; and, since he is a much better philosopher than I am, it would be unfair to give him access to
more philosophical tools than me. Whether this qualifies as a joke will depend on whether it’s an essential
property of jokes that they be funny. I just feel compelled to attempt a joke because the example I chose for
my argument is so depressing.
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part of Big Accomplishment that is an intrinsic duplicate of Little Accomplishment. Call
this proper part of Big Accomplishment Big Accomplishment−.
Now that we have all this in place, we need one further assumption, one that Lewis
defends in (Lewis 1986, pp. 86-90). That assumption is that, for any object or set of objects
in a world, there is another world that contains just intrinsic duplicates of that object or set
of objects. For example, there is a world that contains only me and my intrinsic properties;
there is a world containing only me and my intrinsic properties plus this computer and all
its intrinsic properties, and so on.20
Take all of Big World, minus the bit of collar-raising activity that didn’t have a coun-
terpart in the world with Little Accomplishment. In other words, you’ll take everything
about Big World, take out Big Accomplishment, and then include Big Accomplishment−.
With all that stuff you now have, make an intrinsic duplicate of it. Call that intrinsic dupli-
cate World 2, and let Little World 2 Accomplishment be the counterpart in World 2 of Big
Accomplishment−. There is such a world so long as we accept Lewis’ duplication principle.
If we compareWorld 2 (the world with Little World 1 Accomplishment) to World 1 (the
world with Little World 1 Accomplishment), they are very much the same. In both worlds,
there is a stretch of collar-raising activity, and in both worlds these respective stretches of
collar-raising activity constitute an accomplishment that ends with the achievement of a
raised collar.
There is, however, one important difference betweenWorld 1 andWorld 2. Little World
1 Accomplishment is courageous. However, Little World 2 Accomplishment is not. Why?
Because Little World 2 Accomplishment is stipulated to be an intrinsic duplicate of Big
20I get this idea from Merricks.
229
Accomplishment−. However, Big Accomplishment− is a proper part of Big Accomplish-
ment, and I earlier argued that the proper parts of courageous accomplishments are not
themselves courageous.
In other words, the only difference between World 1 and World 2 is that Little World
1 Accomplishment is courageous and Little World 2 Accomplishment is not. The only
difference is difference in the distribution of thick properties. There are no non-normative
differences between World 1 and World 2.
Here is Supervenience of Thick Properties:
Supervenience of Thick Properties: For any possible worlds w1 and w2 and
any individual i1 in w1 and i2 in w2, if i1 and i2 are intrinsically and extrin-
sically non-normatively indiscernible and w1 and w2 are non-normatively in-
discernible, then, for any thick property P , i1 instantiates P if and only if i2
instantiates P .
Here is the result after we substitute in our examples:
Surprise!: If Little World 1 Accomplishment and Little World 2 Accom-
plishment are intrinsically and extrinsically non-normatively indiscernible and
World 1 and World 2 are non-normatively indiscernible, then Little World 1
Accomplishment is courageous if and only if Little World 2 Accomplishment
is courageous.
However, I just showed that, given Hornsby’s background philosophy of action and one
assumption of David Lewis, Merricks’ argument against microphysical supervenience can
by extended to show that there are no non-normative differences between World 1 and
World 2, and that Little World 1 Accomplishment is courageous while Little World 2 Ac-
complishment is not. Therefore, on these assumptions, the antecedent of Surprise! is true
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while the consequent is false. So Surprise! itself is false, giving us a counterexample to
Supervenience of Thick Properties.21
Thick property supervenience failure is not bad
One might object that what I have given is an abstract argument and therefore inappropri-
ate in the contexts of arguments about normative phenomena. I am very sympathetic to the
thought that certain normative phenomena are not well captured by overly theoretical char-
acterizations. This is an important insight of Williams, Stocker, Gilligan, and other figures
in the moral anti-theory tradition. However, normative supervenience is itself an abstract
doctrine, and as such, abstract arguments against it seem perfectly appropriate.22
Note that the Merricks style of argument can also be used by the reasons fundamentalist
to deny Additive Reasons Supervenience. However, denying Additive Reasons Superve-
nience is problematic for the reasons fundamentalist because the reasons fundamentalist is
committed to Additive Reasons Supervenience for the reason that he has no other superve-
nience relation that he can rely on to satisfy the desiderata I described in §2.6.1 that we need
21Opponents of Merrick’s argument against microphysical supervenience sometimes argue that properties
such as being a table are maximal properties. A maximal property P is a property such that, for any fusion
F that satisfies P ’s other instantiation conditions, there is no fusion of which F is a proper part and that
also satisfies P ’s other instantiation conditions (Sider 2001), (Sider 2003). Maximal properties are extrinsic
properties because whether or not a fusion F exemplifies them depends on the presence or absence of other
things outside F . Sider raises the issue of maximality in order to object to Merricks’ argument against micro-
physical supervenience. Merricks responds in (Merricks 2003). I will not say more about this debate other
than to remark that Merricks seems to me to have the better argument.
Also note that the argument does not go through if one rejects Hornsby’s categorization of actions or one
rejects Lewis’ assumption that, for any object or set of objects, there is a world containing nothing except an
intrinsic duplicate of this object or set of objects. I cannot argue for these claims here. I will just say that I and
many other people think that these claims are correct and that there are good reasons for thinking so, which I
leave to Hornsby and Lewis to defend far more adroitly than I could.
22Furthermore, anyone who thought that abstract arguments were inappropriate for discussions of norma-
tive phenomena would have stopped reading this dissertation a long time ago.
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supervenience to be able to satisfy. I avoid this problem because I accept Transformative
Reasons Supervenience.
Further, the argument I just gave against Supervenience of Thick Properties does noth-
ing to show that Transformative Reasons Supervenience is false. Although, as I argued,
World 1 and World 2 are non-normatively indiscernible, they are not descriptively indis-
cernible, since they differ in that Little World 1 Accomplishment exemplifies the thick (and
therefore descriptive) property of being courageous, while Little World 2 Accomplishment
does not exemplify the thick (and therefore descriptive) property of being courageous.
The falsity of Supervenience of Thick Properties is surely an odd result. However, to
the extent that its oddness causes problems, these problems generalize outside the norma-
tive case. They’re not problems that are unique to normativity, and certainly not problems
that are unique to my own view. Merricks’ argument can be used to show the failure of
supervenience in a wide variety of cases, such as cases of ordinary objects and the case of
consciousness. Anyone who wants to defend the existence of ordinary objects at all has
to deal with this result, and one way to deal with this result is to give up supervenience.
I think the moral that we should draw from these results is not that failures of superve-
nience generate problems, but that philosophers generate problems when they place too
much importance on supervenience. I think that supervenience does not have the kind of
wide application that many philosophers take it to have, and that its importance should be
downplayed unless there are compelling reasons for it. In the normative case, there are
compelling reasons for accepting some sort of supervenience claim: it’s a conceptual con-
straint, it’s presupposed by our practices of normative explanation, and it’s needed to keep
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the normative world from being “out of control” (as Shafer-Landau says).23 None of this is
true, for example, in the case of the strong supervenience of consciousness onmicrophysical
properties.24
There may be strong reasons to accept the supervenience of tables on microphysical
properties. Merricks argues that, if there are tables, this supervenience claim generates
inconsistencies. Merricks, however, thinks that there are not strong reasons to accept the
existence of tables, and so he eliminates them from his ontology. I don’t think that we can
take the analogously drastic step of eliminating normativity.25 So if there were a tension
between normativity and supervenience, I think that we should keep normativity and give
up supervenience. This is what I am advocating in the case of the supervenience of thick
properties on non-normative properties. In doing this, I don’t take myself to be in any
worse of a situation than anyone who wants to defend the existence of ordinary objects
despite the tension between their existence and supervenience. Thus the problem, if it is a
problem, is not a unique problem ofmy view. Fortunately, we don’t need to reject normative
supervenience entirely, since we can rely on Transformative Reasons Supervenience to do
the theoretical work that we need supervenience to do.
In addition to the previous “partners in guilt” strategy for explaining why denying the
supervenience of thick properties on non-normative properties is not a problem, there is
23This is good for me, since otherwise the hundred pages of this dissertation that discuss normative su-
pervenience would have been a complete waste of time. I discussed these compelling reasons to accept
supervenience earlier in §2.6.1.
24In brief, phenomenal and microphysical properties seem far too different and conceptually autonomous
for there to be equally compelling reasons to accept supervenience in the case of consciousness as there are
reasons to accept supervenience in the normative case. For why, read (Chalmers. 1996) or chapters 2, 3 and
6 of Descartes’Meditations.
25Obviously plenty of people don’t agree with this, but I think that they are wrong.
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at least one more reason to think that the failure of supervenience of thick properties on
non-normative properties is not a problem. Thick properties have both a descriptive and
normative nature. Suppose that you could find a set of descriptive properties D that gives
you the entire, exhaustive descriptive content of courage. If you had such a property, you
are guaranteed to be able to isolate a thin normative property N that gives you the entire
normative content of courage. N would be whatever is left over if you start with courage
and take away D from it. N is a thin normative property because, after all the descrip-
tive content is removed, the only content that remains is normative. Perhaps N is just the
property of being good; perhaps it is some exotic thin property that only courageous things
instantiate. It doesn’t matter; the point is that N is a thin normative property. Call this a
conjunctive view of the thick property of courage. On the conjunctive view of courage,
courage is identical to a conjunction of a thin normative property and a purely descriptive
(non-normative) property. Courage is identical toD ∧N , where N is whatever is left over
once the descriptive nature of courage is stripped away.
If the conjunctive view of courage is correct, then it does seem problematic to deny
Supervenience of Thick Properties. World 1 and World 2 from the Sarah example above
were shown to be non-normatively indiscernible. The only difference between them was
a difference in their thick properties. On the conjunctive theory of courage, however, the
descriptive contentD of courage is also non-normative. So, since World 1 and World 2 are
non-normatively indiscernible, D must be present in both World 1 and World 2, leaving
the difference in the thin normative property N as the only difference between the worlds.
There are, in other words, no descriptive differences, but only differences in the presence or
absence of thin normative properties. Failure of Supervenience of Thick Properties would
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therefore amount to a failure of Additive Reasons Supervenience. In that case, we are in the
same position as the reasons fundamentalist who needs Additive Reasons Supervenience
to avoid all the problematical consequences of rejecting supervenience that I discussed in
§2.6.1.
The conjunctive view of thick properties is not the only possible view of thick prop-
erties. We can deny that there exists any purely descriptive (non-normative) property D
that gives you the entire exhaustive descriptive content of courage. Here is what such a
picture of courage would look like. All the platitudes about courage are true: that courage
is exemplified only when you are afraid, that WilliamWallace is courageous, that enduring
pain that you can avoid in order to achieve some great feat is courageous, and so on. These
are non-normative statements that tell us something about what courage is non-normatively
like. But these don’t tell you the whole story. There is something else about courageous
acts that all these platitudes put together won’t capture: that courageous acts are coura-
geous. Put together any purely descriptive property D you like, and I will be able to find
an example of something that’s courageous but not D, or D but not courageous.
Another way to think about this is to compare it to Williamson’s strategy in Knowledge
and its Limits (Williamson 2002). In that book, Williamson argues that the infamous Get-
tier cases and the failure of all the literature that ensued to come up with any definition of
knowledge that avoided all Gettier-style counterexamples shows that “knowledge” is un-
analyzable. However, “knowledge” is a key concept in epistemology that does theoretical
work that other epistemological concepts do not do, so we can’t simply eliminate knowl-
edge and remove it from our theory of the furniture of the mind. The indispensibility of
our concept of knowledge to epistemology gives us a reason to avoid the eliminativist route
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and accept that knowledge is a genuine mental state.
I am suggesting that something similar may be true of some thick concepts: namely, that
we can’t give an analysis of them as a conjunction of purely descriptive and thin normative
concepts. However, thick concepts are key concepts in normative ethics that do theoretical
work that thin normative concepts do not and cannot do, so we can’t simply avoid the
worries about a lack of analysis by eliminating thick concepts from our theory of normative
reality. The indispensibility of thick concepts to normative ethics gives us a reason to avoid
the eliminativist route and accept that thick properties are genuine features of normative
reality.26
Given this, the denial of Supervenience of Thick Properties seems significantly less
problematic. There is no problem in general with imagining two scenarios that differ in that
one possesses a descriptive property that the other lacks. For instance, General Relativity
allows the stress-energy tensor to be null at regions. Imagine two regions that are exactly
alike except that one has a null stress-energy tensor value and another lacks the property
of having a null stress-energy tensor value. There is no problem here. Similarly, take two
leptons that are exactly alike except that one has the property of having a positive charge
and the other lacks this property. Again, there is no problem here.
These examples bear one important disanalogy to the conclusion I wanted to draw from
the Merricks-style argument I gave about Sarah’s courage. Two regions that differ with
respect only to their having or lacking a null stress tensor value, and two leptons that differ
onlywith respect to their having or lacking a positive charge, will nevertheless bear different
26These remarks do not constitute an argument for the position I am describing. They are merely sketching
a position in logical space that you can take towards thick properties, one that I am sympathetic with but cannot
develop here because the dissertation is already too long.
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causal relations to other things. Null stress-energy tensor regions will produce different
gravitational effects on other regions of the universe, and positively-charged leptons will
interact differently with other particles than their negatively-charged counterparts. Thus,
two worlds that differ with respect to the presence or absence of these properties in a single
set of counterpart regions or a single set of counterpart leptons will also differ with respect
to many other non-normative features. What I aimed to establish earlier is that there are
two worlds that are non-normatively discernible but discernible with respect to whether
Sarah’s accomplishment is courageous. Courage, as a descriptive property, either causally
relates to other things in the universe, or it does not causally relate to other things in the
universe. If it does causally relate to other things in the universe, then the presence or
absence of courage between two worlds seems to entail that there will be changes in the
overall non-normative nature of these twoworlds. The twoworlds thenwould not constitute
a counterexample to Supervenience of Thick Properties. If, however, courage does not
causally relate to other things in the universe, then we face an epistemic problem similar
to the one described in §2.5.1. There, I mentioned that not even Moore thinks that we
have a faculty of moral intuition robust enough to determine whether two non-normatively
indiscernible things differ with respect to their normative properties. It is difficult to see
how we would know whether we were in the world in which Sarah’s act is courageous or
the world in which her act is not courageous. This is important because, on my view, thick
properties constitute reasons. So, if we don’t know whether a particular thick property is
present or absent, then we can’t know exactly what reasons we have to act in particular
ways.
A more analogous example to the courage case I’ve been discussing would be two
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worlds that differed with respect to the presence or absence of phenomenal properties.
Chalmers’ zombie world, which I discussed in §4, is non-phenomenally indiscernible from
ours and differs from ours only in that our world features phenomenal property instantia-
tions and the zombie world does not. Furthermore, the property of being blue arguably does
bear causal relations to other aspects of the universe. You might think, for example, that
a reliable subject perceives blue objects as blue because these objects are blue: it’s their
blueness that causes the perceiver’s perception of the object to be a blue experience. The
perceiver’s perception of blue is also a phenomenal property, so, in this case, the phenom-
enal property of blueness would bear causal relationships to other phenomenal properties
such as blueness-perception. If this were true, blueness can alter the causal profile of a
world without altering the non-phenomenal causal profile of a world.
Normative properties may function in a similar way. Take Johnnie, who sees Sarah’s
courage and walks up to the line to sit next to her. Frequently, we explain our and other
people’s actions by citing the normative reasons that they have. We could also of course
cite features of Johnnie’s psychology—we could say, for instance, that Johnnie desired to
overthrow capitalism and believed that subjecting himself to pepper spray on this occasion
would help him attain that goal (because the pepper spraying would occur in the context of
an anti-capitalistic protest, violence directed at people in anti-capitalist protests has such-
and-such beneficial effects on the status of the ongoing revolution to overthrow capitalism,
and so on). We could also cite features of his neurophysiology: Johnnie’s sensory modal-
ities interacted with the gross motor cortex in such-and-such ways, and so on. But there
is another kind of sui generis, distinctly normative explanation of action that purports to
explain the occurrence of actions by citing features of normative reality. Why did Johnnie
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join the protesters on the line? Because Sarah’s courage gave him reasons to do so. He
joined the line for those reasons.
Furthermore, Johnnie’s joining the line was a courageous act. Since Johnnie joined the
line because of Sarah’s courage and the reasons Sarah’s courage provided, there’s a sense
in which Sarah’s courage bears causal relations to other essentially normative events such
as other courageous acts. In other words, Johnnie performed a courageous act because of
Sarah’s courage. If Sarah were not courageous (if, say, Sarah and Johnnie were in a world
that did not feature thick property exemplifications), then Johnnywould not have performed
a courageous act. He may have still joined the line, but his joining the line would not be
courageous.
I mentioned earlier that there is a view according to which phenomenal properties only
bear causal relations to other phenomenal properties and give rise only to phenomenal
events. If we extend this view to the case of normative properties, we can say that thick
properties do not bear causal relations to non-normative properties and give rise only to es-
sentially normative events. There is therefore a position in logical space that allows for the
following two claims to be true. First, there are two possible worlds that non-normatively
indiscernible but discernible in that one world features thick property instantiations while
the other does not. Second, in the world that features thick property instantiations, thick
properties are causally isolated from non-normative events, but are nevertheless causally
efficacious in the sense that they bring about essentially normative events. By “essentially
normative events”, I have in mind actions like Johnny’s courageous act, but there may be
other essentially normative events as well, such as the systematic playing out of injustice.
Let normative causation be any instance of causation between two essentially normative
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events.27
It is useful to compare this kind of causal picture to the picture of reality that Spinoza
gives. For Spinoza, the world is identical to a single, monistic substance whose essence is
able to be conceived in different ways. These different ways of conceiving of the essence of
the monistic substance are called attributes. We can conceive of the monistic substance in
an extended way, in which case we would conceive of events as causal interactions between
essentially extended things: the corpuscles bouncing around and so on. We could also
conceive of the monistic substance in a thinking way, in which case we would conceive of
events as causal interactions between “essentially thinking things”, whose nature Spinoza
is not particularly clear about but which perhaps mean something like things that act as
substrata for phenomenal properties.
Spinoza also accepts the doctrine of causal parallelism, according to which, for every
causal interaction of the extension type between twomodes of themonistic substances, there
is also a causal interaction of the thinking type between those two modes of the monistic
substance. Causal parallelism also entails that there are no hybrid causal interactions. In
other words, for Spinoza, it is never the case that an extended thing can cause changes in
thinking things, and it is never the case that a thinking thing can cause changes in extended
things.
Spinoza also holds that there are an infinite number of ways of conceiving of the essence
27I do not have very worked out views on the nature of causation in general or normative causation in
particular, but I suspect that the difference between normative causation and “non-normative” causationwould
not reside in the nature of the causation at play, but rather in the nature of the entities standing in the causal
relations. In other words, what I tend to think is that there is a single notion of cause which would be at work
in both normative and non-normative instances of causation, and that the difference between normative and
non-normative causation lies simply in the fact that, in cases of normative causation, the events standing in
causal relations are essentially normative, whereas in cases of non-normative causation, the events standing
in causal relations are not essentially normative.
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of the monistic substance but that we, with our finite understanding capacities, cannot con-
ceive of the monistic substance in more than two ways (the thinking way and the extended
way). There may, however, be a third way of conceiving of reality that Spinoza does not
countenance: a normative way. In conceiving of the situation on the protest line, we can
conceive of Sarah and Johnnie as essentially extended beings causally relating to each other
according to the laws of extension (physics, neurophysiology and so on). We can also con-
ceive of them as essentially thinking beings, causally relating to each other according to
the laws of thought (i.e. the laws of folk psychology). Alternatively, we can conceive of
them as essentially normative beings, causally relating to each other according to the laws
of normativity.
The last feature of Spinoza’s view that’s relevant for my purposes here is that, for
Spinoza, our finite understanding is such that we cannot conceive of the essence of the
world through two distinct attributes at the same time. For Spinoza, we cannot conceive of
Johnnie and Sarah’s interaction as both an interaction between essentially extended things
and, at the same time, as an interaction between essentially thinking things. If we allow that
normativity constitutes a third attribute—that is, a third way of conceiving of the essence
of the monistic substance—it would follow on Spinoza’s view that we cannot conceive of
Johnnie and Sarah’s interaction both as an interaction between essentially extended things
and, at the same time, as an interaction between essentially normative things. The kind of
view that emerges would bear some similarities to Bilgrami’s view, mentioned towards the
end of §3, that relations between normative and non-normative properties are not coher-
ent.28
28I call Transformative Reasons Supervenience Transformative Reasons Supervenience because of this
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As I mentioned earlier, I accept that relations between normative and non-normative
properties are not coherent. I am sympathetic to Spinoza’s view that we cannot conceive
of the essence of the world through two distinct attributes at the same time. If we cannot
conceive of the essence of the world through two distinct attributes at the same time, then
it will not be possible to conceive of our world—or any world—as having both normative
properties and extended (non-normative) properties. Conceiving of Supervenience of Thick
Properties requires that we conceive of worlds that have both thick (i.e. normative) prop-
erties and non-normative properties. Conceiving of my denial of Supervenience of Thick
Properties requires conceiving of Supervenience of Thick Concepts and then running it
through a negation operator. So, if Spinoza is right that we cannot conceive of the essence
of the world through two distinct attributes at the same time, my denial of Supervenience
of Thick Properties turns out to be incoherent.
However, we do not have to accept Spinoza’s view that it is not possible to conceive of
distinct attributes at the same time. Chalmers, for instance, would not, since he thinks that
there is no problem in (positively ideally) conceiving of our world at a time as, for instance,
such that its members have (a) non-phenomenal properties in virtue of which the members
aspect of Spinoza’s view. For Spinoza, conceiving of the world first through the attribute of extension, and
then through the attribute of thought, involves a kind of transformation in our way of conceiving of the world.
Although in both cases, we are conceiving of the same world with the same underlying causal structure, the
essential nature of this world and its causal structure is conceived to be radically different. Now suppose we
allow, as I’m suggesting, that there be a third, essentially normative way of conceiving of the world. Con-
ceiving of the world first through the attribute of extension and then through the attribute of normativity will
involve a similar transformation in the way that we conceive of the world. Transformative Reasons Superve-
nience is “transformative” in the sense that it can be formulated and understood when one is conceiving of the
world through the attribute of normativity. This is the case because Transformative Reasons Supervenience
construes the supervenience relation as a relation between normative properties and descriptive properties.
Descriptive properties are also normative properties in the case when the descriptive properties are thick prop-
erties. When we conceive of the world through the attribute of normativity, we can access all and only the
normative features of the world and the relations between them. We can therefore understand what it would
mean for the distribution of normative properties to supervene on the distribution of descriptive properties in
the case in which the descriptive properties include only thick properties.
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causally interrelate in a non-phenomenal way, and also have (b) phenomenal properties in
virtue of which its members causally interrelate in a phenomenal way. Chalmers also thinks
that there is no problem in conceiving of a world that is just like ours in non-phenomenal
respects but lacks phenomenal features. Similarly, I am claiming here that we can conceive
of our world as such that its members have (a) non-normative properties in virtue of which
the members causally interrelate in a non-normative way, and also have (b) normative prop-
erties in virtue of which its members causally interrelate in a normative way. I also think
that there is no problem in conceiving of a world that is just like ours in non-normative
respects but lacks thick properties and therefore lacks any normative features at all. I also
argued in §5.3.4 that these distinct conceptions are conceptions of distinct possible worlds
and therefore that Supervenience of Thick Properties is false.
This section has attempted to show that denying Supervenience of Thick Properties is
not unacceptable or fatal but actually points to an attractive sketch of a theory of norma-
tivity that we have good reasons to develop further. On the theory of normativity sketched
here, thick properties, while causally isolated from non-normative properties and essen-
tially non-normative events, stand in causal relations with each other and give rise to all
that is normative.
A theory like this would be attractive for a variety of reasons. First, it would preserve
the kind of autonomy of normative reality from non-normative reality that provides proba-
bly the most theoretical motivation for adopting irreduciblist views in general.29 Second, it
is consistent with a supervenience claim (Transformative Reasons Supervenience), which
29Scanlon’s own domain-specific theory discussed in §2.4.2 also allows for the autonomy of normative
theorizing, but it does not give any metaphysical weight to normative reality.
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provides us with a way to satisfy the desiderata that I argued in §2.5 we needed a superve-
nience claim to satisfy. Third, it places thick properties at the center of normative reality.
Why this is an advantage will be discussed further in §5.5.
I argued in §5.2 that irreduciblists can avoid worries about brute entailment by intro-
ducing thick properties into their theory of normative reality and arguing that reasons, es-
sentially, are facts that bear some specified relation to thick properties. I did not yet give
any account of what I take that relation to be. In the next sections §5.4 and §5.5, I’ll argue
for my own theory of what the relation is that reasons essentially bear to thick properties.
The general upshot of the argument is that the essential relation is a species of the relation
that holds between questions and answers.
5.4 Reasons as answers
I argue in this section that reasons are answers. After all, it seems like a natural place to
start. If you notice the rain outside and are considering taking an umbrella, a reason like
“it’s raining outside” strikes us as an appropriate (although perhaps not complete or correct)
response to the questionwhy you should take the umbrella. Yet despite the obviousness with
which this strikes us, there is surprisingly little discussion in the literature about what it is
about reasons that explains their power to function as correct answers to why-questions.30
The reasons-as-answers approach that I aim to defend gives a clear explanation of why this
30The only place that I know of to look for contemporary discussion of this thesis is in an exchange
between Hieronymi and Schroeder at (Hieronymi 2005), (Schroeder 2010), and (Hieronymi 2013). Even
this exchange places the reasons-as-answers thesis as secondary to the exhaustively discussed wrong kind of
reason problem. Like most everyone else in philosophy, I also have many things to say about the wrong kind
of reason question, but will not be discussing the wrong kind of reason problem in this dissertation.
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is: on the view, reasons just are answers to certain kinds of why-questions.
The idea that reasons are answers to why-questions has a history: it is arguably implic-
itly present in a claim Anscombe makes about reasons. Says Anscombe:
What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not?
The answer that I shall suggest is that they are the actions to which a certain
sense of the question “Why?” is given application; the sense is of course that
in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this is not a
sufficient statement, because the question “What is the relevant sense of the
question “Why?” and “What is meant by ‘reason for acting’?” are one and the
same. (Anscombe 1957, p. 9)
For Anscombe, an action ϕ is intentional just if the answer to the question “Why did
you ϕ?” (when “you” is indexed to whomever did the ϕ-ing) gives a reason for acting. The
claim seems to be not only that reasons for action are the sorts of things that can be given by
answers to certain kinds of why-questions, but that “reason for action” is to be understood
as meaning the same thing as “answer to a [certain kind of] why-question”, after the relevant
kind of why-question is sufficiently worked out.
Anscombe here is talking about motivating reasons: reasons why one did something or
would have done something. Motivating reasons are not (or at least need not be in every
case) normative reasons, which are reasons why one ought to have done something. My
dissertation is exclusively discussing normative reasons and will continue to do so until the
end. So, in this section, the reasons-as-answers account will be distinct fromAnscombe’s in
that my account will be an account of normative reasons rather than of motivating reasons.
In the course of arguing for the view that reasons are answers, I criticize Scanlon’s
view that the reasons relation is a four-place relation. My argumentative strategy is to
isolate particular situations such that the four-place view of the reasons relation generates
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intuitive inconsistencies. Because the view generates inconsistencies, the view needs to
be either rejected or modified. My particular approach is to modify the view by adding
additional elements into our theory of the the logical structure of the reasons relation. In
other words, I argue that the reasons relation is a six-place relation rather than a four-place
relation, and that my particular characterization of the two additional components avoids
the inconsistency worries that I raise against Scanlon’s view.
I do think that, in the significant majority of cases, Scanlon’s view that the reasons
relation is a four-place relation would not generate the kinds of counterexamples that I
give throughout the argument of this section. In other words, if the space of reasons were
more constrained than it actually is, Scanlon’s view that the reasons relation is a four-place
relation would have been perfectly adequate. However, what I and Scanlon both seek is
a general theory of the logical structure of reasons, one that can accommodate all cases.
The view that I will give in the course of this section better qualifies as a general theory of
the logical structure of reasons because, as I argue, it is able to accommodate strictly more
cases than Scanlon’s theory.
Question structures
In order to formulate and evaluate the prospects for an answers account of reasons, we first
need a working account of what why questions are. The account of why questions that I
will adopt is the one offered by van Fraassen. This section introduces his account and then
indicates why it is safe to take it on board.
On van Fraassen’s analysis, questions of the form “Why P ?” are best understood as
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denoting a function to sets of admissible answers, from 4-place tuples which consist of a
topic proposition that’s expressed by the interrogative, and a contrast class of propositions,
a relevance relation, and a background body of theory and factual information that are
all implicated by the conversational context in which the interrogative is uttered. We can
write this as Θ(PT ;Pa,…, Pj;R;K), where Θ represents the why-function, PT represents
the appropriate topic proposition presupposed by the interrogative, all Pa,…, Pj represent
the elements of the contrast class presupposed by the interrogative, R represents relevance
relation presupposed by the interrogative, andK represents the background body of theory
and factual information. More colloquially, van Fraassen argues that interrogatives of the
form “Why Pk?” should be understood to be expressing questions of the form “Why is it
the case that PT , with respect to R, rather than any Pa,…, Pj , givenK?” An interrogative
is appropriate just if it expresses a why-question that enjoys admissible answers. Call any
tuples that meets these constraints an answers-apt tuple.
The particular why-questions that van Fraassen has in mind are question types rather
than question tokens. We can distinguish between token utterances of why-questions, and
the propositions they express, by referring to the token utterances as interrogatives and
reserving the term “question” for the propositions expressed by the interrogatives. This is
an important distinction to note because, on van Fraassen’s theory, the particular question
that is expressed by any given interrogative will depend on the conversational context in
which the interrogative is uttered.
This is admittedly quite confusing, and so I will go through these various components
one at a time.
The topic of a why-question is the proposition that the question is about. For example, if
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we ask “Why did Adam eat the apple”,31 <Adam ate the apple>32 is the topic of the question
expressed by the interrogative. Van Fraassen argues that a why-question has admissible
answers only if its topic is appropriate. A topic is appropriate only if it is true. It makes
no sense, on van Fraassen’s view, for there to be an appropriate answer to the question
why, say, Romney won the 2012 election, if <Romney won the 2012 election> is false.
Van Fraassen suggests that “Why P ?” questions with a false propositional content have
no admissible answers, and that the suitable response will be, not an answer, but rather an
expression to the effect that the question “Why P ?” is inappropriate (a puzzled stare, a
friendly correction, the statement, “your question doesn’t make any sense”, and so forth).
Van Fraassen introduces contrast classes alongside topics as a further element of the
fully specified propositional objects of why-questions. They serve in part to individuate
why-questions that can be expressed by syntactically identical utterances. Consider again:
“Why did Adam eat the apple?” The questioner might be asking a lot of things. She might
be asking why Adam, rather than Cain or Abel, ate the apple. She might be asking why
Adam ate the apple rather than eating the mango or the pomegranate instead. Or she might
be asking why Adam ate the apple rather than, say, made it into applesauce or threw it at the
snake. This is an important observation, van Fraassen thinks, because each of these distinct
{topic, contrast class} pairs will generate distinct sets of admissible answers. “Adam was
hungry” is an admissible answer to the question why Adam ate the apple (rather than throw
it at the snake). Throwing it at the snake may be very satisfying to Adam, but it will not
satisfy Adam’s hunger. However, “Adam was hungry” isn’t an admissible answer to the
31This is van Fraassen’s choice of example.
32I’ll indicate propositions with “< >” characters.
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question why Adam ate the apple (rather than the mango or the pomegranate). After all,
any of these actions would have satisfied Adam’s hunger, so Adam’s hunger does nothing
to answer why Adam ate the apple rather than these other things. To answer that, you’d
need something like “Adam likes apples the most”.
Van Fraassen generalizes this result to all why-questions. He argues that every why-
question specifies a contrast class of propositions containing propositions that denote alter-
native events or states that do not occur or obtain. Further, each “Why P ?” question seeks
an answer as to why the topic proposition is true and why the alternatives specified by the
elements of the contrast class are false. Van Fraassen does not give a rigorous analysis of
alternatives. But he does state that propositions that are genuine alternatives to the topic
proposition must be false (Fraassen 1980, p. 145). This is intuitive: it makes no sense to
ask why Adam ate the apple rather than the mango if Adam also ate the mango.
In van Fraassen’s Garden of Eden example, these alternatives are alternative actions that
might have occurred instead of Adam’s action of eating the apple. However, it’s important
to note that van Fraassen is offering the notion of contrast classes in service to a general
theory of the structure of the propositional objects of why-questions, and so the contrast
class in other cases might be sets of propositions expressing alternative mere events or
alternative states of the world. For instance, the contrast class expressed by an interrogative
like “Why is the sky blue at noon”, given the context, might be the set consisting of <The
sky is red at noon>, <The sky is yellow at noon>, and so on.
The relevance relation is a relation between pairs of topic questions and contrast classes,
and admissible answers. It is with respect to the relevance relation that answers are deemed
admissible. Depending on the conversational context of an utterance like “Why did Adam
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eat the apple (rather than the mango or the pomegranate)?”, the relevance relation might
constrain admissible answers to ones that cite the circumstances that gave rise to Adam’s
eating the apple (e.g., Eve gave it to him), Adam’s motives in eating it (he was hungry,
he wanted to please Eve), biological factors like Adam’s neural activity or the movements
of his muscles, or cosmological factors like fate or providence. Consider these different
answers to the question “Why did Adam eat the apple rather than the mango?”
1. Adam likes apples better than mangoes.
2. The rules of etiquette indicate that, when in Eden, one must eat apples before man-
goes.
3. There was an apple rather than a mango between Adam’s teeth when Adam’s motor
cortex produced an action potential that contracted his temporalis muscle to occlude
his mandible and maxilla.
4. God willed the Fall so that humans could experience the goodness of the Incarnation,
and Adam’s eating the mango would not have caused the Fall.
Each of these answers will be appropriate in certain contexts and not appropriate in others.
For example, if I’m in a hospital trying to save Adam’s life, (3) seems perfectly appropriate.
But if I answer with (3) in a theology classroom, my professor will think I’m being snarky.33
My theology professor wants answer (4). But (4) is completely inappropriate in a hospital
setting.
Here is van Fraassen’s own example:
33In this judgment, he would also be correct.
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Suppose a father asks his teenage son, “Why is the porch light on?” and the
son replies “The porch switch is closed and the electricity is reaching the bulb
through that switch.” At this point you are most likely to feel that the son
is being impudent. This is because you are most likely to think that the sort
of answer the father needed was something like: “Because we are expecting
company.” But it is easy to imagine a less likely question context: the father
and son are re-wiring the house and the father, unexpectedly seeing the porch
light on, fears that he has caused a short circuit that bypasses the porch light
switch. In the second case, he is not interested in the human expectations or
desires that led to the depressing of the switch. (ibid., p. 131)
Plausibly, the conversational context of the question utterance in this example specifies
(<The porch light is on>, <The porch light is off>) as the contrast class. As far as the topic
and contrast class is concerned, the son is giving a suitable answer to the question why the
lights are on rather than off. Yet, intuitively, we want to say that, given the conversational
context, the son is not giving a suitable answer to his father’s question. He’s merely being
impertinent. Van Fraassen suggests that this is because the conversational context tells
us that any admissible answer to the interrogative has to cite some feature of our human
expectations and desires. Other conversational contexts could specify a feature with respect
to which answers are admissible only if they cite the house’s electrical properties, or various
legal features (a local ordinance declaring, say, that all porches must have their lights on
after dusk), perhaps the dispositions of individual electrons, and so forth.
Lastly, the background body of theory and factual information K helps to determine
which of the admissible answers to the question are correct. “Adam likes apples the best”
may be an admissible answer to the question “Why did Adam eat the apple rather than the
mango, with respect to any features of the action involving human ends and desires”, but it
is not a correct answer to the question if, givenK, Adam actually likes mangoes the best.
Strikingly, van Fraassen refers to correct answers to why-questions as reasons (ibid.,
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p. 143) that favor (ibid., e.g. 128) the particular topic proposition (in contrast to the contrast
class, with respect to the relevance relation, and given the background body of theory and
factual information).
Why van Fraassen’s analysis?
Van Fraassen’s account of why-questions and their role in scientific explanation has been
criticized on a number of fronts. Kitcher and Salmon challenge the pragmatic implications
van Fraassen draws from his account. As an illustration of the pragmatic nature of scientific
explanation, van Fraassen gives the famous example of the tower and the shadow. In the
lawn of an aristocrat’s house, a traveler sees, at sunset, a terrace cast in shadow. The traveler
then notices that the shadow is being cast by a very high tower; the tower’s height and
location explain the presence of the shadow on the terrace. But when asking a servant why
the tower had to be so high, the servant replies that it is because the aristocrat, for his own
personal reasons, intended the shadow to be cast over the terrace at sunset, and constructed
the tower to bring this shadow about. Van Fraassen takes both explanations to be perfectly
legitimate, and offers this story to illustrate his view that whether a particular purported
explanation qualifies as a genuine explanation depends on the conversational context in
which the explanation is given–hence, pragmatism about scientific explanation. Kitcher
and Salmon reply that it is false that the length of the shadow explains the height of the tower.
Rather, what explains the height of the tower is the aristocrat’s desire for the shadow, which
is of course quite a different thing than the shadow itself. Kitcher and Salmon therefore
argue that van Fraassen’s theory of the logical structure of why-questions and their role in
explanation fail to offer a genuinely pragmatic account of scientific explanation (Kitcher
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and Salmon 1987), (Achinstein 1984, p. 131).
Other critics charge van Fraasson with trivializing the notion of explanation (Kitcher
and Salmon 1987), of not accounting for explanation in the case of mathematics (Sandborg
1998), and as not offering a complete account of explanation because of its failure to account
for the existence of some explanations that answer how-questions (Cross 1991).
These objections, alongwith the objections of Kitcher and Salmon above, share a theme:
they are all objections to the claim that van Fraassen’s analysis of why-questions is an anal-
ysis of explanation in general or scientific explanation in particular. Importantly, they are
not objections to van Fraassen’s theory of the logical structure of why-questions and their
answers. Furthermore, as far as I know, there are no extant objections in the literature to van
Fraassen’s theory as a theory of why-questions itself.34 Because of the lack of objections to
van Fraassen’s theory of the logical structure of why-questions, I will just adopt the theory
and incorporate it into the argumentative structure of this dissertation.
I discussed in §2.3 Scanlon’s view that the favoring relation was a 4-place relation.
Specifically, Scanlon accepts
Reasons Relationality: Any reason fact is normative in virtue of its standing in
34Two caveats to make about this claim. First, there are rival theories of why-questions—for instance, the
theory of (Hintikka and Halonen 1995) and the work on erotetic logic that was done before van Fraassen
published The Scientific Image. What I mean is not that van Fraassen’s theory of why-questions has no
competitors, but that I can’t find explicit objections to his theory of the logical structure of why-questions.
Secondly, there does exist one small dispute about whether contrast classes ought to be included in the theory.
(Ruben 1987) argues that contrast classes can be eliminated by conjoining the negations of the elements of
the contrast class to the topic proposition. In other words, Ruben suggests that “Why did Adam eat the apple
(rather than the mango)” is equivalent to “Why did Adam eat the apple and not eat the mango?” Since these
are equivalent, it’s better to just leave out the contrast classes. (Risjord 2000, pp. 66-78) argues that Ruben’s
conclusion produces inconsistencies. However, nothing in what I say in this section will hang on this issue. I
argue in §5.4.3 that reasons-apt tuples need to include some proposition P such that any fact that is a reason
for the agent to perform an action will be a reason for the agent to perform that action rather than P . So
long as there’s at least one such proposition, it is immaterial to my argument whether P is included within a
distinct contrast class, or as a negation conjoined to the fact that serves as the reason. I will assume with van
Fraassen that question-apt tuples must include a distinct contrast class.
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the favoring relation with a circumstance-agent-action triple.
What that means is that the facts that are reasons are always reasons for: reasons for an
agent to perform an action in a circumstance.
In the next two sections, I will argue that Scanlon’s commitment to Reasons Relation-
ality generates inconsistencies and that it should be rejected in favor of a more complicated
view about the structure of the tuples that are apt to exemplify the favoring relation. Then, in
§5.3.4, I’ll argue that this more complicated view gives us reason to think that the favoring
relation just is a specific instance of the relation that relates questions and answers.
Relevance relations
In this section I argue that the favoring relation includes more structure than Scanlon im-
putes to it. Specifically, I argue that the favoring relation needs to include a relevance
relation of the sort that van Fraassen argued we needed in the case of questions and an-
swers. In defense of this claim, I will show that Scanlon’s theory of the structure of the
favoring relation produces inconsistencies which can be avoided if we expand the structure
of the favoring relation to include a relevance relation.
Inconsistency worries about Reasons Relationality
At the beginning of “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, Davidson writes, “I flip the switch,
turn on the light, and illuminate the room. Unbeknownst to me I also alert a prowler to the
fact that I am home. Here I do not four things, but only one, of which four descriptions
have been given” (Davidson 1963, pp. 686-7). Davidson here is providing a component
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of a theory of action individuation. On his view, correct descriptions are not individuation
conditions of actions; or, more simply, Davidson’s view is that there can be lots of correct
ways to describe a single action.
Davidson gives this claim about action individuation in the service of motivating a par-
ticular view on the nature of explanatory reasons and of intentional and unintentional action.
However, it also raises questions about Scanlon’s theory of normative reasons. Take Sarah,
whose exam is quickly approaching and who believes (correctly) that making a short run
for coffee will help her prepare for it. Her upcoming exam thus intuitively provides her
with a reason to run to the nearest coffee shop and acquire a cup of coffee. However, the
nearest coffee shop also happens to be the nearest store, and it also happens to support abu-
sive labor practices. Intuitively, Sarah’s upcoming exam does not strike us as a reason for
her to run to the nearest store that supports abusive labor practices.
Sarah’s just doing one thing: going to the coffee shop, which in this case happens to
support abusive labor practices. “Running to the nearest coffee shop” and “running to the
nearest store that support abusive labor practices” are the same thing, the same action. Our
intuitions about the reasons that Sarah has, then, generate a conflict. Intuitively, Sarah’s
upcoming exam gives her a reason to run to the nearest store (under the description “running
to the coffee shop”). But intuitively, Sarah’s upcoming exam does not give her a reason to
run to the nearest store (under the description “running to the nearest store that supports
abusive labor practices”). Furthermore, in both cases, we’re dealing with the same agent—
Sarah—and the same circumstances: whatever circumstances Sarah happens to be in. Thus
Sarah’s upcoming exam gives Sarah a reason in her circumstances to run to the nearest
store, and Sarah’s upcoming exam does not give Sarah a reason in her circumstances to run
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to the nearest store. This is a contradiction.
Anscombe on action descriptions
What’s going on here? I want to get a clearer view of what’s going on here by considering
a few of Anscombe’s insights into this issue of action descriptions. Davidson, after all, got
his theory of action individuation from Anscombe. Anscombe writes:
Since a single action can have many different descriptions . . . it is important to
notice that a man may know that he is doing a thing under one description and
not under another. Not every case of this is a case of his knowing that he is doing
one part of what he is doing and not another (e.g., he knows that he is sawing
but not that he is making a squeaky noise with his saw). He may know that he
is sawing a plank, but not sawing an oak plank or Smith’s plank; but sawing an
oak plank or Smith’s plank is not something else that he is doing besides just
sawing the plank that he is sawing. For this reason, the statement that a man
knows he is doing X does not imply the statement that, concerning anything
which is also his doing X , he knows that he is doing that thing. (Anscombe
1957, 11-12, §6)
Julia Annas suggests that, in this passage, Anscombe is expressing the view that the same
action can be intentional under one description but not under another (Annas 1976, p. 252).
This interpretation does not come immediately from this passage itself, but it becomes
more plausible when considered in light of other things that Anscombe says. For instance,
Anscombe writes, “The class of things known without observation is of general interest to
our enquiry because the class of intentional actions is a sub-class of it” (Anscombe 1957,
14, §8) If, as Anscombe suggests, Jones’s sawing the oak plank is the same thing as his
sawing the plank, that sawing the oak plank is not something that Jones knows that he is
doing (because, say, he does not know that the wood that constitutes the plank is oak rather
than ash), and, third, that Jones (plausibly) is intentionally sawing the plank under the de-
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scription “sawing the plank”, there will be another description of the action, “sawing the
oak plank”, under which Jones’ action is not intentional.
One might think that Leibniz’s Law worries surface here. Per hypothesi, Jones’ saw-
ing of the plank and Jones’ sawing of the oak plank are the same action. So Leibniz’s
Law should indicate that they share the same properties. But one might think that, on
Anscombe’s view, they don’t: sawing the plank has the property of being intentionally
done by Jones, while sawing the oak plank lacks this property.
Anscombe, however, explicitly argues that her view is not subject to this specific criti-
cism:
It is supposed by some that “x under a description d” is the form of a subject-
phrase. This of course raises the question what sorts of object or entity (distinct
from an A?) and A-under-the-description-d may be. But “Under a description
‘putting the book down on a puddle of ink”’ has as its subject simply “my ac-
tion” and as predicates “intentional under a description” is “qua”, or Aristotle’s
“hē̂i”35 in modern dress. Aristotle too observes . . . that the phrase ”hē̂i” be-
longs to the predicate, not to the subject. There aren’t such objects as an “A qua
B”, though an A may, qua B, receive such and such a salary and, qua C, such
and such a salary. . . . This is no more a rejection of Leibniz’s Law than it is to
say that Socrates is taller than Thaetetus and not taller than Plato”. (Anscombe
1979, p. 220)
Anscombe here requests that we understand her claim that some particular intentional
action is intentional under a description as a claim that the action is intentional “qua” the
description. It is not entirely clear what Anscombe means by this, but her reference to
Aristotle’s use of the dative feminine singular form of the ancient Greek relative pronoun
suggests a hermeneutic key into the passage. Aristotle begins the first part of his Meta-
physics Γ by calling our attention to a type of inquiry into tò òn hē̂i òn, typically translated
35Anscombe uses the Greek spelling rather than the Latin transliteration that appears here.
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as “being qua being”36 or “being as being.”37 Call this “new” kind of inquirymetaphysics*.
Whereas mathematics and the other types of inquiry limit their investigations to the at-
tributes of some particular aspect of being, the study of being qua being, for Aristotle, is
one “which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of
its own nature”.
Although Aristotle in this passage claims that he is introducing a new type of inquiry,
(Cohen 2012, p. 205) argues that it is a mistake to think that he distinguishes it from the
others in virtue of its investigation of a unique domain that Aristotle labels “being as being”.
Indeed, the subject matter of metaphysics* is, for Aristotle, the same as that of the other
sciences—being simpliciter—so this shared subject matter can’t serve as the individuating
principle. The individuating principle that Aristotle offers for the various sciences is not
these sciences’ subject matter, but rather the respect in which the sciences study the subject
matter. Metaphysics* studies being qua being, that is, it studies the attributes that belong
to beings as such, insofar as they are beings. Physics, on the other hand, studies beings
with respect to their motion, insofar as they are movable; mathematics studies beings with
respect to their quantifiability.
All this ultimately gestures towards a plausible interpretation of the above passage from
Anscombe. By claiming that actions are intentional “under such-and-such description” is
to be understood as meaning that they are intentional “qua” that description, Anscombe
seems to be saying that actions are intentional with respect to that description.
36E.g., the Treddenick translation
37e.g., Ross’ translation
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Reasons and relevance relations
This construal of Anscombe gestures toward an explanation of why it is that considering
Sarah’s action under different descriptions generates differing intuitions about whether her
upcoming exam provides her with a reason to run out to the nearest shop. What is likely
going on is that our consideration of the action under these distinct descriptions “makes
salient” distinct features of the action and the larger circumstances against which we evalu-
ate whether Sarah’s upcoming exam provides a reason to run to the nearest shop. When we
think of Sarah’s action of running to the nearest shop under the description “running to the
nearest coffee shop”, this description makes salient the fact that there’s coffee in the shop,
and it’s with respect to the presence of this coffee at the shop that Sarah’s impending exam
is a reason to run to the shop. In contrast, Sarah’s impending exam does not strike us as a
reason for the action when we consider the action under the labor abuse description, since
this description makes salient different features of the action that have nothing to do with
Sarah’s exam.
This sounds strikingly similar to van Fraassen’s description of relevance relations. In
van Fraassen’s example of the father asking the son why the lights were turned on, the
presuppositional context of the father’s question to his son about why the light is on makes
salient certain features of the light’s being on—i.e., housecalling etiquette—against which
an answer that cites the imminent arrival of guests strikes us as appropriate. In contrast,
an answer that cites the immanent arrival of the guests would not strike us as appropriate
if, say, the context made clear that the father was offering his son a physics lesson right
before the arrival of the guests. In Sarah’s case, the presuppositional context invoked by of
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our thinking of the action as running to a coffee shop makes salient features of the action
against which Sarah’s upcoming exam strikes us as providing a reason to run to the nearest
shop.
Action individuation is not a worry
One might object that the conclusions I draw from the Sarah getting her coffee example
are illegitimate because I am illicitly claiming that, in cases like Sarah’s, the person does
only one action. Perhaps, after all, events are more fine-grained than I am assuming. On
a prominent view of event individuation defended by Jaegwon Kim (Kim 1969), (Kim
1976), events are uniquely referenced by event descriptions—in other words, no event can
have multiple, logically non-equivalent, descriptions.38 If it were true that Sarah is doing
two actions, then there is no inconsistency problem with Scanlon’s commitment to the four-
place nature of the reasons relation. After all, there’s no problem created by certain facts
being reasons for some actions and not reasons for others. More specifically, there’s no
inconsistency problem if it turns out that Sarah’s impending exam is a reason for the action
of going to the nearest coffee shop and not a reason for the distinct action of going to
the nearest shop that uses abusive labor practices. The inconsistency worry arises only if
Sarah’s going to the nearest coffee shop and Sarah’s going to the nearest shop that uses
abusive labor practices are the same thing.
I respond simply by asserting the Anscombe-Davidson thesis on action individuation
and rejecting the fine-grained approach of Kim and Goldman.
There are many reasons to reject Kim’s view of action individuation. Suppose first that
38This kind of view was also defended By Alvin Goldman in, for example, (Goldman 1971).
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Bertrand assaulted Candace quickly and sharply on the kneecap (Bennett 1988, p. 78). If
Kim is right, we have then a number of distinct events: Bertrand’s quick and sharp assault
of Candace on the kneecap, Bertrand’s quick assault of Candace on the kneecap, his sharp
assault of Candace on the kneecap, his sharp assault of Candace, his assault of Candace,
and so forth. If events are individuated by their descriptions such that any logically non-
equivalent description denoting an event does so uniquely, then Bertrand is a really, really
bad guy. He assaulted Candace at least five times. It seems that a great injustice is done
when the judge finds Bertrand guilty of only one count of assault.
Further, consider the tender kiss that David gave Eve on the cheek at 10:27p.m. yester-
day. If events are individuated by their descriptions, this kiss is distinct from the tender kiss
that David gave Eve at 10:27 yesterday. But this seems problematic. Eve, for one, would
be quite upset at the suggestion. We can imagine Eve today asking David, “Why don’t
you ever kiss me?”, and David’s reply: “My dear, I’ve kissed you thousands of times!”39
Secondly, though, it seems to be a metaphysical necessity that, in order to kiss someone,
you have to kiss a part of them. (We say that Marilyn Monroe blows kisses at her fans, but
not that she actually kisses them, except perhaps in certain special cases.) Where did David
tenderly kiss Eve on the cheek at 10:27 yesterday? On the cheek. But when we ask where
he tenderly kissed Eve at 10:27 yesterday, the answer is not clear. If it is indeed on Eve’s
cheek, it is hard to see how then we can distinguish the two kisses. Any other property—the
kiss’s slowness, say—would be unavailable for this purpose, as we would need to press it
into service in order to individuate the tender kiss and the tender kiss on the cheek from the
slow, tender kiss and the slow, tender kiss on the cheek.
39Eve perhaps should not be dating such an ontologically promiscuous philosopher.
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Kim of course has his own set of responses to these worries, and answers the previous
worry by drawing sophisticated distinction between constituting and characterizing proper-
ties. The point of including the discussion here is simply to flag some of the many serious
worries about the Kimian semantics of event (action) names and the theory of event individ-
uation in order to provide some motivation for allowing different event names to pick out
the same event. Secondly, even if one accepts the fine-grained approach to action individ-
uation, this would be consistent with my inclusion of relevance relations into the structure
of the tuples that exemplify the reasons relation.
Contrast classes
In the previous section, I argued that action descriptions can sometimes make salient a
subset of features of the action it describes with respect to which we evaluate whether con-
siderations qualify as reasons for that action (for an agent, in the circumstance). There is,
however, a range of cases, ones that David Enoch calls cases of arbitrary choice (Enoch
2011, pp. 73-74), that the introduction of a relevance relation does not seem to accommo-
date.
Here is an example of such a case. Lorenzo is at a supermarket trying to buy food for a
Superbowl party. He picks up a bag of chips and now needs a can of salsa to go with them.
Suppose that Lorenzo picks this particular jar of salsa because it will go well with the tortilla
chips Lorenzo already picked up. Intuitively, Lorenzo does have a reason for performing
the action of picking this particular jar of salsa—after all, it will go well with the chips.
But if we wonder whether he has a reason to pick this particular jar of salsa rather than
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one of the other twelve dozen indiscernible jars of salsa jars, the intuitive answer is: No,
he doesn’t have a reason to pick this particular jar rather than one of the others. They are
indistinguishable in all relevant respects. So the actions are indistinguishable in all relevant
respects, and so we don’t have a reason to do one rather than another. Enoch goes so far as
to suggest that we know this to be true (ibid., p. 74).
This intuitive tension is puzzling. These two descriptions seem to be different ways of
thinking about, or describing, the very same option available to Lorenzo—grabbing this
particular jar of salsa—and so it is puzzling why a consideration like the salsa’s going well
with the chips would appear to be a reason for electing the option when the option is consid-
ered under the first description, but not a reason for electing the option when it is considered
under the second description.
Further, the introduction of a relevance relation doesn’t seem to help resolve the tension
present in this case. The background description of the situation makes salient the features
of the option that have to do with its contributing to bringing about an enjoyable Super-
bowl party. It’s with respect to some of these features—that picking the salsa will procure
Lorenzo something that will go well with the chips, please his guests, and so forth—that the
consideration is a reason for that action under the description. (The description of the sit-
uation does not move us, for instance, to consider the normative significance of Lorenzo’s
choosing the jar of salsa with respect to its usefulness as a doorstop or as the subject of
a still-life painting.) It’s true that describing the option as Lorenzo’s “picking this par-
ticular jar of salsa rather than the others” highlights the salsa’s proximity to a bunch of
indiscernible replicas, but, unlike what we saw in the Davidson-style cases, thinking about
this doesn’t change our inclination to evaluate considerations as normatively salient with
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respect to something other than the option’s contribution to bringing about an enjoyable
Superbowl party. Something else, then, must be responsible for the intuitive tension.
One possibility is that the second, more expansive description makes salient some fea-
tures that constitute what Dancy calls disablers for the reason. A disabler, for Dancy, is
a fact whose existence makes it the case that a consideration is not a reason. The consid-
eration’s status as a reason, in other words, depends on the nonexistence of this fact. For
example, suppose that Gesenia makes a promise to Ralf to meet him for coffee at 12pm.
That she made the promise gives her a reason to show up to the coffee shop at 12pm. But
Ralf suddenly has to be rushed to a hospital and must miss the meeting. Gesenia no longer
has the reason to show up. This is because Ralf’s being rushed to the hospital disables the
reason that Gesenia has in virtue of her having made the promise. A description of the ac-
tion like “showing up for coffee at 12pmwhen Ralf had already been rushed to the hospital”
would make salient a disabling feature of the situation, and so we should not expect that
the promise would present itself as a reason to show up when considering the action under
this description.
However, turning to our more banal salsa case, it’s surely the case that the salsa’s going
well with the chips is still a reason to pick it, even though that jar is located next to a bunch of
indiscernible replicas. The presence of these other jars doesn’t disable the reason Lorenzo
has to pick this particular jar. Intuitively, if we describe the action as Lorenzo’s picking this
particular salsa from among many indiscernible replicas, Lorenzo does have a reason to do
so. He also has a reason to pick some other particular jar of salsa from among the many
replicas. He just, intuitively, doesn’t have a reason to pick this or that particular salsa rather
than any of the others.
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This may seem like it is useless hair-splitting. After all, I am drawing a distinction
between “picking A rather than B, ...,N” and “picking A from among B, ...,N .” Isn’t this
just an instance of the worst excesses of analytic intuition-pumping and concept-chopping?
I think the answer is no. For one, it is unclear how any kind of philosophical work on the
nature of reasons can even get off the ground without any reliance on intuitions in some
form. We can debate about whose intuitions are better—those of the philosophers or those
of the folk?—but we do need to appeal to intuitions at some point. As Frank Jackson is
fond of saying, if we don’t start from someplace intuitive, then “otherwise we start from
somewhere unintuitive, and that can hardly be a good place to start from” (Jackson 1998,
p. 135). Second, appealing to intuitions is a way to decide between competing theories. It
is likely, particularly in ethics, that any theory that aspires to something more than being a
mere laundry list of intuitively true claims about particular cases will fail to satisfy every
intuition that we have. Our ethical intuitions are too muddled to be fully specified by an
interesting theory. But we can accept as a general principle that a more intuitive theory is
ceterus paribus better than a less intuitive one. I, naturally, think that my theory will turn
out to be quite intuitive, in addition to possessing various other theoretical advantages. But
we need to wait to decide whether my theory is more intuitive than others until it’s fully
developed.
A second possibility is that the second description highlights additional features with
respect to which other considerations disfavor the action. If this were true, we should expect
that the initial considerations—the salsa’s going well with the chips, and so forth—would
still favor the action, even though these reasons turn out to be outweighed by other, weight-
ier reasons. Consider the description “Rachel’s going into a burning building.” That she
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might die presents itself as a reason for her not to go in, when considered under this descrip-
tion. If we expand the description to highlight the fact that someone is trapped inside—say
by describing it as “Rachel’s going into a burning building in which two victims are trapped
inside”, her possible death still presents itself as a reason for her not to enter, even though
the presence of the victims outweighs this other reason and ultimately gives her sufficient
reason, all things considered, to enter the burning building. In contrast, when we consider
Lorenzo’s option under the description “picking this particular jar of salsa rather than one
of the indiscernible replicas”, the salsa’s going well with the chips does not present itself
as a reason for the option at all. So this second explanation fails to capture what is really
going on in the Lorenzo case.
Does Lorenzo have a reason to pick this jar of salsa? Yes. Does he have a reason to
pick this jar of salsa rather than one of the others? No. Since the introduction of relevance
relations does not, by itself, resolve the intuitive tension present in these two descriptions
of the Lorenzo case, we need to look elsewhere. A natural place to look would be at the
differences between the two descriptions. In this case, the difference is only the inclusion
of the “rather than” clause. So let’s consider that.
Rather-than clauses also featured prominently in van Fraassen’s theory of why-
questions. We saw that, for van Fraassen, questions why some proposition is true are al-
ways, implicitly or explicitly, questions why some proposition is true rather than (in contrast
to) some class of alternative, false propositions. For example, “Adamwas hungry” answers
the question why Adam ate the apple rather than threw the apple at the snake. But it doesn’t
answer the question why Adam ate the apple rather than the mango.
Analogously, we might entertain the thought that considerations that favor an action
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are always, implicitly or explicitly, considerations that favor an option rather than (in con-
trast to) some class of alternative actions. The intuitive tension can then be explained by
hypothesizing different contrast classes of options implicated when we consider the topic
option under these different descriptions. For instance, “Lorenzo’s choosing this jar of
salsa rather than one of the others” explicitly implicates a contrast class consisting of the
options of choosing this other jar of salsa, that jar of salsa over there and so on. “Lorenzo’s
choosing this jar of salsa” could implicitly implicate a contrast class consisting of options
like Lorenzo’s choosing the jar of mayonnaise (which will definitely not go well with the
chips)—or, more plausibly, a contrast class consisting of an option like his not choosing
anything at all.
We don’t need to actually include the rather-than locution in the action description to
generate the intuitive conflict. We can get the same result in just the same way that van
Fraassen gets his: with emphasis. Lorenzo has a reason to choose this jar of salsa. But he
doesn’t have a reason to choose this jar of salsa.
All I’ve done so far is to indicate that there is an intuitive tension and that the intro-
duction of contrast classes into our theory of the structure of the favoring relation would
resolve this tension. However, this would not work if there were some cases of facts that
were reasons not in contrast to anything at all, but were just reasons simpliciter. For exam-
ple, this would be true if the fact remained a reason no matter what set of contrast classes
you tested it against. One plausible candidate is something like Kantian dignity. A person’s
rationality gives me a reason to respect her. It also gives me a reason to respect her rather
than someone else (since Kantian value is not comparable). And it gives me a reason to re-
spect her rather than adopt any other attitude toward her (since our duty to respect rational
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beings is categorical.
However, even our reason to respect a person’s Kantian dignity admits of at least one
minimal contrast class: every reason to respect a person’s Kantian dignity will always be
a reason to respect a person’s Kantian dignity rather than not respect that person’s Kan-
tian dignity. It’s a conceptual and metaphysical truth that, if you perform some action,
you make it the case that you do not fail to perform that action. It’s also a central feature
of practical reasoning that, when we consider whether we have reasons to do something,
there’s a background presupposition that if we don’t have reasons to do something then we
won’t do it. That’s the whole point of considering reasons for action. If we were going to
do the action anyway, irrespective of whether we have any reasons to do so, looking for
reasons is a waste of time.40 Looking for reasons to do any particular action presupposes
that the reasons serve to adjudicate between doing that action and not doing that action.
We can therefore sleep well at night knowing that every reason for an action is a reason for
performing that action rather than not performing that action.
An aside on action omissions
I just argued that every action has a minimal contrast class consisting of the failure to per-
form that action. Here is an objection to this. There are no such things as failures to perform
an action. Failures to perform an action are not actions; in fact, they’re not anything at all.
I failed to go to the moon today. That’s not an action that I did. It’s not anything at all. If
there were such a thing, it would be a purely negative thing, a negative fact or event, and
40It may not be a waste of time to look for things that other people would take to be reasons with the aim
of rationalizing your behavior to them. It would just be a waste of time to look for normative reasons for your
behavior if you were unwilling for these reasons to impact your decision.
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there are no such things as negative facts and events.
I agree that failing to go to the moon is usually nothing at all. We are failing to go to the
moon all the time, and I don’t want to say that there are an indefinite number of “failings
to go to the moon”. However, there seem to be at least a few such things—for instance,
Commander John Young’s failure to go to the moon as scheduled on March 17th, 1972 due
to technical problems (Deffree 2015). The important difference is that, unlike our everyday
failings to go to the moon, Commander Young’s failure to go to the moon on that day was
an intentional decision to call off the planned launch, one that Commander Young made on
the basis of reasons. Intuitively, we want to say that Commander Young did do something
in his failure to go to the moon.
Similarly, my ceasing to work on my dissertation at 3am seems to qualify as an action
if I chose to stop working on it as opposed to simply falling asleep in my half-cubicle. And
there are many similar examples. The robber walks in to the bank and shouts “don’t move
or I’ll shoot!” He has just given you, the bank teller, a reason not to move, and when you
comply by ceasing all movement, you have indeed done something. All these examples are
examples of bona fide actions that, unlike most actions that we perform on a daily basis,
are negatively defined: defined in terms of an absence of activity.
This, however, seems metaphysically problematic. How can you have something that
exists but is such that all its essential features are absences? So, in this section, I’ll sketch
the outlines of a metaphysics of action omissions. I’ll do so by applying Varzi and Casati’s
theory of holes to Hornsby’s metaphysics of action.
Here is another example. At 9pm, I am working on my dissertation. Six hours later, at
3am, I am still working on my dissertation but I am also fighting sleep. I suggest that, given
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my efforts to resist it at 3am, the omission of sleep at 3am is a positive action in a way that
the omission of sleep was not a positive action (in fact, nothing at all) at 9pm when I was
wide awake. Actions are a species of events. So my omission of sleep at 3am is some sort
of event, and so we should look around for some sort of sleep omission event with which
to identify the sleep omission action. But it seems wrong to identify this with any of the
positively defined actions that I might be engaging in—the dissertation section writing, the
coffee drinking and so forth. After all, these events were all present at nine pm, but the
action of omitting sleep was not.
My suggested solution to the puzzle draws on an insight that I take from Jennifer
Hornsby. Hornsby argues that actions are constituted by activity stuff. Sebastian’s stroll
through the streets of Bologna between 2 and 3pm is an action: Sebastian did stroll. This
action, furthermore, is constituted by what Hornsby calls activity: unstructured event stuff
that constitutes actions in a way similar to the way that an infinitely divisible clay would
constitute a clay statue. Because strolling activity constitutes Sebastian’s stroll, Sebastian’s
stroll from 2 to 3pm ontologically depends on the presence of strolling activity between 2
and 3pm in the same way that the statue ontologically depends upon its constituent clay.
Applying this to the case of my sleep omission, we could say that my positive sleep
omissions are constituted by sleep omitting activity. But this alone hardly seems to help,
since the notion of sleep omitting activity is no less confusing a notion than that of an action
omission itself.
I suggest that a plausible account of the metaphysics of action omission can be gained
if we combine Hornsby’s insights with some of the insights present in a discussion of the
metaphysics of holes offered by Achille Varzi and Roberto Casati (Varzi and Casati 1994).
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Like action omissions, holes seem to be characterized by absence. Varzi and Casati describe
a theory of holes as immaterial bodies constituted by, but not identical to, unqualified space
and which ontologically depend on their material host. Call this the immaterial constitution
theory. A related but distinct view of the metaphysics of holes might claim that holes are
constituted not by unqualified space of the holed region but by the matter located in that
region. In the case of a stereotypical donut, this second view would suggest that the donut
hole is constituted not by the unqualified space of the holed region but of the material air
that exists within the holed space. Call this the material constitution theory. The material
constitution theory has the advantage of not needing to postulate the existence of immaterial
bodies, but it runs into problems when we consider the possibility of vacuums. It seems
wrong to say that the hole ceases to exist if the donut is placed in a vacuum chamber and
the air previously located in the holed region is removed.
A reasonable application of the immaterial constitution theory to the case of my action
of sleep omission might yield the following view. Let a ϕ-omission be an omission of an
action constituted by activity of the ϕ type. For example, a sleeping omission would be an
omission of an action constituted by activity of the sleeping type. Φ-omissions are actions
that are constituted by unqualified spacetime and ontologically depend on the existence of
an acting host and the absence of host activity of the ϕ-type in the spatiotemporal region
containing the omission. In other words, in order for me to be engaging in sleep omitting
activity from 3am to 3:15am, I have to exist from 3am to 3:15am and not sleeping during
this time. We can be neutral for our purposes here on the precise spatial extension of the
omission, but since actions are events and events have spatial extensions, it’s important to
include spatial extension in our characterization of action omissions.
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This characterization is too liberal since, on this revised characterization, I would be en-
gaging in sleep omission activity at 9pm as well as at 3am. After all, from 9pm to 9:15pm I
also existed and was not sleeping. To solve this problem, we need to find some way of in-
corporating the exertion that exists at 3am and that did not exist at 9pm. After all, it was the
presence of the exertion that made the difference as to the presence of the sleeping omission
at 3am but not at 9pm. So let’s consider this further revision. Let a phi-omission-exertion
be an exertion to refrain from activity of the phi-type. Then: phi-omissions are actions
that are constituted by unqualified spacetime and ontologically depend on the existence of
a phi-omission-exerting host that enjoys an absence of host activity of the phi-type in the
spatiotemporal region containing the omission.
This seems to do the trick. It also allows for the intuitive result in the following case. If
I were to try to jump over a twenty-story building, we don’t want to say that I am jumping
over the twenty-story building. I may be trying to jump over the building but I’m not
actually jumping over the building. Similarly, suppose I am struggling to stay awake and not
succeeding: my eyelids are closing despite by greatest efforts to mentally will them open.
In this case, although I am a sleep-omission-exerting host, nevertheless I am not omitting
sleep, I am not performing the action of sleep omission, since I am falling asleep anyway
and therefore failing to omit sleep. My characterization of action omissions captures this
since it requires that, in addition to the host’s exerting sleep-omission effort, the host must
also not actually be sleeping.
There still remains the question of what phi-omissions are supposed to be. In the case
of holes, we saw that the immaterial constitution theory of holes was to be preferred over
the material constitution theory because it was better able to allow for the metaphysical pos-
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sibility of spatial vacuums. But we need not allow for any analogous “temporal vacuum”
in the case of action omissions. “Temporal vacuum” here just means time which does
not contain activity, just as spatial vacuums are spaces which do not contain matter. Al-
though there may be a need to account for temporal vacuums—if, say, we want to allow for
the metaphysical possibility of an inactive but temporally extended Parmenidean monistic
substance—there is no need to posit the existence of temporal vacuums in order to provide
a satisfactory account of the metaphysics of action omissions. After all, action-omissions
were seen to persist only across intervals during which the acting host was engaging in
phi-omission-exertion activity. This activity itself minimally provides the requisite tempo-
ral stuff that we can press into service as constituting the phi-omission. Here is the result:
A host’s phi-omission is an action that is constituted by the host’s phi-omission-exerting
activity and ontologically depends on the absence of host activity of the phi-type.
Why reasons are answers
Structural similarity
Scanlon defends
Reasons Relationality: Any reason fact is normative in virtue of its standing in
the favoring relation with a circumstance-agent-action triple.
In the last two sections, I argued that Scanlon’s theory of the four-place structure of the
tuples that are apt for exemplifying the reasons relation generates inconsistencies, and that
these inconsistencies can be resolved if we expand the structure through the introduction of
a relevance relation and a contrast class, as follows:
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Extended Reasons Relationality: Any reason fact is normative in virtue of its
standing in the favoring relation with a quintuple consisting of a fact, an agent,
an action, a circumstance, a contrast class of actions, and a feature of the action
with respect to which the fact is a reason.
Sarah’s impending exam would not be simply a reason for Sarah in her circumstances to go
to the nearest shop. Sarah’s impending examwould be a reason for Sarah to go to the nearest
shop rather than not go to the shop, in her circumstances, with respect to some feature of
the action—say, its relevance to the value of academic achievement.
In this section, I want to argue that Extended Reasons Relationality is structurally iden-
tical to van Fraassen’s view of the structure of answers-apt tuples.
On van Fraassen’s view, (1) “Adam doesn’t like mangoes” is an answer to why (2)
Adam ate the apple, (3) rather than eating the mango, (4) given the background factual
information and empirical theory, (5) with respect to our theoretical apparatus that has to
do with folk psychology. Comparing this to Extended Reasons Relationality, we notice a
few differences. Extended Reasons Relationality imputes six components to the reasons-
apt tuples; van Fraassen imputes five components to the answers-apt tuples. Extended
Reasons Relationality features a “circumstances” component, while the closest analogue in
van Fraassen’s answers-apt tuples is the background set of theory and factual information.
The “relevance relation” in Extended Reasons Relationality is given by some sort of value
such as academic achievement, while, for van Fraassen, it is given by one or another theory
(folk psychology, etiquette, Christian theology, and so on). I argue that these differences
are merely superficial.
Despite these superficial differences, there are important similarities between the two
structures. To see this, it’s helpful to observe what happens when we apply van Fraassen’s
theory to the question “Why did Sarah go to the nearest shop”? Suppose she did. Frequently,
we explain our and other people’s actions by citing the normative reasons that they have.
We could also of course cite features of Sarah’s psychology—we could say, for instance,
that Sarah went to the nearest shop because she desired to do well on her impending exam
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and believed that going to the nearest shop would help her attain that goal (because the
shop has coffee, coffee has such-and-such effects on studying and so on). We could also
cite features of her neurophysiology. But there is another kind of normative explanation of
her action that purports to explain our actions by citing features of normative reality. Why
did Sarah go to the nearest shop? Because she has reasons to do well on her upcoming exam
(and the shop has coffee, and coffee has such-and-such effects on studying and so on). She
went to the shop for those reasons.
Let’s take this particularly normative kind of explanation as the theoretical apparatus
with respect in which “Sarah has an upcoming exam” answers the question why Sarah
went to the nearest shop rather than didn’t go to the nearest shop, given the background set
of empirical theory and factual information. Here, we have the five components that are
present in van Fraassen’s theory. We have a topic proposition “Sarah went to the nearest
store”; a contrast class of not going to the store; a relevance relation that cites features of
the particularly normative kind of explanation that I hinted at above; a set of background
theory and factual information; and the answer, which in this case is “Sarah has an upcoming
exam”. Call the topic proposition an “event proposition”, since it is a proposition about the
occurrence of an event: Sarah’s going to the nearest shop.
Now, let’s apply Extended Reasons Relationality to Sarah’s reason to go to the nearest
store. Academic achievement then would be the respect in which Sarah’s upcoming exam
is a reason for Sarah to go to the nearest shop rather than not go to the nearest shop, given
Sarah’s circumstances.
The first thing to note is the similarity between the agent and action here with the topic
proposition in the above statement. In the topic proposition above, we also have Sarah and
we also have the action of going to the nearest shop. The agent and action tuples in Extended
Reasons Relationality can be combined to form an event proposition. Thus Extended Rea-
sons Relationality will always give us a topic proposition that meets two constraints: that
the subject of the event proposition is an agent, and that the object of the event proposition
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is an action. Topic propositions in a van Fraassen reasons structure don’t have to consist in
an agent and action, but any agent and action can be combined to form a topic proposition.
The second thing to note is that, for Scanlon, the circumstances that constitute the
reasons-apt tuples were stipulated to be non-normative circumstances. I have no dispute
with this feature of Scanlon’s theory and agree with him that the circumstances relevant
to evaluating whether a fact is a reason for an action are non-normative circumstances.
Van Fraassen’s background set of factual information and empirical theory is also non-
normative—after all, it’s factual information and empirical theory that we’re talking about.
Thus the circumstances component that appears in Reasons Relationality and, by extension,
Extended Reasons Relationality, can itself easily constitute a background set of factual in-
formation and empirical theory.
The most significant difference between my account of reasons-apt tuples and van
Fraassen’s account of answers-apt tuples is our distinct accounts of the origin of the rele-
vance relation. In van Fraassen’s theory, the relevance relation is given by a specific theory:
folk psychology, neuroscience, etiquette, Christian theology and so on. In my construal of
the reasons-apt tuples, the relevance relation is given by a particular value with respect to
which the fact is a reason for the action.
However, formally, the question of what “gives” the relevance relation is immaterial.
Formally speaking, the relevance relation in van Fraassen’s theory is simply a function
from topic propositions and contrast classes to admissible answers. The source of that
function is not itself built into the answers-apt tuple. Since Extended Reasons Relationality
also includes such a function, the differences in what provides the relevance relation are
not material to the question of evaluating similarities and differences between answers-apt
tuples and reasons-apt tuples.
Extended Reasons Relationality’s construal of reasons-apt tuples is therefore struc-
turally identical to van Fraassen’s construal of answers-apt tuples. Both give us a topic
proposition, a contrast class, a relevance relation, and a circumstance.
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Reasons as answers
I have just given an argument that reasons-apt tuples and answers-apt tuples have identical
structures. I think, though that we should take the further step of saying not only that they
are structurally identical, but that they are identical simpliciter. In particular, I suggest that
reasons just are answers of a certain kind; and that the favoring relation just is a particular
kind of the relation that holds between questions and answers.
In The Scientific Image, van Fraassen is doing philosophy of science; he is looking, in
the book, for an account of scientific explanation. Thus, in developing his account of the
structure of answers-apt tuples, van Fraassen considers only questions about why events
occurred. Van Fraassen, however, intends his theory of questions and answers to be a theory
of questions and answers simpliciter, not simply a theory of questions and answers about
why certain events occur. There are other kinds of questions and answers than questions
and answers about why certain events occur. Here is an example. Why should Sarah go to
the nearest shop? Because she has an impending exam. This is not a question and answer
about why a particular event occurred. It’s a question and answer about why a particular
event (Sarah’s going to the nearest shop) should occur. Since van Fraassen intends his
theory of questions and answers to be a theory of questions and answers simpliciter, this
theory should also account for these normative-seeking sorts of questions and answers as
well.
Here are two different approaches that we could take towards these normative-seeking
questions and answers. On one approach, answers why an action should occur and reasons
for an action to occur are distinct kinds of things. On another approach, answers why an
action should occur and reasons for an action to occur are identical kinds of things. I suggest
that these kinds of things are identical. Here are two arguments for this.
First: inference to the best explanation. I argued above that reasons-apt tuples and
answers-apt tuples are structurally identical. Furthermore, it’s always the case that, when-
ever a fact is a reason for an agent to perform an action, that fact will also partly answer the
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question why that agent should perform that action. Why should Sarah go to the nearest
shop? Because she has an impending exam. What explains this remarkable coincidence?
One explanation is that, well, to be a reason for an agent to perform an action just is to be
an answer the question why that agent should perform that action.
Second: parsimony. I said in §2.4 that the reasons fundamentalist held that the rea-
sons relation was a sui generis relation that was both numerically and qualitatively distinct
from other relations that we can describe in non-normative vocabulary. Lack of parsimony
is typically seen as a defect of a theory, and in the case of the reasons fundamentalist, it
generated serious other problems as well. We can avoid these worries about parsimony by
affirming that the reasons relation is just a specific kind of the relation that obtains between
questions and answers.
We need a further modification here. Sarah’s impending exam does answer the question
why Sarah should go to the nearest shop, but only partially. There are lots of other facts that
we’d need to state in order to fully answer this question: the fact that the shop has coffee,
the facts about coffee’s effects on studying habits, and so on. These facts would likely be
included in the circumstances against which Sarah’s impending exam is a reason for her
to go to the nearest shop. However, I will simply register the incompleteness of Sarah’s
impending exam as an answer to the question why Sarah should go to the nearest shop by
stating that reasons are partial answers to questions why agents should perform actions:
Proto-Answers Account of Reasons: Reasons are partial correct answers to
questions why an agent should perform an action rather than not, in a particular
circumstance, with respect to a relevance relation.
In §5.2, I made a great deal out of thick properties and argued that the incorporation of
thick properties into the theory of reasons by means of Thick Essence of Reasons would
help the irreduciblist avoid worries about Brute Entailment. The Proto-Answers Account
of Reasons tells us something about what reasons are—partial correct answers to “should”
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kinds of why-questions—but it does not yet say anything about thick properties. I’ll discuss
the role of thick properties in the next section.
5.5 Answers and thick properties
Proto-Answers Account of Reasons is a purely formal theory of reasons. It tells us some-
thing about what reasons are, and it gives us some constraints that need to bemet in order for
something to qualify as a reason. It is not, however, a substantive theory: it does not give
us any tools to determine which facts answer which questions about what agents should do.
In §5.2, I suggested that the most promising approach to this substantive issue, for the irre-
duciblist, is to incorporate thick properties into her theory of reasons and state that reasons
are facts that bear some relation to a thick property.
Let’s return again to the Sarah example. We saw that Sarah’s impending exam seems
to be a reason for Sarah to run to the nearest coffee shop, but seem not to be a reason to
run to the nearest store that promotes abusive labor practices. These actions, per hypothesi,
were the same. I also argued, through an analysis of Anscombe, that the difference between
the two intuitions had to do with these distinct action descriptions’ making salient distinct
features of the action with respect to which the fact was a reason for the one action and not a
reason for the other. To better understand the difference, then, we should better understand
these distinct features of the action that the distinct descriptions make salient.
One likely possibility is that the distinct features of the action are distinct aspects of
the causal profile of the action. Sarah’s going to the store produces a lot of effects: it
secures her some coffee, it boosts her studying performance and knowledge of the course
material that she’s studying, and it diminishes her bank account. It burns some calories,
changes the arrangement of air molecules, and increases revenues for people that abuse
their workers. Sarah’s impending exam is a reason to run to the shop with respect to the
action’s causal properties of securing coffee and boosting her studying performance. Her
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exam is not a reason to run to the store with respect to the other causal effects of the action:
diminishing her bank account, crushing some blades of grass, changing the arrangement of
air molecules, and increasing revenues for immoral employers.
This suggests that, at least frequently,41 the features of an action with respect to which
a fact is a reason for that action are features of that action’s causal profile.
What does securing coffee have in common with boosting studying performance that it
does not have in common with diminishing a bank account, crushing blades of grass, rear-
ranging air molecules, and benefiting abusive shopowners? Securing coffee and boosting
studying performance are both features of the causal profile of Sarah’s running to the near-
est shop. In this case, they do share a similar property: the property of directly contributing
to the promotion of Sarah’s performance on her impending exam. The other features of
the action’s causal profile also contribute in some sense to the promotion of Sarah’s per-
formance: after all, they are part of the action’s causal profile. But they don’t contribute in
a direct way. In other words, if we imagine our wizard suspending the laws of nature and
contemporary finance such that the air molecules are not rearranged, the blades of grass are
not crushed, and Sarah’s bank account is not diminished, the action of running to the near-
est shop would still contribute to the promotion of Sarah’s performance on the impending
exam. Although these events do contribute to the promotion of Sarah’s performance on the
impending exam, they do so “accidentally” and not directly.
This suggests that the features of an action with respect to which a fact is a reason for
that action are the states of affairs that that action will promote.
Similarly, the diminishing of Sarah’s bank account and the benefiting of abusive
shopowners have something in common: they both directly contribute to the promotion
of economic injustice in a way that the other aspects of the causal profile of the action do
41It may not always be the case. For instance, if one is a Kantian, one might think that the feature of my
action of telling the truth to Johnnie with respect to which “Johnnie is a rational agent” is a reason to tell the
truth to Johnnie is the action’s universalizability, which is a formal rather than a causal feature of the action.
I acknowledge this position and that it may cause difficulties for the view I give here, but will not discuss it
further because the dissertation is already too long.
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not. If our wizard suspended the laws of nature such that the blades of grass did not bend,
the air molecules did not rearrange, that Sarah’s studying performance was not improved,
and so on, Sarah’s running to the shop would still contribute to the promotion of economic
injustice. Although these other events do contribute to the promotion of economic injustice,
they do so “accidentally” and not directly.
Sarah’s impending exam partly answers the question why Sarah should run to the near-
est shop. It partly answers this question because it tells us something about how running
to the nearest shop would promote Sarah’s academic performance. Interestingly, the shop-
keepers’ commitment to abusive labor practices tells us something about how running to
the nearest shop would promote economic injustice. However, the shopkeepers’ commit-
ment to abusive labor practices does not answer the question why Sarah should run to the
nearest shop. It doesn’t even answer the question why Sarah should run to the nearest shop
with respect to the action’s consequences for economic injustice. What is the difference
here? Plausibly, the difference has to do with the fact that Sarah’s academic performance
is good, and economic injustice is not good. The shopowners’ abuse of workers answers
the question why Sarah’s running to the nearest shop would promote injustice. However,
the shopowners’ abuse of workers is not a reason for Sarah to run to the nearest shop be-
cause the shopowners’ abuse of workers does not answer any question as to why Sarah’s
running to the nearest shop promotes a good state of affairs. It therefore does not answer
any question as to why Sarah should run to the nearest shop.
This suggests that the features of an action with respect to which a fact is a reason for
that action are good states of affairs that that action will promote. In other words, a fact can
be a reason for an action only with respect to some good state of affairs that that action will
promote.
With this, we have secured a role for thick properties and an argument for why they need
to be incorporated into our theory of the nature of reasons. Take a property like academic
achievement. Sarah’s upcoming exam is a reason to run to the nearest store with respect
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to the action’s promotion of academic achievement. In other words, Sarah’s running to
the nearest store will bring about the state of affairs of Sarah’s academic achievement, and
Sarah’s upcoming exam is a reason for running to the store with respect to this value be-
cause it partly answers the question why running to the store will bring about the state of
affairs of Sarah’s academic achievement and therefore promote the property of academic
achievement. However, we saw that facts can be reasons for action only with respect to
states of affairs that are good. Thus, Sarah’s upcoming exam is not only a reason for run-
ning to the store with respect to the property of academic achievement which running to the
store will promote. It’s a reason for running to the store with respect to the property of “aca-
demic achievement ∧ good”, which running to the store would promote. But the property
“academic achievement ∧ good” is a thick property, since it contains both a non-normative
element (the academic achievement) and a normative element (the goodness).
The result is this:
Answers Account of Reasons*: Reasons are partial correct answers to ques-
tions why an agent should perform an action rather than not, in a particular
circumstance, with respect to a (good) thick property that the action would
promote.
The qualifier that the thick property be “good” is there in order to capture the earlier obser-
vation that facts are never reasons with respect to the promotion of “bad” thick properties.
5.6 Thick properties and Thin Centrality
Answers Account of Reasons* is in tension with one of the components of my theory that
I stated at the very beginning of this chapter:
Reasons Thin Centrality: For all facts F , F is a thin normative fact only if F
is a reasons fact or F embeds a reasons fact.
The tension is due to the inclusion of the thin property goodness in Answers Account of
Reasons*. Answers Account of Reasons* analyzes reasons in terms of goodness. However,
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Reasons Thin Centrality states that all thin normative facts, such as the fact that such-and-
such thick property is good, to be facts about the instantiation of the reasons relation. So the
fact that such-and-such thick property is good would have to be a fact about something’s
being a reason—that is to say, a fact about something’s promoting something that is good.
This is circular.
One option here is to hold that this circle is virtuous. It’s not inconsistent to say that
academic achievement is good because academic achievement has features that provide
reasons to promote academic achievement, and that these features provide reasons to pro-
mote academic achievement in virtue of academic achievement’s goodness. This would
be a kind of distinctly metaethical coherentism: a coherentism with respect to the meaning
of our normative concepts. It would be odd and perhaps unusual, but it’s not inconsistent.
Our concepts of goodness, of being a reason, and of being a thick property would form
what Peacocke calls a “micro-holism”, and it’s not completely beyond the pale that such a
micro-holism might be a feature of our normative concepts.
I do not myself favor this metaethical coherentist approach to reconciling Answers Ac-
count of Reasons* and Reasons Thin Centrality. The solution that I favor bears similarities
to Augustine’s theory of normativity. Augustine, as a theist, is very concerned that God
not be responsible for the creation of evil and the failure to stop evil from occurring. His
(Augustine’s not God’s) solution to this problem is to deny evil’s existence. Evil, for Au-
gustine, is not a property. It is a property absence—specifically, an absence (or privation)42
of goodness. Because of this, Augustine argues that God cannot be responsible for creat-
ing evil or failing to stop it from occurring. After all, evil does not exist. It’s just a lack
of goodness. When we say that something is evil or an evil, Augustine thinks that we are
saying, rather, that that thing is less good than it could be, or less of a good than it could
be. But there’s nothing wrong with God’s having created a world that’s not the best world
42For Augustine and Descartes, privations are absences of something that ought to be the case. I lack a
third hand. This is an absence. But it’s not a privation, since it should not the the case that I have a third hand.
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that God could have created. The world is still good! What are you complaining about? Be
thankful that you have a world at all!
I suggest that something like this is true in the case of “bad” thick properties like eco-
nomic injustice and cruelty. I suggest that economic injustice, for example, is not a thick
property. It is the privation of a thick property—in this case, the privation of full economic
justice. Cruelty would be a privation of benevolence, dishonesty a privation of honesty,
and so on.
If we accept that there are no such things as “non-good” thick properties, we can take
out the “good” qualifier from our Answers Account of Reasons*. After all, if there are
no non-good thick properties, then qualifying that the thick property that features in our
account of reasons be a good thick property would be redundant. The result is
Answers Account of Reasons: Reasons are partial correct answers to questions
why an agent should perform an action rather than not, in a particular circum-
stance, with respect to a thick property that the action would promote.
I have just described two ways in which the buck-passing view of thin normative prop-
erties can be reconciled with my view that reasons are essentially constituted by thick nor-
mative properties. These two ways were: micro-holism about normative properties such
that thick properties were also constituted by thin; and a foundationalist view that thick nor-
mative properties were the fundamental constitutent of normative reality. There are virtues
to each approach.
In one sense, the thick properties should be considered the fundamental constituents
of normative reality because they are the fundamental constituents of our normative lives.
Considerations about thick normative property instantiations help us get around in distinct
social contexts. For example, considerations about honor can help people navigate situa-
tions like that of the Wild West or the 19th century Russian military, and considerations
about holiness can help people navigate social situations like those that exist in some sem-
inaries or monasteries. Thin properties are much less able to help us navigate these social
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situations because they lack descriptive content and are therefore determinations of their
distribution could turn out to be more difficult.
However, this is not to say that thin properties are irrelevant to our normative lives. Thin
properties become particularly relevant when thick properties conflict, as they serve the role
of providing a single set of ranking criteria by abstracting from the descriptive content of
the conflicting thick properties. Williams’ Gauguin may have had difficulty deciding be-
tween being loyal to his wife or audaciously sailing to Tahiti, but this difficulty may have
been more easily resolved had Gauguin considered the relative goodness of each action and
chosen the better of the two. If thick normative properties like loyalty and audacity did
have a goodness component such that this component could be isolated in each property
and compared in this way, the result, when combined with the buck-passing account of
goodness and the thick property account of reasons, would be a micro-holism: thick prop-
erties constituted by thin properties like goodness, thin properties constituted by reasons,
and reasons constituted by thick properties.
I myself do not take a stance on which view would best reconcile my thick property
account of reasons with a buck-passing view of thin properties. I do, though, take this to
be a substantially underexplored question worth pursuing in significantly more detail.
5.7 A note on thick properties and normative motivation
I want to end this dissertation with some remarks on normative motivation. Normative
motivation is the branch of moral psychology that studies whether and how our thoughts
that some action is good or bad, right or wrong, or what we ought or ought not to do all
things considered, motivate our ϕ-ing or intending to ϕ or not ϕ, or otherwise feature in our
ϕ-ing or not ϕ-ing. More simply, normative motivation is the study of how our thinking
that we ought to do something relates to our doing it.
Usually this branch of moral psychology is called moral motivation rather than norma-
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tive motivation, but I agree with Rosati that normative motivation is the more accurate term
to describe the study of how thoughts that something is a reason, whether moral or not, can
motivate our actions (Rosati 2006).
I have not discussed normative motivation up to this point, first, because questions of
normative motivation are outside the purview of normative metaphysics, the topic of my
dissertation. Second, normative motivation is conceptually secondary to normative meta-
physics. One could agree with reasons fundamentalists that there are irreducibly normative
truths about the exemplification of the irreducible favoring relation that supervenes on the
non-normative features of the world and ground all normative truths, but also consistently
tell a different story about moral psychology and normative motivation than the one that
Scanlon and the other reasons fundamentalists (Parfit, Enoch) tell. What follows in the next
paragraphs are some remarks to clarify my claim here.
Normative metaphysics is theoretically prior to normative motivation
The fact that the favoring relation has the features that reasons fundamentalists say it does
is consistent with our not being motivated to do anything for reasons at all. Suppose that all
agents were maximally akratic: although they reasoned correctly and came to correct judg-
ments about what they ought to do, these judgments never translated into action–perhaps
because other mental events get in the way; perhaps because, as Frankfurt once described
in a thought experiment, we are all hypnotized in such a way as to neurologically stymie
the realization of any intentions to act that might form (Frankfurt 1988, p. 7).
Secondly, suppose that practical reason itself could never result in correct judgments
about what one ought to do all things considered. Shakespeare offers a helpful description
of what this might be like in this following monologue, spoken by the clinically depressed
Hamlet:
And thus the Native hue of Resolution
Is sicklied o’er, with the pale cast of Thought,
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And enterprises of great pitch and moment,
With this regard their Currents turn awry,
And lose the name of Action. (Shakespeare 2015)
The examples of maximally akratic agents and agents in the tragic grip of a practical
reason that can never generate rational intentions to act reinforce that the question of what
reasons are can be answered, if it can be answered, independently of the question whether
and how these reasons motivate us. In particular, the question of normative motivation
seems to me to be an empirical matter which we would be able to resolve given a the-
ory of normative epistemology—that is, how reasons themselves factor into the formation
and reliability of our beliefs about them. Furthermore, any development of the theory of
normative knowledge is going to require a prior development of the theory of the nature
of reasons. In saying this, I am claiming, as Peacocke does in the case of consciousness
and the first person, that the metaphysics of the favoring relation enjoys explanatory and
theoretical priority over the epistemology of the favoring relation (Peacocke 2014, p. 2).
Since normative motivation is conceptually posterior to normative metaphysics, we are
in a better position to discuss normative motivation now that the normative metaphysics is
done.
Humean and non-Humean normative motivation
Reasons fundamentalism agrees with Humean views in claiming that many of our actions
are motivated by reasons. They differ with Humean views, however, in their stance on
what reasons are, which ultimately generates substantial differences between the Humean
and reasons fundamentalist theories of rational motivation.
On one kind of Humean model of reasons, reasons are primary reasons–that is, belief-
desire pairs.43 When these belief-desire pairs interact in the appropriate way, this inter-
43Davidson uses the term “primary reason” in a somewhat more expansive way, to include all pairs of pro-
attitudes and beliefs–pro-attitudes being a more expansive category than the category of desire. (Davidson
1963, p. 686).
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action, for the Humean, causes an action. Something motivates an agent to do something
just if it “gets” that agent to do that thing, in some way. So reasons, for the Humean, can
motivate their agents to perform actions.
For instance, Smith drinks the petrol. Why did Smith do that? A Humean might answer
that Smith wanted to drink alcohol and he believed that the drink in the glass before himwas
a gin and tonic. Smith’s belief that the liquid was a gin and tonic interacted with Smith’s
desire for alcohol to cause Smith’s action of drinking the liquid in front of him (which in
this case happens, unfortunately for Smith, to be petrol) (Williams 1981, p. 102). Since
Smith’s belief that the liquid was gin, and desire to drink alcohol, “got” Smith to drink the
liquid in front of him, the belief-desire pair motivated Smith to drink the petrol. And since
these belief-desire pairs are reasons, the Humean I am describing has a theory on which
reasons can motivate us to act.
Contemporary Humeans about practical reason then to reject that beliefs constitute rea-
sons. Contemporary Humean Mark Schroeder provides, for example, the following desire-
based (subjectivist) analysis of reasons:
For [some proposition] R to be a reason for [an agent] X to do [action] A is
for there to be some [state of affairs] p such that X has a desire whose object
is p, and the truth of R is part of what explains why X ’s doing A promotes p.
(Schroeder 2007, p. 59)
Schroeder’s subjectivist analysis of reasons makes no reference to beliefs because he wants
to allow for agents to have reasons even in cases where they are ignorant of what their
desires are or how to bring them about. Most of us want to say, for instance, that Lonnie
has reasons to drink water rather than milk when he risks being dehydrated in the desert
(assuming Lonnie desires to be sufficiently hydrated) even if he lacks the belief that milk
will dehydrate him (Railton 1986, pp. 174-175). Schroeder’s analysis allows for the water’s
propensity to hydrate better thanmilk to be a reason for Lonnie to drink the water rather than
the milk: drinking the water promotes Lonnie’s desire for the state of affairs of his being
hydrated to obtain. If Lonnie drinks the milk rather than the water due to his false belief
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that milk better hydrated him, then Lonnie would be motivated by a belief in a proposition
that is not a reason on Schroeder’s analysis: it’s not true that Lonnie’s drinking milk would
hydrate Lonnie, and therefore the proposition that Lonnie’s drinking milk would hydrate
Lonnie cannot feature in an explanation of why drinking milk would promote Lonnie’s
desire to be hydrated. However, Schroeder’s analysis also allows for reasons to motivate
us in the case that we do believe the reason and act accordingly. Water’s propensity to
hydrate Lonnie is a reason for Lonnie to drink water, given Lonnie’s desire to be hydrated.
Therefore, if Lonnie did believe that water hydrated him better than milk, and drank water
on the basis of this consideration, Lonnie would be motivated to drink water for the reason
that water would hydrate Lonnie. So even sophisticated Humean accounts of reasons such
as Schroeder’s account allow for reasons to motivate agents to perform actions.
Reasons fundamentalists tend to agree with the Humean that reasons motivate their
agents to perform actions. But because they disagree with the Humean about what reasons
are, they end up telling a different story as to what this motivation consists in. Scanlon,
for instance, writes that the Humean reduction of reasons to belief-desire pairs “is refuted
by the evident lack of intrinsic normative significance of facts about desires” (Scanlon
2014, p. 7). Scanlon agrees that one’s desire for some state of affairs to obtain can motivate
agents to attempt to bring about that state of affairs, but he argues that the mere existence
of a desire for some state of affairs to obtain does not suffice to provide one with reasons
to bring about that state of affairs.44 Scanlon is also concerned that subjectivist theories
of reasons cannot explain the normativity of one’s reasons to conform one’s actions to the
subjectivist maxim that one ought to do what best promotes one’s desires.
Scanlon’s rejection of the Humean view of the nature of reasons leads Scanlon to hold,
again contrary to the Humean, that one can adequately answer the question of rational mo-
44Scanlon therefore lacks Schroeder’s intuition that “there is a reason for everyone to do what promotes
her desires” (Schroeder 2007, p. 55). Schroeder analyzes this claim as the claim that, for all agents and
actions, if an agent’s doing some action promotes one or more of that agent’s desires, then there is a reason
for that agent to do that action. I also lack this intuition, for what it’s worth, so it is probably too optimistic
for Schroeder to claim that this claim is “obviously true”.
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tivation without referencing desires. He writes,
a rational person who judges there to be compelling reason to do A normally
forms the intention to do A, and this judgment is sufficient explanation of that
intention and of the agent’s acting on it (since this action is part of what such an
intention involves). There is no need to invoke an additional form ofmotivation
beyond the judgment and the reasons it recognizes, some further force to, as it
were, get the limbs in motion. (Scanlon 1998, pp. 33-34)
Scanlon is not denying that desires may play a role in motivation. I think, for instance,
that Scanlon would agree that desires would appear in an adequate explanation of actions
done by people in the grip of extreme passion. These actions, however, would not count as
actions done for reasons.45 And we can give sufficient explanations of actions that agents
do when acting for reasons simply with references to that agent’s judgments about what
that agent has most reason to do.
I would like to compare Scanlon’s viewwith a distinct view of normativemotivation that
one might have. On one view of normative motivation, normative properties motivate us to
action not only through our forming judgments in response to them, but also perceptions of
them. The idea is that, when we see some kids burning a cat, we not only judge the presence
of cruelty but actually see the cruelty.
Tamar Szabo-Gendler has recently argued that, in addition to beliefs, there are more
primitive, belief-like states called aliefs that are representative and behavioral, and that
govern us in cases of instinctual response. If you see a rope, perceive it as being a snake,
and then jump in response, Szabo-Gendler argues that your perception and your jumping
were mediated by the formation and activity of an alief that both represents the rope as a
snake and motivates, in a sub-personal way, your jumping.
45This forms the basis of another argument that the reasons fundamentalist couldmake against theHumean.
Intuitively, someone who commits a violent crime in the grip of passion is motivated by desires. But these
desires do not provide us with reasons to commit crimes. Jones’ desire to control everything about his spouse
does not make his spouse’s having gone out with her friends without telling Jones into a reason for Jones to
hit her. One could simply deny that the motivating mental events in cases of action from extreme passion are
desires. Scanlon and Quinn worry that this approach is unlikely to succeed, since the only say to distinguish
the bona fide desires from the affective attitudes that aren’t would involve appeal to normativity, and therefore
to the notion of a reason (Scanlon 1998, pp. 38-39), (Quinn and Foot 1993, p. 228).
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Aliefs share similarities with mental states that have sometimes been called “besires”.
A besire is a mental state that is both belief-like and desire-like. Besires are belief-like in
that they represent the world as being a certain way, and they are desire-like in that they are
capable of motivating. Although there is no clear consensus on what exactly a besire is in
the literature, besires are usually understood to represent the world at the level of judgment.
Thus besires are less primitive, more sophisticated mental states than aliefs, despite sharing
similarities with them.
Scanlon’s position, expressed in the blockquote above, is that the presence of an agent’s
judgment that X is sufficient reason to do Y provides sufficient explanation as to why that
agent did Y; there is no need to further appeal to any additional form of motivation beyond
the judgment. Scanlon seems to be drawn to this externalism about normative motivation
from a strong conviction that desires do not provide reasons, a conviction that he develops
at length in chapters 1 and 2 of hisWhat We Owe to Each Other.
It is possible to share with Scanlon this conviction that desires do not provide reasons,
but avoid Scanlon’s commitment to the view that judgments alone can motivate. The reason
is simple: the furniture of the mind relevant to motivation includes much more than beliefs,
desires, intentions and actions. It might also include besires and aliefs: states which are not
desires and do not decompose into desires, but yet are affective in nature, making it more
easily comprehensible how such states could “get the limbs in motion”. That Scanlon seems
to fail to consider this possibility may be a consequence of his rejection of Humean theo-
ries of normative motivation, which understand motivation as produced by what Davidson
called a “primary reason”: a belief-desire pair. Scanlon rejects this theory of normative
motivation by refusing to countenance that desires have a role in normative motivation.
But, being immersed in the Humean model which itself recognizes only beliefs and desires
as salient to motivation, Scanlon is left only with judgments to explain action. Enriching
our view of mental states to include aliefs and besires may provide accordingly enriched
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